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Abstract 
For decades economic growth and its determinants have been the centre of 
attention among both theoretical and development economists. Theoretical economists 
have built models of economic growth while development economists are concerned as 
to how low-income countries can catch up with the rich ones, or, worse, become caught 
in a low-income trap.  The persistence of poverty in some countries in the world and the 
failure to catch up has caused social scientists to not only review and debate the sources 
of economic growth but also to take the debate of convergence more seriously and try to 
provide different explanations. 
Neoclassical growth (NCGM) and new growth (NGM) theories, currently the 
main contending schools of thought, try to explain growth sources, and, by extension, 
convergence by focusing on capital accumulation and technological change, 
respectively. However, empirical studies using either model largely ignore the 
importance of institutions, on which there is increasing focus and discussion of 
economic performance, and globalization, which affects the economic welfare of 
countries. Therefore, in this research we try to reopen the debate of convergence 
incorporating these factors in re-estimating the above models. We do this by examining 
convergence for three groups of countries, which are classified by income according to 
the World Bank classification method, and by applying the GMM method to estimate 
the growth models.   
 The results of this research show that the income level of countries is material 
when it comes to both the sources of growth and the speed of convergence. The debate 
over which model (NCGM or NGM) is appropriate is not that meaningful. Each model 
is appropriate for countries at particular levels of income, but not for the entire income 
range.  The NCGM, which is believed to be obsolete by many economists, especially 
those who espouse the NGM, continues to be relevant for many countries of the world. 
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 Testing the convergence hypothesis in terms of GDP per capita shows that 
middle-income countries converge with high-income ones in both models. However, 
this only occurs very slowly in low-income countries. Therefore, we can conclude that 
income convergence is not monotonic and that an income threshold may need to be 
reached before convergence occurs. This shows the existence of a poverty trap. 
 Investigating the role of institutions and globalization and innovation factors 
shows that these factors are the most important drivers of growth for middle-income and 
high-income countries but not for low-income countries. However, the effects of these 
variables were greatest across middle-income countries compared to high-income 
countries, which makes sense for the convergence hypothesis in both classes. 
 Capital accumulation and secondary schooling are the most important drivers for 
low-income countries. This result again alerts us to the existence of an income 
threshold. Being more globalized and having stronger institutions does not work for 
these groups of countries unless they reach a certain level of income. This is consistent 
with the results of other researchers who find that ‘the tide of globalization does not lift 
all boats’. 
  
iv 
Abstrak 
Selama berdekad, pertumbuhan ekonomi dan penentunya menjadi tumpuan di 
antara ahli teori ekonomi dan ahli ekonomi pembangunan. Ahli teori ekonomi telah 
membina model pertumbuhan ekonomi manakala ahli ekonomi pembangunan pula 
prihatin tentang mengapa negara-negara yang berpendapatan rendah boleh mengejar 
golongan yang kaya atau lebih teruk lagi terperangkap dalam perangkap penduduk 
berpendapatan rendah. Kegigihan daripada belenggu kemiskinan di beberapa negara di 
dunia dan kegagalan untuk bersaing telah menyebabkan saintis sosial bukan sahaja 
untuk mengkaji dan membahaskan sumber pertumbuhan ekonomi bahkan turut 
memberi tumpuan yang lebih serius mengenai perdebatan tentang perubahan itu dan 
cuba untuk memberikan penjelasan yang berbeza. 
Pertumbuhan neoklasik (NCGM) dan pertumbuhan teori baru (NGM), aliran 
pemikiran yang utama pada masa kini adalah, berusaha untuk menjelaskan sumber 
pertumbuhan dan mengikut perubahan lanjutan dengan masing-masing memberi 
tumpuan kepada pengumpulan modal dan perubahan teknologi. Walau bagaimanapun, 
kajian empirikal yang menggunakan kedua-dua model sebahagian besarnya 
mengabaikan kepentingan institusi, di mana terdapat tumpuan yang semakin meningkat 
dalam perbincangan prestasi ekonomi, dan globalisasi, yang menjejaskan kebajikan 
ekonomi negara. Oleh itu, di dalam kajian ini kami berusaha untuk membuka semula 
perdebatan tentang perubahan itu dengan menggabungkan faktor-faktor ini dan 
menganggarkan semula model-model di atas. Kami berbuat demikian dengan 
memeriksa perubahan untuk tiga kumpulan negara-negara yang diklasifikasikan oleh 
pendapatan mengikut kaedah klasifikasi Bank Dunia, menggunakan kaedah GMM 
untuk menganggarkan pertumbuhan model. 
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Keputusan kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa tahap pendapatan negara adalah penting 
apabila ia datang kepada kedua-duanya iaitu sumber pertumbuhan dan kelajuan 
perubahan tersebut. Perdebatan ke atas model mana (NCGM atau NGM) yang lebih 
sesuai adalah tidak begitu bermakna. Setiap model adalah bersesuaian bagi setiap 
negara pada peringkat pendapatan tertentu, tetapi bukan untuk keseluruhan julat 
pendapatan. NCGM, yang dipercayai oleh kebanyakan ahli ekonomi, terutama mereka 
yang menyokong NGM, menjadi usang, terus menjadi relevan untuk kebanyakan negara 
di dunia. 
Ujian hipotesis perubahan dari segi KDNK per kapita menunjukkan negara-negara 
berpendapatan sederhana akan berubah menjadi orang yang berpendapatan tinggi dalam 
kedua-dua model. Walau bagaimanapun, perkara ini berlaku amat perlahan di negara-
negara yang berpendapatan rendah. Oleh itu, kita boleh menyimpulkan bahawa 
perubahan pendapatan adalah tidak ekanada dan ambang pendapatan mungkin perlu 
dicapai sebelum perubahan berlaku. Ia menunjukkan kewujudan perangkap kemiskinan. 
Penyiasatan tentang peranan institusi dan globalisasi dan faktor inovasi 
menunjukkan bahawa faktor-faktor ini adalah yang paling penting untuk memacu 
pertumbuhan negara berpendapatan sederhana dan berpendapatan tinggi dan bukannya 
negara-negara berpendapatan rendah. Walau bagaimanapun, kesan daripada 
pembolehubah ini adalah yang terbesar di seluruh negara-negara berpendapatan 
sederhana berbanding dengan negara-negara berpendapatan tinggi bagi hipotesis 
perubahan yang masuk akal dalam kedua-dua kelas ini. 
Pengumpulan modal dan persekolahan menengah adalah perkara yang paling 
penting bagi negara-negara berpendapatan rendah. Keputusan ini sekali lagi 
mengingatkan kita kepada kewujudan ambang pendapatan. Menjadi lebih global dan 
mempunyai institusi yang kuat juga tidak akan berhasil untuk kumpulan negara-negara 
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sebegini melainkan jika mereka mencapai paras pendapatan tertentu. Ini adalah 
konsisten dengan hasil penyelidikan lain yang mendapati bahawa 'arus globalisasi tidak 
boleh mengangkat semua bot'. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
The question of whether poorer countries are converging to the richer ones is an 
important issue in development economics, in general, and growth literature, in 
particular (P Aghion & Howitt, 1998; P. Aghion & P. Howitt, 2006; R. J. Barro, 1991; 
Phelps, 1966; Raiser, Di Tommaso, & Weeks, 2001; J.D. Sachs, 2003). Convergence is 
important for developing countries because of the already wide gap between rich and 
poor countries and because for some of the latter, this gap is increasing.  This process is 
also occurring in most of the development that has global significance.  Such 
development includes increasing the globalization of goods, services, finance, people 
and ideas, as well as accelerating technological change. For a better understanding about 
the debate of convergence it is helpful to have an initial definition of this term from the 
growth literature.  
 
1.1.1 What Does Convergence Mean? 
“Poorer countries can grow at a faster rate than rich countries in terms of GDP 
per capita and reach to the same steady state” provides a general definition for the term 
unconditional convergence from the neoclassical growth theory. In this theory, 
developing countries should grow faster because of the diminishing return to scale, 
especially for capital. However, later on, during the twentieth century, following the 
second industrial revolution, 1860-1865, technological revolution economists started 
thinking about catching up in terms of technology and not GDP per capita, and, 
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therefore, the concepts of frontiers or distance and proximity to frontiers became 
important in the new growth theories. 
 
1.1.2 History of Convergence and the Convergence Debate 
Around 300 hundred years ago, about 1750, the industrial revolution happened 
in England and income started to increase. The pattern spread among European 
countries, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and for two hundred years 
economic growth was sustained and increased in these areas. The source of this growth 
was technology, science, communication, institutions and governance. This increase in 
income affected the lives of around 15 per cent of the people in the world (Spence, 
2011). Outside this circle, the other countries remained poor, and, therefore, great 
divergence happened. However, after World War II, 1945, this growth also started in 
developing countries. Of course, at first, it was not massive and it only happened in 
some isolated countries, however, after a while, it spread to other countries. 
Furthermore, the growth rate became even greater, 7 per cent, compared to industrial 
countries that were around 2 per cent during those 200 years. It seems that after two-
hundred years of what has come to be called “the great divergence”(Pomeranz, 2001), 
convergence has taken over. What caused this shift to occur? Which factors accelerated 
the growth rate in these groups of countries?  The interesting part is that, 
notwithstanding the shift, some countries are still trapped at the low-income level, and 
cannot even catch up with the middle-income countries.  
According to the new growth theories developed by P. Aghion and P. Howitt 
(2006), and C. Jones (1998), technology plays an important role in explaining the 
growth rate of advanced countries and a large proportion of their growth is explained by 
technological change. Furthermore, these classes of theoretical models, which were 
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inspired by Schumpeter, argue that being farther away from technology leaders or 
advanced countries could be a benefit for the developing and undeveloped countries to 
take advantage of this backwardness and grow faster. However, as can be seen in the 
reality, this idea of technology catching up is not working for some low-income 
countries. They are far away from the technology leaders and even though they have 
such an advantage to grow faster they are still in the trap of a low level of income. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The persistence of poverty in several countries in the world, and, therefore, the 
failure of technological catching up and convergence hypothesis, has led to social 
scientists taking the debate of convergence more seriously and encouraged them to 
provide different explanations for this behaviour. While some economists, like Bloom, 
Sachs, Collier, and Udry (1998), explain the failure using geographical reasons, others, 
like R. Nelson (2007) and D. Dollar and Kraay (2004) use the role of institutions and 
globalization, respectively. These explanations can be grouped under different theories 
of economic growth. 
The neoclassical and new growth theories try to explain these differences by 
focusing on capital accumulation and technological change, respectively. However, 
empirical studies in this area, technological catching up and convergence hypothesis, 
largely ignore the importance of institutions and globalization. Therefore, in this 
research we try to reopen the debate of convergence according to these shortcomings in 
empirical studies, and, by applying a new method of estimation, generalized method of 
moments (GMM), re-estimate the models across three different groups of countries that 
are classified by their level of income according to the world classification method.  
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1.2.1 The Importance of Convergence in Economic Development 
The growth rate of countries is one of the most important concerns of 
economists in recent decades, because it is not only about the welfare and level of 
standard of living of people, but it is also about having better political and social 
positions across different countries (Milanovic & Squire, 2005). Taking a look at the 
United States of America (US) could be a good example. Since 1870, the US GDP per 
capita increased almost tenfold until 1990. In contrast, the GDP per capita of Africa for 
the same period only increased threefold. This rapid growth made the US a superpower 
among countries. Recently we can see this kind of rapid growth rate for China and some 
other countries and the political movement among them. Indeed, the growth of 
latecomers like Korea and Taiwan has excited development economists eager to identify 
development “models”.  Indeed, the rise of China, India and other members of the 
BRICs (Brazil and Russia) are shifting the economic balance of power from the so-
called G7.  Therefore, understanding the driving forces of growth is always interesting 
for economists. At the same time, these gaps among developed, undeveloped and 
developing countries have attracted the attention of economists. Studies have attempted 
to determine why some countries are rich while others are poor, and which factors can 
accelerate the growth rate of countries to converge to the development level. Such 
questions raise the concept of convergence. 
Actually, the debate on convergence came into sharp focus when P.M. Romer 
(1986) questioned the neoclassical growth models (NCGM) introduced by Solow 
(1956). Solow’s models raised the convergence concept. He believed that since there is 
a diminishing return to capital and labour, an economy is converging to a unique steady 
state, whether it is higher or lower than the equilibrium capital level. Of course, initially 
it was all about convergence within a country and later it was extended to across 
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countries.  Since this NCGM could not explain the long-run growth path and at the same 
time come to a bigger sample, because of different structures, convergence is not 
happening or in other words countries are heterogeneous in some aspects and so their 
steady state determinants are different.  P. Romer (1991) claimed that this class of 
model is not accurate and he introduced the new growth theory (NGM): endogenous 
growth model.  In this new model, P.M. Romer (1986) questioned two main 
assumptions of the NCGM: first, diminishing returns to capital and labour, and, second, 
exogeneity of technology. By avoiding these two assumptions he could explain the 
endogenous long-run growth of economies. In this model, technology is endogenous, 
countries can grow in the long-run, and, therefore, there is no convergence across 
countries.   
However, empirical evidence in the world shows that convergence is happening 
and those developing countries are accelerating their growth rate and catching up with 
the richer ones. Therefore, Romer’s model also seems to be inadequate. This point is 
helpful to understand the interactions across countries among other dimensions like 
human capital, institutions and so on. At the same time, Solow’s assumption that 
countries with similar economic structures should converge to the same steady state has 
also not been borne out in the real world.  This was the beginning of the convergence 
debate, which created different concepts, methodologies and factors.  
One area of development is to refine the specification of models through the 
inclusion of new variables in growth models to control the steady state growth path of 
different countries.  Thus, N. G. Mankiw, D. Romer, and D. N. Weil (1992) introduced 
the augmented Solow model to the literature, and, by adding human capital to the 
growth model, claimed that 80% of cross country income differences can be explained 
by this model. Meanwhile, economists like Redek and Sušjan (2005), F. Caselli, G. 
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Esquivel, and F. Lefort (1996); Easterly and Levine (1997); Nandakumar, Batavia, and 
Wague (2004) , and Pomeranz (2001) argue that capital per capita (physical and human) 
can only account for a proportion of differences in output per worker, and, instead, 
changes in total factor productivity or technological changes can explain the huge 
difference.  Therefore, total factor productivity (TFP) became the engine behind long-
run growth across countries.  
In addition, the endogenous growth model makes it possible to explain these 
differences by endogenizing technology, stock of knowledge, through different 
channels. Economists have conducted much research in this area concerning through 
which channels technology can affect TFP, and, finally, growth. Human capital is one 
of the important channels through which technology can affect growth. Economists like 
Lucas (1988), pioneered applying human capital in a different way than just investment 
in education, like the effect of learning by doing through human capital on growth.  By 
introducing these spillover effects, other economists tried to contribute to the growth 
literature by incorporating other factors that can effect growth through human capital, 
such as R&D, technology transfers or imitation, trade and innovation (Eberhardt & 
Teal, 2010; J. Ha & P. Howitt, 2007; Harris, 2011; Madsen, 2008).  
As can be seen, studies about conditional convergence produced different 
important issues that can be important for growth literature. First, by studying 
conditional convergence, new stylized facts about growth across several countries can 
be produced. Second, undertaking research about convergence highlights the 
significance of changing technology across countries, and, therefore, develops new 
methodologies and also factors for quantification of these differences. The results of 
such quantification are very important since they create different technology based 
models, and, like the current study, can also be a motivation to contribute to the 
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literature by applying them in different theories like the neoclassical model. 
Furthermore, choosing convergence as the criterion to give validity to growth models 
makes this debate more important. Researchers have argued that by testing the 
convergence hypothesis the validity of the model can be approved. This argument has 
introduced many different methods, models, and concepts, to the growth literature. 
 
1.2.2 Cases of Successful Convergence and the Debate on Causes 
To make the concept of convergence clear, first we take a look at some 
successful countries in this process and explain how they have escaped from the low-
income trap and catch up with the rich ones. Later we extend it across other countries 
and test the convergence hypotheses based on two-definitions highlighted in this study 
by employing two growth models.  
One good example is Korea, which joined the OECD countries in 1996 (Figure 
1-1). In 1965, its GDP per capita was around USD1,351 and although during 18 years 
this amount doubled and reached USD3,709 the distinction between OECD and Korea 
remained. 
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Figure 1-0-1: GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) dispersion between OECD countries and Korea 
 
Note: Author’s calculations 
 
However, around 1996, its GDP per capita accelerated and rose to USD10,119 
and, therefore, caught up with the OECD countries, and, finally, Korea joined this 
group. Other countries that can also be named as successful in the process of catching 
up include China and India.  
Figure 1-0-2: GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) dispersion across OECD countries, Korea, India, 
China, Brazil and Low-income countries. 
 
Note: Author’s calculations 
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The interesting thing about China is that, around 1965, its GDP per capita was 
approximately USD100 lower than India, which was around USD192 (Figure 1-2).  
However, by late 1980, when some countries agreed to have more liberalized economies 
in order to became more prosperous, as figure 1-2 shows, China accelerated its growth 
rate and it rose to USD2,425 in 2010 even with the Asian crisis in 1997-98. However, 
India could not catch up with the developed countries as fast as China or Korea.  
We can extend this question to other countries in the middle-income and low-
income groups as well. Why do these countries not accelerate their growth rate to catch 
up and converge with the developed one? Why does poverty persist in some low-
income countries? For instance, in the case of Africa, during the period 1965-1990, on 
average, the growth rate of GDP per capita was 0.2 per cent while, in East Asia and the 
Pacific the growth rate of GDP per capita was around five per cent (Easterly & Levine, 
1997).  This poverty persists in African countries in the sense that the levels of income 
in the 1990s were the same as in 1970. This empirical evidence of persistence of 
poverty in poor countries, on the one hand, and the catching up of some countries with 
the developed ones, on the other hand, attracted the attention of economists to 
investigate the factors and policies that can affect growth in these countries. This 
evidence raises many questions about convergence.  Were those countries that were 
more successful endowed with better conditions in the beginning?  Were there factors 
special to these countries that could grow fast?  Was it luck?  Was it history?  Were 
there factors that were favourable to growth? Of course, we can say that a part of this 
debate is ideological, whether it is the market or the state? However, since this is not the 
concern of this study we open this part for further research. 
 
10 
1.2.3 Analysis of Convergence through Growth Models 
Convergence has been analysed from both a qualitative and quantitative 
perspective. Qualitative discussions are framed in terms of poverty and overcoming 
barriers to its reduction. Quantitative analysis has been largely based on growth models.  
Yet, from the perspective of growth models, convergence is an important but not the 
primary objective of investigation, which is to explain why and how economic growth 
occurs. Researchers use growth models to examine the convergence hypothesis, 
classifying them by type as a basis for comparison, such as unconditional convergence 
vs. conditional convergence, income convergence vs. total factor productivity (TFP) 
convergence, and global convergence vs. club convergence, etc. Therefore, estimating 
convergence equations and the factors that contribute to convergence has become 
increasingly popular and convergence or the ability to catch up economically became 
the criterion to assess which class of growth models is valid. One of the purposes of this 
research is to test whether these different growth model types are mutually exclusive, 
and, hence, whether the existing judgment of their validity, convergence hypothesis, is 
appropriate. To do so, different growth models and the determinants of growth should 
be explained.  
Growth models have developed over time. The neoclassical exogenous growth 
model (NCGM), which was introduced by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), was 
pioneered in testing the convergence hypothesis. However, subsequently, because of the 
shortcomings of this model according to empirical evidence, P.M. Romer (1986) talked 
about the endogenous growth model (NGM), which consists of a newer version of the 
NCGM as well as the evolutionary growth model of Schumpeter and others. The NGM 
was expanded by C. Jones (1998) in the R&D based model, and P Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) who talked about the importance of R&D intensity instead of inputs and distance 
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to frontiers. However, at the same time, the Schumpeterian framework ran parallel to 
the neoclassical models. 
In each of these classes, the channel that brings growth is different. The NGM 
studies focused more on catch up technologically, by working more on factors that can 
increase total factor productivity as a source of growth rather than factor accumulation, 
which is important in NCGM. This is because researchers recognize the limits of factor 
accumulation in the efforts of countries to achieve catch-up growth.  At the same time, 
economists like Redek and Sušjan (2005) supported that most of the differences in 
growth rates across countries could be explained by total factor productivity. In these 
models, innovation and R&D play a crucial role on productivity growth (J. Ha & P. 
Howitt, 2007; Kortum, 1998; Madsen, 2008; Segerstrom, 1998).   
In addition, economists like N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992), in their augmented 
Solow model, explained the cross country income variations by physical and human 
capital accumulation, and not technology change, which was supported by Pääkkönen 
(2010) . 
How and through which channels technology and factor accumulation can affect 
growth in the new growth model and neoclassical model, respectively, are two 
important questions in growth literature.  
One of the variables that play a crucial role in both NCGM and NGM literature 
is human capital. However, the way that these two theories look at this factor is 
different.  In the neoclassical growth models, human capital is entered into the 
production function as another advantage of capital, which can affect growth, while in 
the new growth theories it is a source of technological change and technology transfer, 
which can effect growth through different channels, such as innovation, imitation, R&D 
activities and international trade.  
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In this research, since in the new growth literature, the existing literature 
emphasizes innovation and imitation as sources of growth, we try to look at the 
neoclassical growth model by reopening the debate of the accumulation of human 
capital through these channels.  
In addition, we argue that even with a proper definition for the human capital 
variable, existing explanations in NGM ignore several important factors.  We postulate 
that globalization and institutions are accelerators of innovation and imitation rate that 
need to be included into the new growth model. Without having proper institutions in a 
country, people do not feel secure to innovate. In addition, we should not ignore the role 
of globalization as a factor that helps to transfer technology to countries far from 
technology leaders. Because trade is not only the flow of goods but also the flow of 
ideas, it can be very important for improving the imitation rate in developing and 
undeveloped countries. Similarly, the NCGM omit important variables. We contribute 
to the literature by deriving the neoclassical regression equation by incorporating new 
aspects of growth, imitation and innovation through human capital into the neoclassic 
growth model.  
This research explores the convergence hypothesis by focusing on the two types 
of growth model mentioned above by applying a panel dataset. One is allocated to the 
new growth model and the other is for the neoclassical growth model (NCGM).  
By pursuing the above approach, we want to answer two questions 
simultaneously. First, which class of growth model can explain the different growth 
rates across countries and for which did the convergence occur. Second, as two 
important factors, what are the roles of institutions and globalization, for which, 
according to the literature, their effect is still not clear. This research contributes to the 
literature by looking at these factors in both the neoclassical and new growth models, 
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and shows the effect of these factors by considering the assumptions that are important 
for each of the classes. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The above broad review of economic growth raises several research questions that 
this study will try to answer: 
1. Do countries with a low and middle level of income converge to the income 
level of high-income countries in terms of GDP per capita?  
2. Is convergence the criterion to show the validity of different growth models?  
3. Which class of model is accurate to explain the different growth rates across 
low-income, middle-income and high-income countries? Neoclassical or 
endogenous models? Factor accumulation (neoclassical view) or technology 
change (endogenous view)? 
4. Does globalization speed up the process of convergence in poor countries?  
5. Do institutional factors affect the growth rate and accelerate the convergence 
process? (Governance indicators) 
To answer the foregoing questions, the research will study the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of growth and convergence theories. For testing the convergence 
hypothesis we have to briefly discuss the theories of economic growth that form the 
foundation of convergence. Therefore, the thesis will study different theories of growth 
including the neoclassical and endogenous models. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
Given the questions posited above, the research objectives of this study will be: 
1. To examine which class of growth model can better explain the different 
growth rates across these three groups of countries. 
2. To measure the speed of convergence based on the factor accumulation 
(neoclassical model) and technology change (endogenous model) models in three 
groups of countries (conditional β- convergence). 
3. To measure the speed of convergence in each dimension of technology 
based on the new growth model (φ convergence). 
4. To examine the effect of globalization in the three groups of countries 
using two different growth models, through human capital accumulation and 
technology spillovers. 
5. To test the effect of institutions in three groups of countries using two 
different growth models, through human capital accumulation and technology 
spillovers. 
 
1.5  Structure of Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter will explain the 
theoretical background of economic growth and convergence, focussing on the models 
used in the study and a review of previous literature about different growth theories and 
different convergence concepts. The third chapter reopens the debate of technology 
spillovers from the innovation and imitation perspectives and builds the models that are 
going to be tested in the current study.  The fourth chapter reviews the empirical studies 
that have been conducted to test convergence based on the method that they used. 
Chapter five discusses the role of human capital, institutions and globalization on the 
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growth and convergence process in greater detail by reviewing the empirical studies that 
have been done in these fields. The sixth chapter addresses the definitions and 
measurements, controlling variables, research hypothesis, sample, model specifications 
and the method used for testing the model. Chapter seven presents the results of 
convergence in each group. Finally, the conclusions, limitations and possible 
contributions will be presented. 
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2 Chapter 2 
Theoretical Background of Growth Models 
2.1 Introduction 
A key question for many developing countries is: do developing countries tend to 
converge with the developed ones? Does the growth in high-income countries affect the 
growth in low-income countries in an affirmative way? Does growth in high-income 
countries eventually slow down? What are the sources affecting lung-run growth in 
countries? What does history have to say about convergence and growth?  
As we can see in figure 2-1, the gap between high-income countries and middle 
and low-income countries was at its highest point in the late 1980s, which was not 
unexpected because of the oil shock, which happened during 1970, followed by global 
recession in the early 1980s. However after this period, the growth rate was boosted, 
especially in middle-income countries, and of course, in low-income countries, albeit at 
a lower rate, and this growth rate passed even from high-income countries growth rate 
in late 1990s. What causes these differences in growth rate across countries to occur? Is 
it an automatic force or does it depend on several variables like institutions, the policies 
implemented in each economy, their level of human capital and so on? Why could 
middle-income countries catch up with the rich ones while low-income countries could 
not?  
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Figure 2-1: The growth trend of low-income, middle-income and high-income economies 
 
Note: GDP per capita growth rate, (1950-2011): The growth trend in low-, middle- and high-income 
economies. Author’s calculation from World Bank database (2011). 
To answer the foregoing questions, the next section describes the concepts of 
convergence in their general form. Section 3 is about the history of growth models and 
the implications of convergence based on these different classes of growth model. 
Section 4 is the summary and conclusion.  
 
2.2 General concepts of convergence 
            Hume and Tucker (1974) were the economists who pioneered the debate of 
convergence from the mid-eighteenth century.  They had two different views; Hume 
believed that there is a tendency across countries to converge with rich ones, while 
Tucker believed in the persistence of disparity among countries. After 1820, economists 
became more interested in these disparities because of the great divergence that 
happened around the world. described the main contention of the “convergence 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Low income growth trend Middle income growth trend
High income growth trend Poly. (Low income growth trend)
Poly. (Middle income growth trend) Poly. (High income growth trend)
18 
hypothesis”: ‘Under certain conditions, being behind gives a productivity laggard the 
ability to grow faster than the early leader’Krueger and Berg (2003).  
Later economists divided the concept of convergence into two categories: Micro 
and Macro convergence. R. J. Barro (1991), Rassekh and Thompson (1993), and 
O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson (1996) defined the concept of micro convergence as 
“income of identical factors across countries will equalize based on the factor price 
equalization theory under the Heckscher-Ohlin model”. The second concept is macro 
convergence, which focused on aggregate factors like per capita income and 
productivity. Of course, since these aggregate variables are the weighted average of 
factor price, there is a relationship between the micro and macro concepts. The macro 
convergence supporters argued that economies tend to converge in terms of per capita 
income and productivity over time. These theoretical concepts of convergence need to 
be operationally defined: 
 
2.2.1 β Convergence and δ Convergence 
There are two concepts of convergence – “β convergence” and “σ convergence” 
– which were introduced by R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995). β convergence 
applies when the speed of convergence is faster across poor countries (R. J. Barro & X. 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Further, they subdivided the “β convergence” concept into 
conditional and absolute β convergence. In absolute β-convergence, it assumes that the 
only difference in growth rates amongst countries is reliant on their initial levels of 
capital. However, in conditional β-convergence some variables are added to the model 
to control the differences among economies and, therefore, convergence appear under 
some conditions.  
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The other concept is “δ convergence”. If the differences between incomes per 
capita of countries decrease over time it indicates δ convergence. One way to test δ 
convergence is to measure the standard deviation of GDP per capita amongst countries 
over a specific period. If the value of standard deviation in a sample becomes smaller it 
means that countries decreased the gap that existed among their income per capita. 
Otherwise, there is no convergence. 
 
2.2.2 Club Convergence versus Global Convergence 
The other concept is club convergence versus global convergence. The pioneer 
who focused on this concept was Baumol (1986), who argued the concept of “club 
convergence”. In this concept countries are divided into two groups based on their 
growth rate: countries that have lower and countries that have higher growth rates. 
Those countries that have middle ranges are going to merge with each of these groups 
depending on the rate of the immigrants that they have in each group. Therefore, 
countries in each group experience growth or stagnation (Boldrin & Canova, 2001). 
Quah (1996), and Ben-David and Papell (1994), in their research also supported the 
existence of club convergence.  
 
2.2.3 Income Convergence versus TFP Convergence 
The initial studies based on the neoclassical growth models focused more on the 
concept of convergence in terms of income, because the important matter in those 
classes of models was capital deepening and nothing else. However, with the emergence 
of new growth theories, economies started thinking about catching up in terms of 
technology, and, since total factor productivity (TFP) was the closest measure for 
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technology, the economies started studying whether or not countries are closing their 
gap in terms of the level of TFP.  
To have a better understanding of the concept of convergence, here we test the 
absolute or unconditional convergence in terms of GDP per capita and productivity for 
the sample of low-income, middle-income and high-income countries. 
Figures 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 indicate the result of absolute β convergence across 
low-income, middle-income and high-income countries, respectively, for the period 
1996 and 2010.  
Figure 2-2 shows that there is a positive relationship between the growth rate 
and initial level of GDP per capita and also productivity across low-income countries 
during the period, and, therefore, there is no convergence. However, the slope of fitted 
value is sharper in testing convergence in terms of productivity. 
Figure 2-2: Convergence across low-income Countries in terms of GDP per 
capita and productivity, 1996–2010. 
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Note: Author’s calculation from World Bank database (2011). 
 
However, in figure 2-3 for middle-income countries, the slope of curves 
becomes negative but not that sharp to support absolute convergence. This means that 
countries tried to reduce the gap between their incomes. 
Figure 2-3: Convergence Middle-income Countries in terms of GDP per capita and productivity, 1996–
2010 
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Note: Author’s calculation from World Bank database (2011). 
 
Finally, in figure 2-4, the absolute convergence is tested across high-income 
countries. As can be seen, there is a strong negative relationship between initial GDP 
per capita and the growth rate of GDP, while in terms of productivity it is exactly the 
opposite, the relationship is positive. This means that unconditional convergence is not 
happening across high-income countries in terms of productivity. 
Figure 2-4: Convergence across high-income Countries in terms of GDP per 
capita and productivity, 1996–2010 
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Note: Author’s calculation from World Bank database (2011). 
 
Although the convergence hypothesis will be tested in detail in the next chapter, 
these graphs help to give a perspective about the convergence hypothesis.  
The second concept is δ convergence. Figure 2-5 shows the δ convergence in three 
groups of countries.  
Figure 2-5: GDP per capita dispersion in the high-income, Middle-income and low-income countries, 
1980-2010 
 
Note: Standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP per capita. Author’s calculation from World Bank 
database (2011). 
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As can be seen, across low-income countries, there is no trend to reduce the gaps 
between their incomes per capita; however, across high-income and middle-income 
countries δ convergence can be seen. 
 
2.3 Growth Models and Convergence  
Since one of the purposes of this study is to compare two models of growth 
together, in the next section exogenous and endogenous growth models are defined and 
the concepts of convergence based on each model are discussed in detail. 
 
2.3.1 Exogenous Growth Models and the Concept of Convergence 
Quantitative growth models have had over half a century of history.  In the early 
studies, economists believed that physical capital was the main factor for explaining 
growth in countries. Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946), for the first time in their famous 
model, showed the effect of capital on growth. In their model, society is divided into 
two groups: firms and households. The increase in production capacity and aggregate 
demand are the two main sources for forming capital. In their model, fluctuation of the 
whole production is related to physical capital accumulation. As it is assumed the 
capital is rising in proportion to labour; production is carried out in a fixed proportion of 
labour and capital. However, an uneven rapid growth rate in some countries showed that 
physical capital could not explain the whole fluctuation in growth, which led to the 
eventual emergence of neoclassical growth models. 
Most of the modern growth models came from the studies done by Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956). In their model, they assumed that there is diminishing return to capital 
and labour. The prediction of convergence is derived primarily from this assumption. 
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Constant returns to scale 1  and Inada conditions 2  are other assumptions that they 
assumed in their model. While some economists believed that assuming these 
assumptions causes the results to be unrealistic, Solow (1956) argued that if the 
assumptions that are used in research do not lead to the right results, they are not wrong. 
The results showed that policies, which were assumed to be able to change the long-run 
growth patterns, could not be effective since they could only affect the short-run growth 
rate. The results of their study also asserted that exogenous factors like savings rate, 
technological progress and the growth rate of population could affect the growth rate of 
an economy (Solow, 1956). Their theory, now referred to as the neoclassical growth 
theory, states that, in the long-run, only technological change and population, which are 
exogenous, can affect growth (Solow, 1956). Furthermore, in the long-run, economies 
are leaning towards zero in their steady state. Therefore, it can be seen that in this 
model, the rate of long-run growth is determined totally by exogenous factors and that it 
does not depend on other factors like saving rate and policies (R. J. Barro & X. Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). 
The steady state for the country is determined by its rate of saving, depreciation 
and population growth; if countries have a different steady state, there is no tendency 
for convergence among them. Therefore, the only thing that can affect the growth rate in 
the long-run, as said before, is the rate of exogenous technological progress. 
Hence, according to the neoclassic growth theory, two equations are important 
in analysing growth: production function equation (2-1) and accumulation equation (2-
5). The factors in Cobb-Douglas production function can be summarized into two items: 
physical capital K (t) and effectiveness of labour𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡 . Then the production function 
takes the form as below: 
                                                 
1 -“ A production function exhibits constant returns to scale if changing all inputs by a positive proportional factor has the effect of 
increasing outputs by that factor.” 
2 - “are assumptions about the shape of a production function that guarantee the stability of an economic growth path in a 
neoclassical growth model” 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 
∝(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1−∝   0<α<1      (2-1) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is output, Kt is physical capital, At is technology, Lt is labour, α is capital 
share so there is diminishing return to capital. L and A assumes growth at an exogenous 
rate according to the following functions: 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿0𝑒
𝑛𝑡   (Simply normalize 𝐿0 to unity)    (2-2) 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡          (2-3) 
Considering the constant return to scale assumption, the intensive form of production 
function is as follows: 
𝑦?̂? = ?̂?𝑡
𝛼          (2-4) 
Where, ?̂?=K/AL and ?̂?=Y/AL. One of the assumptions in the neoclassical model is to 
consider that the economy is closed. Therefore, when a country reaches to its steady 
state, equilibrium happens and so saving and investment would be equal. Therefore, a 
change in capital during time is determined by the following equation (accumulation 
equation): 
𝑘?̇? = 𝑠?̂?𝑡
𝛼 − (δ+  g +  n)?̂?𝑡        (2-5) 
Where s is saving rate, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, n is the constant growth rate 
of the population and g is the growth rate of technology (R. Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
2004) 
In the steady state the accumulation of capital is constant; therefore, we have: 
𝑘∗ = [
𝑠
(𝑛+𝑔+𝛿)
]1/(1−𝛼)         (2-6) 
Insert this equation into (2-4), the equilibrium effective per output equation is as 
follows: 
𝑦∗ = (
𝑠
(𝑛+𝑔+𝛿)
)
𝛼
1−𝛼⁄          (2-7) 
Taking logarithm from equation (2-7): 
ln(𝑦∗) =
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln 𝑠 −
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)      (2-8) 
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Since there are no data for the effective per income equation, the equation should be 
transferred back to a per capita income form. We had ?̂? = Y/AL, therefore, by taking 
logarithm, we have: 
Ln(?̂?) = Ln(Y) - Ln (L) – Ln (A)       (2-9) 
          =Ln(y) - Ln (A)                                                                                    (2-10) 
Then taking logarithm from equation (2-3) and substituting it in equation (2-10), 
Ln(?̂?)= Ln(y)- Ln(𝐴0) – gt                                                                         (2-11) 
And, finally, we have: 
ln[𝑦∗] = 𝑙𝑛𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡 +
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑠) − ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)               (2-12) 
This equation is for the level of per capita income, Where 𝐴0 reflects country specific 
factors, such as climate and culture (N. G. Mankiw et al., 1992). For deriving a model 
for growth of income per capita, we linearize the transition growth path, and we assume 
the country is sufficiently close to its steady state so linearization is appropriate. 
𝑑𝐿𝑛𝑦?̂?
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆( 𝐿𝑛?̂?∗ − 𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑡)                  (2-13) 
Where 𝜆 = (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛼) is speed of convergence. Now we want an equation to 
treat it like a regression equation. We integrate equation (2-13) from yt to y0: 
Ln( ?̂?𝑡 ) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)𝐿𝑛(?̂?∗) + (𝑒−𝜆𝑡) ln ?̂?0                  (2-14) 
Where ?̂?∗is the steady state for output per effective worker and let 𝑦𝑜 be the initial level 
of output, therefore, we have to transfer it to the format of per worker by using equation 
(2-11). Therefore, we have: 
𝐿𝑛 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0 = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)𝑔 + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)ln (𝐴0) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)𝐿𝑛(𝑦∗) + (𝑒−𝜆𝑡) ln 𝑦0
                     (2-15)  
And by substituting 𝐿𝑛(𝑦∗) by its amount in equation (2-15):  
Ln( 𝑦𝑡 – 𝑦0) =  (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)𝑔 + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)ln (𝐴0) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑛(𝑠) +
(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑛(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) − (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡) ln 𝑦0                   (2-16) 
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A more general form of equation, which is used in empirical panel studies, is: 
 Ln( 𝑦𝑡,𝑖 – 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) − 𝛾 ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 +
 𝜑𝑡                               (2-17) 
Where 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡 are time specific and country specific effects and β1, β2 and γ 
are parameters to be estimated. By equation (2-17), which is from the Solow-Swan 
model, the link between the growth model and convergence becomes clear. As we can 
see the speed of convergence ( 𝛾) is dependent on the initial level of income and the 
structural parameter of neoclassical growth model, which is what economists like R. J. 
Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), and N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) called conditional 
convergence. When an economy starts with a level of capital per unit of effective labour 
lower than the steady state, the level of capital monotonically increases to its steady-
state value. This means that the growth rate decreases monotonically. Since output 
varies with the capital, the growth rate of production also declines monotonically when 
the level is below its steady state level. In other words, poor countries grow faster than 
rich countries, on the assumption that both have the same technologies and preferences, 
until they converge to the same steady state. 
 
2.3.2 Endogenous Growth Models and the Concept of Convergence 
For the period after World War II, empirical studies showed that the neoclassical 
model is incapable of explaining the differences across growth rates of countries. 
Economists believed that by taking technological progress as an endogenous factor, 
each country’s growth rate can be determined.  Therefore, attempts to endogenize 
technology started. The only problem that this class of model faced was about the 
assumption of increasing return in a general equilibrium framework rather than 
decreasing return, which was the fundamental assumption of the neoclassical model. In 
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other words, according to the Walrasian theory of general equilibrium, all factors must 
be paid their marginal products. However, according to the Euler theory on assuming 
increasing return, all factors cannot be paid their marginal products. Therefore, 
something beyond the Walrasian theory should be found. 
 Arrow (1962) made the initial study that tried to endogenize technology into the 
growth models. He assumed that the growth rate of technological progress is a result of 
commodities produced by labour based on their experience. In other words, the 
technology can be affected by “learning by doing”. This means that labour productivity 
is endogenous. The important point here, in this model, is to assume that the learning 
factor is free for all firms, with no cost, like public commodity. The problem with 
Arrow’s model was that the model only works when the ratio for capital-labour is fixed. 
That means in the long-run the growth rate is limited to labour growth rate, and, 
therefore, the saving rate does not play a role and the model is not dependent on saving 
behaviour, like the Solow model. 
Another person who tried to endogenize technology was Nordhaus (1969), who 
made an assumption of an economy based on the neoclassical framework except for 
knowledge production. Capital and labour produce output through an aggregate 
production function. What makes his model different from the previous ones is that it 
integrates an invention factor into the economic analysis. In general, invention means 
the activities that can expand the level of technology. As opposed to the “Schumpeter 
tradition”, which believed that invention is an exogenous factor in an economy, 
Nordhaus (1969) believed that there is a relationship between invention and economic 
activities. He equated the rate of technology as an increasing function of the number of 
innovations produced, and, therefore, he endogenized technology in his model. He 
generated some new twists for the new model of invention. He took invention as a 
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variable that is produced in the system as a new production process. Invention is 
regarded as a public commodity and available for any firm without costs. In practice, 
the inventor can keep his invention as a secret for a specific period of time but after this 
period, his monopoly is relinquished and it is free to be used by any other firm. 
However, in the Nordhaus model, just as Arrow’s model, the growth rate cannot be 
sustained without accounting for population growth because of the assumption of 
increasing returns. Economists like Hicks (1963) also introduced “invention possibility 
set” models and Kennedy (1964), Samuelson (1965) and von Weizsäcker (1966) 
followed suit and fully collaborated their findings. Uzawa (1965) studied the “optimal 
education” model and emphasized the role of an educated labour force as an input in the 
production function, and analysed the optimal growth path. However, all these models 
faced the problem of increasing return. They could not answer the question of how the 
economy would compensate activities to make technology grow when there is an 
increase in returns and endogeneity of technology. 
 
2.3.2.1 First Generation of Endogenous Growth Models 
According to the neoclassical growth model, technological progress is an 
exogenous factor and is the only factor that can permanently affect growth rate in the 
long-run, while other permanent shocks like change in human capital; saving rate and 
population have a temporary effect on growth.  However, P.M. Romer (1986) argued 
that this assumption is not reliable since it does not explain how or why technological 
progress occurs. Therefore, to answer these questions of new growth theories, 
endogenous growth models were introduced. P.M. Romer (1986) lumped physical 
capital from saving and intellectual capital from technology together, therefore it can 
offset the effect of diminishing returns. In these models technological progress is an 
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endogenous factor of economic growth and the heart of growth that is determined by the 
growth process through the accumulation of workers employed in knowledge-producing 
activities. In other words, growth is explained by technological progress and 
technological progress is the outcome of optimizing firms and individuals undertaking 
investigation in R&D and schooling. The production function of ideas is the source of 
growth. The parameters in the idea production function show whether innovation 
through R&D can affect growth permanently or temporary. As can be seen, in the 
endogenous theory, the role of human capital is important since it is a source of 
knowledge and knowledge is directly related to technological progress. Furthermore, 
human capital is a source for creating different new products and is also the only source 
that can inherit knowledge from past generations.  In the endogenous growth models the 
long-run growth is accrued because of the accumulation of knowledge. Knowledge, as 
P. Romer (1991)  said, is a basic form of capital, which changes the nature of the 
aggregate growth model.  He believed that “an economy with a large total stock of 
human capital will experience faster growth”. Therefore, he explained that growth is not 
happening in underdeveloped countries, because of the low level of human capital and 
that less developed countries have less growth because of their large population. In 
these models, there is a positive relationship between the level of R&D and productivity 
growth(P. Aghion & Howitt, 1997; P. Romer, 1991). An increase in the size of 
population will increase researchers in the R&D sector, which increases activities, and, 
ultimately, increases productivity.  
The important point in these new models is the role of increasing returns as 
opposed to diminishing returns in neoclassic models. Knowledge and other inputs, as a 
function of production of goods, have increasing marginal product. The presence of 
externalities and increasing returns in producing new knowledge introduce a very 
competitive equilibrium growth model. The existence of equilibrium is dependent on 
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the externalities. Even without the condition of increasing returns, equilibrium will 
coexist with externalities. The increasing return to knowledge is necessary to ensure that 
the consumption and utility do not grow too fast. The important item here, which makes 
this model different from the older one is the assumption of increasing marginal 
productivity of the intangible capital good knowledge (P.M. Romer, 1986) 
 P.M. Romer (1986), in his study, following the Maddison database 1979 
(Maddison, 1979) for emphasizing the role of knowledge, showed that there is no 
relationship between the initial income per capita and the growth rate of a country. He 
indicated that output per person has increasing returns relative to the growth rate of the 
technology leader. He believed that technology came from innovation and innovation is 
directly related to the rate of scientific progress. In addition, economic activities and 
decisions can also affect technological progress. For example, one of the factors that can 
affect technological progress is research and the development sector, which occurs 
through economic policies that can affect competition, trade and education. He selected 
eleven industrialized countries and showed that the growth rates of these countries are 
higher than the previous decade by 0.85 for Sweden and 0.81 for Norway. Furthermore, 
in 22 developed economies he found a positive relationship between the growth rate of 
output and the number of scientists and engineers who are employed in research. Today, 
his approach is known as the AK model. The simplest form of AK model mentioned is 
the Cobb-Douglass production function: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼                   (2-18) 
In the AK model, α is equal to one, therefore, the equation is remodelled to this form: 
Y=AK                     (2-19) 
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Where A represents the level of technology, which is a positive amount, and, here, K 
includes human and physical capital. Therefore, this makes the absence of diminishing 
returns more realistic. As said before, in the neoclassical model the fundamental 
equation is as follows, which depends solely on K: 
?̇? = 𝑠. 𝑓(𝑘) − (𝑛 + δ). 𝐾                  (2-20) 
The growth rate of k is driven by division of both sides by k:  
?̇?
𝑘⁄ = 𝑠.
𝑓(𝑘)
𝑘
− (𝑛 + δ)                  (2-21) 
By substituting f (k)/k= A in equation (2-21), then the following equation results in: 
F (k)/k=s.A-(n+δ)                   (2-22) 
This shows the growth rate of K. This equation shows that growth can happen 
even without technological change. Moreover, growth is not only dependent on 
technological change, but can also be affected by parameters in the model like the 
savings rate and population growth. Except for diminishing returns, this is one of the 
main differences between the neoclassical models and endogenous ones.  
The other difference concerns the prediction of convergence; in the endogenous growth 
models of P.M. Romer (1986), there is no convergence at all at any level of y, which is 
contrary to what neo-classical models predicted about convergence.  As said by Solow 
(1956), “the speed of convergence is determined by:   
λ= (1 -α). (g+ n +δ)                   (2-23) 
In the AK models α=1, the share of capital in the Cobb-Douglas function, therefore, 
when λ is equal to zero, it means that there is no convergence, and it does not matter 
whether the country is poor or rich. 
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After P.M. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) was another economist who had a 
significant effect on endogenous growth models.  The model that Lucas developed was 
a two-sector model that emphasized the role of education on growth, assuming that 
population growth and all the other factors were endogenous. He divided capital into 
two categories: one is physical capital that is accumulated in production and produced 
by the technology of consumption good and the other kind of capital is human capital 
that increases productivity on its own and is produced by a different technology. Human 
capital here has increasing marginal returns and creates endogenous growth. He 
believed that a labour force with high education is able to learn faster than one without 
high education. The importance of human capital came from the idea that the formation 
of the next generation of human capital is affected by earlier generations. He believed 
that every unit of human capital produces new units of human capital. Lucas believed 
that human capital has a positive effect on growth. In his model, the first sector is for 
the production of output and the second sector is for the production of new human 
capital. Therefore, if one ignores the positive external effects of human capital, 
endogenous growth can only be possible if there are constant or increasing marginal 
returns to human capital accumulation. This model, just as Romer’s model (1986), 
predicts no convergence and there is no decline in the growth rate of developed 
countries. Economists like Scott (1991) supported this idea and showed that there has 
been no tendency of a decline in the productivity growth rate in the US, United 
Kingdom and Japan in the last thirty years.  
During the second half of the twentieth century, some empirical studies 
indicated that some countries have been converging to the same steady state; however, 
these results were not consistent with the first generation of endogenous theory in which 
there is no convergence for countries in terms of GDP per capita. In 1992, Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (henceforth MRW) reconsidered the Solovian production function and 
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argued that it is not necessary to rely on the endogenous models to explain the 
divergence across countries. As explained before, λ is the speed of convergence in the 
Solow model: λ= (1 -α). (g+ n +δ).  As we can see here, the share of capital α, which is 
highlighted in the assumption of diminishing returns, is very important in determining 
the speed of convergence. The Solow model explains that a smaller α, leads to faster 
convergence. As it becomes equal to zero the diminishing return disappears and there 
will be no convergence. The contribution of MRW to the literature here, is that they 
augmented human capital to the model in addition to physical capital and argued that if 
we consider the process towards steady state transitional dynamics, as protracted, the 
Solow model could explain the different growth rates across countries. By augmenting 
human capital to the model the income elasticity becomes 1 rather than ½ in the Solow 
model and the performance of the model improves. Furthermore, they obtained an 
expression for the steady state of income per capita: 
ln(𝑦?̇?) = 𝑙𝑛𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 +
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘 +
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ −  
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)           (2-24) 
Equation (2-24) shows that the steady state level of income per capita is 
positively related to A(0), which, according to MRW, is not just the level of technology 
but also other variables like culture, institutions and climate. Furthermore, more 
importantly, it is related to the rate of accumulation of human capital in addition to other 
Solow factors. In their analysis, they let the population growth rate, saving rate and 
secondary school enrolment change across countries and determine the steady state. By 
doing so, they found evidence of convergence even in a big sample of countries with 
different structures. The MRW model is influential in the growth-convergence debate 
for two reasons. First, they augmented human capital as an additional controlling 
variable for steady state. Second, the empirical evidence of their model considered 
convergence, which was rejected by the first generation of endogenous growth models. 
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 Evans and Karras (1996) also showed that the Solow-Swan (1956) models could 
explain the growth rate of countries with common technology around the world. In 
addition, R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), in their studies, indicated that 
convergence happened based on the neoclassical models but not endogenous ones. 
These findings had a double impact, on the one hand, some economists think that the 
Solow model could explain the convergence progress across countries and are working 
to extend the model and test it with new controlling variables and updated time series 
and methods.  On the other hand, these findings pushed economists to study more about 
technological advances and pay more attention to the role of innovation, which was 
used by Schumpeter years before and led them to a new aspect of growth theory. 
 
2.3.2.2 Second generation of endogenous growth models 
In 1995, C. Jones (1998), in his book, argued that the “scale effect” predictions 
of many recent ideas for production functions (P. Aghion & Howitt, 1997; P. Romer, 
1991) are not consistent with empirical evidence. For example, in the case of the US, 
between 1950 and 1990, the number of researchers was five times bigger than before 
but still the growth rate was 2 per cent. Therefore, the prediction “constant return to 
knowledge” of these models was not consistent with the empirical evidence. However, 
this inconsistency does not refute the important role of R&D based growth models. 
Therefore, in the other generation of growth models the researchers eliminate this fact 
and retain the other features of R&D based models. In addition, semi endogenous 
growth models were introduced. In these models, they relaxed the assumption of 
constant or increasing return to knowledge and substituted diminishing return to 
knowledge. Therefore, for a sustained growth rate, growth in R&D is required.  Kortum 
(1998) and P. Aghion and Howitt (1997) supported these ideas. On the one hand, this 
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class of model was similar to Romer’s, in which growth drives endogenously through 
R&D, while, on the other hand, it is similar to the Solow model in which long-run 
growth only depends on those factors that are usually exogenous, especially population 
growth rate, which could be a proxy for innovators and scientists, and, therefore, is 
independent of policy changes in economies. 
Considering the following Cobb-Douglas production function (J Ha & P  Howitt, 2007): 
 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼                                     (2-25) 
Where Y is output, A is level of technology, K is capital stock, L is labour force and α is 
capital share, which is assumed to be constant. The growth in ideas production function 
for the first generation of endogenous growth models is given by: 
?̇?
𝐴
= 𝛾(𝑋)𝜎                     (2-26) 
Where ?̇? is the number of new ideas generated, A is the stock of knowledge, γ is 
the research productivity parameter, X is R&D input and σ is the duplication parameter 
(1 if there are no duplication innovations and 0 if there are a number of innovations). In 
the first generation of endogenous models, they assumed a constant return to 
knowledge, and, therefore, that policies that determine R&D input will affect the long-
run growth rate.  The failure of this model is the back to scale effect item, which states 
that the higher the level of R&D input, the higher the productivity growth. 
As mentioned above, C. Jones (1998) refuted this theory and introduced the semi 
endogenous growth model, as follows: 
?̇?
𝐴
= 𝛾(𝑋)𝜎 𝐴𝜃−1 , θ<1                 (2-27) 
Where, θ is return to scale in knowledge, which is diminishing here. Therefore, this 
model assumes that there is a positive relationship between R&D growth and 
productivity growth. 
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 P. Aghion and Howitt (1997) wrote a paper in response to Jones’ critique. In 
their paper, they argued that having sustainable productivity growth in an economy 
requires a sustained R&D intensity, and the size of the labour force (GDP) employed 
(spent) in the R&D sector rather than growth in R&D (Dinopoulos, 2006; J. Ha & P. 
Howitt, 2007; Madsen, 2008).  
  
Ȧ
A
= γ(
X
Q
)σ Aθ−1 , Q ∝  Lφ , θ<1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1            (2-28) 
Where, Q is product variety, L is employment or population and φ is the 
parameter of proliferation and 
X
Q
  is research intensity. This equation implies that the 
increasing rate of population will increase the number of people who can innovate new 
products. The difference between this model and previous ones concerns the 
assumptions of increasing complexity of innovation, which enter R&D as research 
intensity instead of just R&D input.  
They assumed a constant return to scale like the first generation; however, they 
added a new assumption – increasing complexity of new innovation. These models are 
famous as the Schumpeterian fully endogenous growth models. They called them 
Schumpeterian fully endogenous growth models because they were inspired by the 
theory of “creative destruction” which was introduced by Schumpeter: 
“The process whereby each innovation creates some new technological 
knowledge that advances our material possibilities, while rendering obsolete some 
of the technological knowledge that was created by previous innovations”(Howitt, 
2000).  
In these models, physical capital and intellectual capital were separate and saving 
is the result of former growth and later growth is from innovation (P. Aghion & P. 
Howitt, 2006). Here, growth is the reason for the innovation process that improves the 
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quality of outputs, which is inspired by “research activities with uncertain results”. New 
inventions render previous technologies obsolete; this is called “the factor of 
obsolescence”, which is the embodiment of Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destructive”. 
The “creative destructive” progress pointed out two conflicting aspects of research 
activity.  On the one hand, researchers in this period will develop research and new 
inventions in the next period, and, on the other hand, new inventions and research 
render the previous ones obsolete. Furthermore, if the research that firms have done is 
successful, they can have the monopoly of that patent (P. Aghion & P. Howitt, 2006). It 
is clear that in this class of models, the role of R&D is very important, and, as J. Ha and 
P. Howitt (2007), and Madsen (2008) pointed out, if a country wants to have sustainable 
productivity growth, more labour force (GDP) should be employed in the R&D sector. 
Howitt (2000), based on the fully Schumpeterian endogenous growth models, suggested 
that those countries that attempt to increase their R&D sector will reduce the gap with 
rich countries and will increase their growth while those that do not will not grow at all. 
The growth rate of productivity is determined by multiplying the research intensity with 
the technological gap between a country and a country in the technology frontier. 
Countries that are further from the frontier will grow faster in this model.  
Ȧ
A
= τ (
X
Q
) (
A𝑀𝑎𝑥−𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
)                   (2-29) 
Where τ is the R&D productivity parameter, 
X
Q
 is the research intensity and A𝑀𝑎𝑥 
is the country in the frontier. If A𝑀𝑎𝑥  remains at the same level and the research 
intensity increases, the countries lying behind can converge to the leader’s level of 
productivity. Nelson and Phelps (1966) argued that human capital plays an important 
role in absorbing foreign technology. They added the human capital time technology 
frontier to the model and named it “theoretical level of technology, T”, and showed that 
improvement in technology is not only dependent on human capital but also on the gap 
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between the level of theoretical technology and technology in practice. In their model, 
similar to the Solow model, the long-run growth rate of technical progress is still 
exogenous. 
Ȧ
A
= ω(𝐻𝐶)(
𝑇𝑡−𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
)                                       (2-30) 
In other words, according to this equation, the technological gap will be dependent on 
the level of human capital (Raiser et al., 2001). 
 R. Griffith, Redding, and Reenen (2004) employed a model, which tested the 
two faces of R&D: one is the effects of R&D on innovation and the other is the effect of 
R&D on absorptive capacity and promoting convergence. This model implies that R&D 
is not just promoting TFP growth but also helps technology transfer across countries: 
Ȧ
A
= γ (
X
Q
) + 𝛽 (
A𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐴𝑡
) + 𝛼 (
X
Q
) (
A𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐴𝑡
)                (2-31) 
The third term on the right shows the effect of research intensity based on absorptive 
capacity. 
From equation (2-31), the link between TFP growth and distance to technology 
frontier can be seen. The sign of β shows whether or not catching up happened across 
countries, if it is positive it means that countries are catching up to advanced economies. 
Since technology is very important for growth, especially in this class of model, 
knowing the channels for innovating new technologies and also the channels through 
which these technologies can be transferred to other countries is very important. 
Therefore, innovation and imitation play an important role in the catching up process. 
This research tries to focus on this part and contribute to literature by looking through 
different channels for transferring technology across countries. In the next section the 
history of growth theories will be discussed to see how different classes of growth 
model have been created and how they deal with the convergence issue and also 
technology and other important factors as sources of growth. 
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Later, R Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004) extended the model of P 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) by focusing more on the role of R&D as an accelerator of 
absorptive capacity and incorporated it in the Schumpeterian fully endogenous model. 
They were inspired by the idea of P Aghion and Howitt (1998), who introduced income 
convergence by “allowing the size of the quality-augmenting innovation to depend on a 
firm’s distance behind the technological frontier” (R Griffith et al., 2004) (R Griffith et 
al., 2004) (R Griffith et al., 2004) (R Griffith et al., 2004) (R Griffith et al., 2004) . In 
these models, the rate of technological progress depends on research and countries can 
benefit from the backwardness in their technology and grow faster. Therefore, 
according to this backwardness these recent models also cover the convergence debate 
through technology transfer (R Griffith et al., 2004). R Griffith et al. (2004), in their 
paper, extended the P Aghion and Howitt (1998) model and emphasized three parts – 
R&D based innovation, the potential for technology transfer and the role of R&D in 
promoting absorptive capacity. They argued that countries further from the technology 
frontier can grow because of both innovation and technology transfer. The important 
point in their paper is that if the research is not successful in the first period the 
technology can transfer independent from R&D activities. They called it “autonomous 
technology transfer”. In addition, they emphasized that the pace of this transfer is a 
function of government policies, institutions, international trade, and level of human 
capital. In other words they captured the role of R&D as a promoter of absorptive 
capacity and not just innovation. More investment in the R&D sector and more foreign 
technology could be absorbed and the important thing here is that developing countries 
should not only focus on importing technology from developed countries but also work 
on their own domestic technological activities (Fagerberg, 1994). Therefore, a country 
that is far from the technology frontier has more benefit and can grow faster considering 
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the role of human capital, trade, institutions as well as investment in R&D. The 
following equation (2-32) was employed by R Griffith et al. (2004):   
             (2-32) 
Where E is an “expectations operator”. This equation is inspired from 
Schumpeterian endogenous growth. Innovation is the main factor in determining 
economic growth. This equation also includes empirical evidence of productivity 
convergence. The potential of transferring technology denotes that those countries far 
from the frontier ( ), can experience a faster growth rate than the others. 
Although all of the countries that are away from the technology frontier have this 
potential to grow, the possibility of this event depends on the institutions and 
government policies ( μi ) and the absorptive capacity of countries. With more 
investment in the research and development sector, the ability of a country to assimilate 
from new technology will be increased, and, therefore; it can increase the rate of 
technology transfer.  
According to this equation, the equilibrium level of relative TFP depends on the 
following factors: 
 Institutions and government policies, which affect research productivity (λf, λi). 
 Size of labour force that works in the research sector ( , ). 
 The size of innovation, which is at the technology frontier (δ). 
 Political-economic variables, which form the speed of abstractive capacity 
during technology transfer (φi , µi).  
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Now we can see the concept of convergence through these models. The further a 
country is from the technology leader, the greater the productivity growth it could have. 
This is the concept of convergence in the Schumpeterian fully endogenous growth 
models. In our study, we were inspired by the Schumpeterian fully endogenous growth 
theory to drive our productivity regression.  
 
2.4 Summary 
The question about income inequality across countries has been an important 
question since 1820, when the great divergence happened in the world. Since then, 
economists have tried to explain this disparity by employing different theories, models 
and methods. In previous studies economic indicators like saving, investment, capital, 
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and socioeconomic indicators like education and 
health have been used to explore the different growth across countries. However, the 
uneven growth disparities across countries make it difficult to conclude which factors 
are more effective.  In addition, in the new growth theories the concept of technological 
catch up came into sharp focus. Technologies have always been an engine of growth in 
all growth theories. In the neoclassical theory, they treat it as an exogenous factor; 
however, in the new growth model it is endogenous, which is determined inside the 
model. While in previous studies most researchers focused on the concept of 
convergence in terms of GDP per capita (or β convergence), recent studies supported 
that a large fraction of income disparities can be explained by technological change (or 
total factor productivity, TFP).  They argued that income convergence can be the 
outcome of both capital deepening and technological catch up. Therefore, economists 
directed their attention to this concept (Charles Jones, 1998; Madsen, 2008; Raiser et 
al., 2001). Since TFP is the closest measure for technology, researchers use it for 
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investigating whether or not countries are closing their gap in terms of their TPF levels. 
In this debate, the distance to the technology leader is very important. The further from 
the technology leader the country, the more advantage it has from this backwardness 
and grows faster. Therefore, we can see that the concept of convergence here changes 
from the distance from steady state to distance from technology frontier. 
In this section we described the different growth models and compared them, and 
described the theoretical framework of these models, making clear the link between the 
growth models and convergence hypothesis, which is how we can test the convergence 
hypothesis through these models. Also, we described the different concepts of 
convergence that exist in the literature, absolute β convergence and σ convergence in 
terms of GDP per capita and technology catch up in terms of TFP. 
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3 Chapter 3 
Reopening the Debate of Technology: Innovation and Imitation 
Perspective, Empirical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Looking back through history we can see that the role of technology became very 
important during World War I and II, and even more important after the emergence of 
three tigers in Asia (Singapore, Thailand and Korea). Economists have conducted a lot 
of research to understand what is going on and tried to explain this massive growth rate 
through different channels. A large portion of literature in this field investigated the role 
of technology and how it can affect growth in different countries. However, most of the 
studies in this field are radical and stick to the school of thought that they believed. For 
example, the neoclassical people try to prove that capital accumulation is the main 
source of growth without considering the role of technology.  They believed that 
technology is important but they did not try to look at the role of imitation and 
innovation of technology through the accumulation of capital in their model. 
Furthermore, in the new growth theory they considered the role of imitation and 
innovation in their model but they ignored other items like the role of institutions and 
globalization as factors that could increase the pace of imitation, and, consequently, 
increase the growth rate of countries. 
Therefore, this research tries to reopen the role of technology in these two classes 
of model by focusing on the role of imitation and innovation. 
  
46 
3.2 Reopening the Debate of Technology 
Although technology is assumed to be a main source of growth in all kinds of 
growth model, it can affect growth through different channels in each class of model. 
Neoclassic economists argue that technology is a public good and the same across 
countries, and, therefore, the rate is constant and exogenous, while in the endogenous 
theory they argue that it is not the same across countries and that the rate is endogenous 
and determined inside the model. Therefore, the debate of how it should be endogenized 
in the model remains an interesting topic. 
At the same time, the disagreement between neoclassic people and new growth, 
make this debate more interesting. Researchers have conducted empirical studies using 
these different theories with different methods, which have contributed considerably to 
this area. 
Such studies include those done by N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) who introduced 
the augmented Solow model, separating human capital from physical capital, or Charles 
Jones (1998), who introduced the semi endogenous models by emphasizing R&D 
activities or P. Aghion and Howitt (1997), who introduced the fully endogenous growth 
models, which is also famous as the technology-gap models that emphasize the role of 
R&D intensity and absorptive capacity.  In recent attempts, economists focussed more 
on the role of innovation and imitation on these models and tried to endogenize them 
into growth regressions (Phelps, 1966; J. D.  Sachs, 2003). The more investment, for 
example, in R&D departments, causes more innovation, which has a direct effect on 
increasing productivity and growth. Furthermore, increasing the ability of the country to 
imitate these new innovations from the other countries can also increase the productivity 
and growth. These two aspects are seen to be very important in explaining the growth 
rate across countries.  
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However, in considering the role of two factors – institutions and globalization – 
that appear to have been ignored, we shall contribute to the analytical literature by 
discussing their role as accelerators of absorptive capacity as well as the role of human 
capital, which has been extensively discussed.  We shall derive the technology-gap 
regression taking into account these new variables. Furthermore, to show how these 
different dimensions of technology evolved in past years, this study follows the standard 
analysis of testing β and σ convergence. Finally, to link the technological change to 
convergence in terms of income we estimate the classic growth regression, which 
decomposes GDP per capita growth into the sum of dynamic of technology change and 
physical capital accumulation rate. Section two extends the Solow model by including 
these new aspects of growth, which are highlighted in the new growth theories. In line 
with the augmented Solow model, this study applies globalization and institutions as 
well as innovation as factors that increase the accumulation of human capital, and drives 
a regression, which can be tested empirically. 
 
3.3 Reopening the Debate of the Knowledge Transfer on NGM 
New growth models are different from NCGM in that knowledge is a key source 
of growth. The stock of knowledge plays an important role in explaining the different 
growth rates across countries. Therefore, the components of knowledge stock are very 
important. Creation (CKi) and imitation (IKi) are two components of knowledge stock 
growth that have attracted considerable attention in recent growth literature (Castellacci, 
2011). 
 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
= 𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝐼𝐾𝑖         (3-1) 
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Technology (knowledge) spillovers or imitation is considered as an important 
item in explaining growth. Hitherto, in most of the existing models, technology transfer 
was considered as an automatic phenomenon, and none of the models could explain 
through which mechanism technology transfer happens across countries and affects 
growth.  Therefore, factors that can be considered for imitating and implementing new 
technologies from advanced countries are becoming very interesting in empirical 
studies. Imitation depends on the distance to technology frontier (DTFi), in which 
countries that lie behind the technology frontier have the opportunity to catch up by 
imitating technology from leaders, and absorptive capacity (ACi), which shows to what 
extent countries have the ability to absorb technology from frontiers (Beck & Laeven, 
2006; Jess  Benhabib & Rustichini, 1996; R. Griffith et al., 2004; R. R. Nelson, 2008; 
Phelps, 1966; Pomeranz, 2001; Raiser et al., 2001; J.D. Sachs, 2003). 
𝐾𝐼𝑖 = 𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖
𝜇 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑖         (3-2) 
In previous studies, the absorptive capacity depends on R&D (R. Griffith et al., 
2004) and human capital (HCi) (D. Dollar & Kraay, 2004; Madsen, 2008), and, by the 
study done by Castellacci (2011), it is a function of human capital and infrastructure. In 
this study, we argue that institutions (INSi) and globalization (GLOBi) are the other 
factors that can improve the ability of a country to observe foreign advanced 
technologies. Without having proper institutions (e.g. property rights) in a country, 
inventors do not innovate, and, therefore, there is no knowledge to transfer across 
borders. The other factor is globalization (GLOBi), which can improve the absorptive 
capacity. Flow of ideas, as well as flow of goods, are very important in accelerating 
growth. Therefore, human capital would be useless without the support of proper 
institutions and the existence of globalization in terms of ideas.  
𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝐻𝐶𝑖
𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖
𝛽2 ∗ 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖
𝛽3𝑅&𝐷𝑖
𝛽4
      (3-3) 
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The other component is creation of knowledge (CKi), which can be a function of 
the innovation intensity of a country (INOi) and the level of human capital. Innovation 
intensity refers to the research intensity and the number of scientific journals (P. M. 
Romer, 1990).  
𝐶𝐾𝑖 =  𝑅&𝐷𝑖
𝛾𝐻𝐶𝑖
∝1
         (3-4) 
Taking the lags of equations (3-2) and (3-4) and substituting those in (3-1), gives us the 
following equation for knowledge stock growth (or productivity growth): 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄ = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + (𝛽1+∝1)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖 +
𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖          (3-5) 
This equation highlights five sources of productivity growth: innovation 
intensity undertaken by R&D sector; human capital, which affects both imitation 
(technology transfer) and innovation; institutions and globalization, which affect the 
absorptive capacity in a country; and, finally, distance to technology frontier, which 
shows the tendency for catching up in terms of technology across countries. The 
interesting point here is how we take care of distance to technology frontier in this 
equation. It is obvious that it will take some time to transfer technology from the 
advanced countries to the developing and less developed ones. Therefore, since the 
technology in the leader country affects a country far from the frontier by lagged, we 
enter this variable by lagged here also. Therefore, we rewrite the equation (3-5) like 
this: 
 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄ = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖 + (𝛽1 +∝1)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖 +
𝜇log (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1)        (3-6)  
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Now we can drive the equation that shows the relation between technology 
changes and growth of GDP per capita in terms of endogenous theories. We do this by 
considering the classic Cobb-Douglas production function (in per worker): 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖𝐾𝑖
𝛼          (3-7) 
Where Yi is the GDP per capita of country i, Ai is knowledge stock and Ki is level of 
physical capital. The growth rate of GDP per capita over time is: 
∆𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖⁄ =
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄ + ∆𝑘𝑖
𝛼/𝑘𝑖
𝛼
       (3-8) 
This equation decomposes the growth of GDP per capita into technological changes and 
physical capital accumulation, which here, is capital formation. By plugging equation 
(3-5) into equation (3-8), we have the following equation: 
∆𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖⁄ = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖 + (𝛽1 +∝1)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖 +
𝜇log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝐹,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖        (3-9) 
Where Yf is GDP per capita of country in the frontier and Yi is a GDP per capita of 
sample country, these two terms substitute to terms 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹 (Castellacci, 2011). 
FCi indicates the formation of physical capital. 
 
3.3.1 The Dynamics of Technology 
To show how these different dimensions of technology have evolved in recent 
years, this study follows the standard analysis of testing convergence, β convergence, 
for innovation intensity, human capital, institutions, globalization and studies how their 
statistical distributions have evolved over the past thirteen years. We call it φ 
convergence here. 
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φ convergence: 
φ convergence for each dimension means that less developed countries have 
experienced more rapid technological growth than developed ones. The following 
equation is a basic cross-country regression form, which is used in applied growth 
theories for testing the convergence hypothesis: 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖,0 + 𝜀𝑖                  (3-10) 
Where 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄  is the growth rate of each technology dimension of country i over the 
period 1996-2010, and 𝐴𝑖,0 is the the log of its initial level at the beginning of period.  
𝛽1 shows the speed of convergence for each dimension of technology. 
 
3.4 Extending the Solow Model in Terms of Knowledge Transfer 
In line with the new aspects of the endogenous growth theories, innovation and 
imitation, we want to reconcile the neoclassic growth model by incorporating the 
essence of these theories mentioned in the previous sections. Starting from the 
augmented neoclassic production function, N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) , equation 11-3 
is given: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 
∝𝐻𝑡
𝛽
(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1−∝−𝛽  α+β<1                (3-11) 
Where Y is output, K is physical capital, A is technology, L is labour, H is 
human capital, α and β is capital share, and according to NCG assumptions, there is a 
diminishing return to capital. Labour force and technology are assumed to grow at an 
exogenous rate according to the following functions: 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿0𝑒
𝑛𝑡 (We simply normalize 𝐿0 to unity) (n=exogenous growth of labour force)  
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𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡 (g= exogenous growth of technology)                         (3-12) 
According to the assumption of constant to scale, the intensive form of production 
function is as follows: 
𝑦?̂? = ?̂?𝑡
𝛼ℎ̂𝑡
𝛽
                   (3-13) 
Where ?̂? = 𝐾/𝐴𝐿, ℎ̂ = 𝐻/𝐴𝐿 and ?̂? = 𝑌/𝐴𝐿. In the Solow-Swan model the saving rate 
is determined exogenously according to the decision of savers or government policy.  
Therefore, the capital accumulation equation is written in terms of per effective worker 
like this: 
𝑑?̂?𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑠𝑘?̂?𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)?̂?𝑡                   (3-14) 
And N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) accumulated human capital through investing in 
education in the model. 
𝑑ℎ̂𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑠ℎ?̂?𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)ℎ̂𝑡                   (3-15) 
Here, we want to contribute to the literature by accumulating human capital 
through other channels – imitation and creation – which is important in recent growth 
literature. In the recent new literature, the role of R&D activities is highlighted as an 
important source of growth. Countries that spend more money on the R&D sector can 
innovate more, and, therefore, can accelerate their growth rate. Although, empirical 
evidence shows that other countries that are not involved in R&D activities can take 
advantage of these new ideas by the diffusion of technology, the effect of innovation 
has its own place. Another way of accumulating human capital is through technology 
spillovers and absorbing new technology (imitation) that need a certain level of human 
capital. However, there are several difficulties in absorbing technology (imitation) from 
advanced countries. This research considers globalization as a way for technology 
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spillovers. Globalization leads to a sense of openness, international trade and 
infrastructure, all of which are included in the KOF index. Furthermore, institutions, 
which have become important determinants of economic growth in recent literature, are 
the other channel for accumulation capital. These two concepts are employed in the 
model by considering this fact from the new growth theory that the absorptive capacity 
of a country can present a possibility for accelerated human capital accumulation 
(Pääkkönen, 2010).   
Now, in this study, we want to enter creation and imitation (absorptive capacity) 
as accelerators of human capital accumulation. Therefore we rewrite equation (3-18) 
like this: 
𝑑ℎ̂𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑠ℎ(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵)
𝜋(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂)𝜗(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝜌?̂?𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)ℎ̂𝑡   
   0 <GLOB<1, 0< 𝐼𝑁𝑂<1, 0< INS<1               (3-16) 
 
3.4.1 The Steady State 
In the steady state, the levels of physical and human capital per effective worker 
are constant (M. Knight, N. Loayza, & D. Villanueva, 1993). The steady state values are 
given in the following equations: 
?̂?∗ = (
𝑠ℎ
𝛽
∗(1+𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵)𝜋𝛽∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑂)𝜗𝛽∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝜌𝛽∗𝑠𝑘
𝛼
𝑛+𝑔+𝛿
)
1
𝛼+𝛽               (3-17) 
ℎ̂∗ = (
𝑠ℎ
1−𝛼∗(1+𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵)𝜋(1−𝛼)∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑂)𝜗(1−𝛼)∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝜌(1−𝛼)∗𝑠𝑘
𝛼
𝑛+𝑔+𝛿
)
1
𝛼+𝛽             (3-18) 
Substituting these equations into (3-13), we have: 
?̂?∗ = (
𝑠ℎ
𝛽
∗(1+𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵)𝜋𝛽∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑂)𝜗𝛽∗((1+𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝜌𝛽∗𝑠𝑘
𝛼
(𝑛+𝑔+𝛿)𝛼+𝛽
)
1
𝛼+𝛽               (3-19) 
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And the econometric equation to estimate it should be written in logarithm form: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?) =
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ +
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘 +
𝜋𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵) +
𝜗𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂) +
𝜌𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆) −
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)                (3-20) 
Following M. Knight et al. (1993) linearization of the transition path around the steady 
state is given as: 
𝑑𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?)
𝑑𝑡
=  𝜆(ln ( ?̂?∗) − 𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?))                 (3-21) 
Or integrating equation (3-19) from T=t-1 to T= t: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?) − ln ( ?̂?
∗) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 ln ( ?̂?∗) − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝐿𝑛(?̂?𝑡−1)               (3-22) 
We can rewrite it like this: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?) = 1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 ln ( ?̂?∗) + 𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝐿𝑛(?̂?𝑡−1)                (3-23) 
Where λ= (n+g+δ)(1-α-β)  is the speed of convergence.  
Substituting for 𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?) in equation (3-23) we have: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦?̂?) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘+(1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝜋𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 +
𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵) + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜗𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂) + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆) −
(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝐿𝑛(?̂?𝑡−1)               (3-24) 
Since the format of equation (3-24) is per effective worker we have to transform it to 
per worker for the purpose of estimation. Therefore, as we had 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡, by taking 
logarithm we have: 
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  𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡                  (3-25) 
And we have, ?̂?=Y/AL, we can write it in per worker like this:  ?̂? = 𝑦/𝐴, 𝑙𝑛 ?̂? = 𝑙𝑛𝑦 −
𝑙𝑛𝐴 
Therefore we have: 
𝑙𝑛 ?̂? = 𝑙𝑛𝑦 − 𝐿𝑛𝐴0 − 𝑔𝑡                  (3-26) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡) = 𝐿𝑛𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡 + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘+(1 −
𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜋𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵) + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜗𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂) + (1 −
𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠) − (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡−1) 
                             (3-27) 
For estimating the growth regression we subtract 𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡−1) from both sides.  
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡) = 𝐿𝑛𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡 + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘−(1 −
𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜋𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵) + (1 −
𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜗𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂) + (1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆) + (𝑒−𝜆𝑡 − 1)𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡−1)
                     (3-28) 
Equation (3-28) is the one that provides us with a good specification for empirical 
research; however, we will not use it literally. This equation shows the effect of 
different factors on the GDP per capita growth rate. The first two terms 𝐿𝑛𝐴0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑡 
represent the cross specific effect and time specific effect, respectively. A0 represents all 
the unobserved factors that affect efficiency. These two items might be correlated to the 
other explanatory variables on the model. The third and fourth coefficients show that the 
more saving and investing in human and physical capital, the more rapid growth it has. 
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The fifth term is about the role of population growth on economic growth. With a given 
β, α, δ and g, population growth rate has a negative effect on GDP per capita growth.  
The coefficient of GLOB shows that if 𝜋  is positive, it means that opening up the 
borders and being globalized can help speed up the rate of GDP per capita growth. This 
is also the same for the coefficients of INS and INO. In addition, for the last term, if λ is 
positive it means that there is a negative relationship between the initial level of GDP 
per capita and growth rate. “Countries below their steady states growth path, can grow 
faster: conditional convergence” (R. J. Barro & X. Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter reopened the debate of technology as a source of growth in both 
neoclassical and new growth theories.  In neoclassical theory, Solow (1956) contributed 
to the literature by talking about technological improvement as a source of growth in the 
long-run. However, he could not explain how and through which channels technology 
can affect growth. In addition, he believed that factors like saving, population growth 
and capital depreciation are the only factors that can affect growth in the short-run and 
that it is unaffected by policies.  
During the 1960s and 70s, massive changes in the growth rate of some Asian 
countries – Singapore, Korea and Taiwan – attracted the attention of economists to 
investigate the causes of these changes, and, finally, Romer (1986) introduced his new 
idea of endogenizing technology to the model, which talked about the important role of 
R&D and innovation in explaining the growth rate of countries. In line with his studies, 
other economies extended his model and highlighted the other factors that can 
contribute to growth like the role of imitation and technology transfer on growth. 
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In this research we want to contribute to the literature by reopening the debate of 
technology in these two growth theories by focusing on the role of imitation and 
innovation. In the new growth theory, economists consider these two factors as sources 
of growth. However, they did not explain the factors that can increase the pace of 
imitation and innovation like the role of institutions and globalization.  Therefore, this 
study considers the other factors like R&D expenditure, human capital, institutions and 
globalization as factors that can increase the capacity of countries to absorb technology 
from frontiers.  
In the neoclassical theory, capital-deepening theories, we contribute to the literature 
by considering these new aspects of growth, imitation and innovation as accelerators of 
accumulation of capital that is important in this class of model. Further, we consider 
institutions and globalization as factors that can accelerate the accumulation of human 
capital. 
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4 Chapter 4 
Empirical Studies on Testing Convergence 
4.1 Introduction 
Looking back through the literature, economists tried to test convergence 
hypothesis in different samples of countries, data sets and using different econometric 
methods. In terms of data, cross-sectional data, time series, as well as panel data that 
pooled both were used. The attempt of this chapter is to highlight the most important 
studies done in each different field and also highlight the shortcomings of these studies, 
which are going to be addressed by the current research. 
 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis to Test Convergence 
There are two types of study in cross sectional analysis. One discusses 
convergence within a country and the other type argues convergence among countries. 
We try to separate these studies from each other, since, for example, regions within a 
country can converge because of government regional development policies, while it is 
different across countries, which have different structures. Therefore, the convergence 
arguments for both types are different. 
 
4.2.1 Convergences across Countries 
As mentioned earlier, the pioneer study for testing convergence dates back to the 
end of the nineteenth-century, when Baumol (1986) tried to investigate the relationship 
between productivity and the annual growth rate in 16 industrialized countries between 
1870 and 1979. His study began with a cross sectional analysis on standard Solow 
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growth regression, where the speed of convergence depends only on the initial level of 
GDP per capita. The results indicated that there was a negative relationship between the 
initial level of productivity and the growth rate. In his research, he did not control any 
factors except the initial level of productivity in each country, and, therefore, the results 
showed absolute convergence. In another attempt to support the previous results, he 
chose a sample of 72 countries over the period 1950-1980. Although, this time he 
analysed GDP per capita for testing convergence, he asserted that these data, like the 
previous sample, could be used to proxy Maddison’s productivity data.  This time the 
results were not compatible with the preceding one. The poorest countries grew most 
slowly, meaning, that there was no tight negative relationship between GDP per capita 
and annual growth rate.  
“This suggests that there was more than one convergence club. Rather, there are 
perhaps three, with the centrally planned and the intermediate groups somewhat 
inferior in performance to that of the free-market industrialized countries. It is 
also clear that the poorer less developed countries are still largely barred from 
the homogenization processes” (Baumol, 1986).  
However, De Long (1988) wrote a comment on Baumol’s paper (1986) and argued that,  
“Baumol's regression uses an ex post sample of countries that were now rich and 
have successfully developed. By Maddison's choice, those nations that have not 
converged were excluded from his sample because of their resulting present 
relative poverty. Baumol’s sample suffers from selection bias, and the 
independent variable was unavoidably measured with error. Both of these create 
the appearance of convergence whether or not it exists in reality” (De Long, 
1988). 
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Therefore, De Long (1988) used an unbiased sample in his study named Once-Rich 
Twenty-Two. The result of the study showed that,  
“In the long-run, data do not show convergence on any but the most 
optimistic reading. They do not support the claim that those nations that 
should have been able to rapidly assimilate industrial technology have all 
converged. Nations rich amongst the once-rich twenty-two in 1870 have not 
grown more slowly than the average of the sample” (De Long, 1988).  
Finally, De Long (1988) argued that finding divergence in the sample led us to think in 
the way that “in the long-run there may not be technology transfer that can be a key 
factor for economic growth” (De Long, 1988). 
It also pushes us away from the belief that the West, even in industrialized 
countries, in 2090 or 2190 living standards would be roughly equal. The absence of 
convergence, even among wealthy nations in 1870, forces us to argue like P. M. Romer 
(1990) that the relative income gap between the rich and poor may tend to be wide. This 
argument leads studies to investigate income convergence among different samples and 
periods. While researchers try to figure out this problem, different concepts of 
convergence have emerged. 
The most important studies done in this field can be traced back to the early 
1990s when Robert Barro and Sala-i-Martin did a series of studies on economic growth 
with a focus on economic convergence using the cross sectional approach.  These 
studies were the most influential, which made convergence an on-going debate until 
now. In their research, important questions were raised, like is there a tendency in poor 
countries to grow faster than rich ones? Are the factors that lead to convergence 
automatic forces? And, which factors can accelerate the growth across countries and so 
speed up the convergence process (R. J. Barro & X. Sala-i-Martin, 1995)? Their studies 
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rely on the neoclassical growth model, which emphasizes the negative relationship of 
the initial level of income or GDP per capita and annual growth rate, which is known as 
β convergence. Lichtenberg (1994) tested the convergence hypothesis that R. J. Barro 
and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992) discussed in a sample of 22 OECD countries between 1960 
and 1986.  The results of his study do not support the convergence hypothesis. He 
claimed that the rate of convergence was overestimated in previous studies.  
However, the results of other studies, like Carree and Klomp (1997), support the 
convergence hypothesis across countries. In their study they applied the same sample 
like Lichtenberg (1994), OECD countries, and between 1950 and 1994. 
 
4.2.2 Convergence within Countries and Regions 
 R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995) focused on the concept of convergence 
among the 48 states of the US from 1840 to 1988 and 73 regions in Europe from 1950 
to 1985. The results showed convergence. The basis of their analysis is their paper in 
1992. Their findings support the idea of β-convergence between and within regions, 
meaning that poor eastern states can grow faster than rich eastern states. Furthermore, in 
another attempt, R. J. Barro (1991) tried to test convergence among 48 US states by 
using gross state product (GSP) between 1963 and 1986 by using the cross section 
approach. This research also supports the existence of convergence among states.  
In the US, between 1880 and 1990, the B-convergence was examined (1996) and 
supported in 48 states by X. X. Sala-i-Martin (1996). Per capita income was used in the 
area as the dependent variable; however, he chose real per capita GDP as the dependent 
variable in the second empirical study and no convergence was found between 1960 and 
1990 for 110 selected countries. Even though in OECD countries B-convergence was 
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found for the same period at the rate of 1.4 per cent. Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1997) 
also tested regional convergence across different regions of Greece by applying cross 
sectional analysis. They focussed on neoclassical theory and divided Greece into two 
sides: south and north. They did not find any evidence for supporting the convergence 
hypothesis, and, therefore, they supported the idea of Baumol (1986) on club 
convergence. 
 
4.3 The Time Series Analysis to Test Convergence 
While the main concern of most research was on the traditional unit root test on 
developed countries, economists tried to extend the sample of countries. For the first 
time, K. Lee, M. H. Pesaran, and R. Smith (1997) used the Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
for testing convergence across 102 countries. The results indicated that the null 
hypothesis of unit root could only be rejected for a few.  
 Bernard and Durlauf (1996), and Quah (1996) were the other economists who 
tested the convergence hypothesis. Bernard and Durlauf (1996), first tested the 
convergence across fifteen OECD countries between 1900 and 1989. The multivariate 
unit root and cointegration tests both rejected the convergence hypothesis. Furthermore, 
in another study, Bernard and Durlauf (1996) examined the factors that affected labour 
productivity and convergence during the period 1963-1989 in the United States’ 
industries. They compared two methods in their research: cross sectional and time 
series. The results from both methods only support the convergence hypothesis in 
labour productivity for two departments – mining and manufacturing. Pesaran (2007) 
used the “Pair-wise” test for testing convergence hypothesis and their results were 
similar to Bernard and Durlauf (1996).  
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However, Evans and Karras (1996) used time series analysis for a sample of 56 
countries between 1950 and 1990 and used “unit root test of pooled deviation”. The 
results supported the convergence hypothesis.   
 
4.4 The Panel Data Analysis to Test Convergence 
Economists, like N. Islam (1995), F. Caselli et al. (1996), Bianchi (1998), Kevin 
Lee et al. (1997), Shioji (2005), Evans and Karras (1996), and Beyaert and Camacho 
(2008) pooled cross section and time series data together to improve the information set 
and increase the power of testing. Each of them used different methods in panel to test 
the convergence hypothesis across countries.  However, each of them has their own 
shortcoming. For example, Shioji (2005) applied both panel data and the cross sectional 
method for testing convergence hypothesis across 48 states of US between 1929 and 
2001. Using cross sectional data, the results show that convergence happened at a slow 
rate reaching to the same steady state, while applying the fixed effect method (like N. 
Islam (1995)) the speed of convergence was higher and reached to a different steady 
state. It is true that by using the fixed effect methods he takes care of country specific 
affects but he did not consider time specific effects. The other problem with his study is 
that he assumed that all the explanatory variables are exogenous, so he ignored the 
problem of endogeneity of some variables that could lead to unbiased results. 
Furthermore, F. Caselli et al. (1996) used the generalized method of moments for 
estimating (Arellano-Bond GMM) convergence rate across 98 countries between 1960 
and 1985. In their study, the convergence rate was around 10% instead of 2%, which 
was common in cross sectional analyses.  
In their study they addressed two sources of inconsistency compared to cross 
country analysis. One concerns the incorrect treatment for country specific effect, which 
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leads to biased results. Second, in empirical cross country growth regression, all the 
variables account as exogenous, which raises the problem of endogeneity, because some 
of the variables are expected to be endogenous in the model. Therefore, the generalized 
method of moments takes care of these problems and gives robust results.   
Now, here in this study, as we will describe in detail in chapter six, dynamic 
system GMM is used to test the convergence hypothesis in terms of GDP per capita and 
productivity in the neoclassical and fully endogenous growth models, to show which of 
the variables can explain the different growth rates across countries and what is the 
convergence rate for each group. In the next chapter we are going to talk about the role 
of human capital, globalization and institutions in the growth and convergence process. 
 
4.5 Summary 
There are a few ways through which we can classify and compare between studies.  
One is within and between countries, while another, which we are using, is cross section 
vs. time series vs. panel methods.  We reviewed some important studies done in this 
field and highlighted the shortcomings of each method. Finally, we came to the 
conclusion that the dynamic system GMM is the best method because it gives the most 
robust results among the methods based on our sample. In addition, we showed in this 
chapter that most of the studies focused on high-income countries and some selected 
developing countries. Therefore, this research tries to cover other groups of countries as 
well as high-income countries and put them in four groups: whole sample, low-income, 
middle-income and high-income countries, to see how convergence happened in these 
different groups of countries and also compare them together. The other important 
contribution concerns the determinants of growth. The next chapter focuses on human 
capital area, globalization phenomenon, institutions and technology transfer and 
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presents the studies done in these areas and introduces new comprehensive proxies for 
each area, which makes this research richer that the others. 
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5 Chapter 5 
The Role of Human Capital, Institutions and Globalization on Growth 
and Convergence 
5.1 Introduction 
In the recent empirical studies it is accepted that technological change and 
physical accumulation alone cannot adequately explain the differences in economic 
growth across countries. The question as to which factors can explain these differences 
together with the question as to which factors can accelerate the growth rate of 
developing countries remains an important issue up to now. Therefore, there is a sharp 
focus on the factors that can contribute to growth. In recent literature, human capital, 
institutions and globalization are separately becoming the important factors that can 
explain the economic growth fluctuations. What we want to do here is review the past 
studies in each field and highlight the gaps that exist in them.   
This study looks at these three areas according to the two different classes of 
model: neoclassical model and new growth theory. In the neoclassical model, according 
to the assumptions, human capital accumulation is important for growth as well as 
physical capital accumulation.  Now we want to look at the factors that can increase the 
accumulation of human capital. In previous studies investing in education was 
highlighted. By introducing new growth theories, innovation and imitation are also 
important. Here, we reconcile the theory of neoclassical growth with these new factors 
that should contribute to growth. Institutions and globalization can increase the human 
capital accumulation. The more a country is open, the more it can observe advanced 
technology through FDI and international trade. Therefore, this item can be considered 
as an accelerator for observing technology. The other area that is important in 
accelerating technology diffusion is the role of institutions. When the rules are not 
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respected or they are changed frequently or there is no protection for property rights 
there is uncertainty, which leads to a fall in investment – domestic or foreign – which 
can be a channel through which technology imports affect the economic performance J. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1997); Fernandez and Rodrik (1991); D. Rodrik (1998); Tornell 
and Velasco (1992). By having proper institutions, countries that are far from the 
technology frontier can take advantage of this backwardness and can grow faster by 
adopting new technologies. 
In new growth models, as creation and imitation become very important, we 
highlighted the role of human capital in each of them and especially the role of 
institutions and globalization as facilitators and accelerators of the imitation (absorptive 
capacity) rate. 
 
5.2 History of Human Capital as a Factor Explaining Growth 
The reference to human capital in studies of convergence has its roots in the 
related areas of labour economics and the theory of the firm. Mincer (1958), Schultz 
(1961), Becker (1994) and Denison and Poullier (1967) pioneered the concept of 
“human capital” into labour economics. Schultz (1961) emphasized the role of 
education in enhancing the ability of individuals and thereby boosting the economic 
productivity. Denison and Poullier (1967) were the other researchers who argued about 
the importance of human capital. They indicated that improving the level of knowledge 
of workers directly influences his/her performance through which they can learn newer 
production processes better than the uneducated ones.  
At the macroeconomic level, R. J. Barro (1991) selected a sample of 98 countries 
for the period of 1960-1985 and noted the important influence of human capital in 
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economic growth and convergence based on the neoclassical growth model. First, he 
tested convergence in GDP per capita for the selected 98 countries, but he did not find 
convergence and there was no relationship between initial GDP per capita and the 
growth rate over the period. Subsequently, he included primary and secondary school 
enrolment in the model as proxies for human capital. By adding these variables to the 
model, convergence appears. This result means that a sufficient level of human capital 
boosts the growth rate in poor countries. N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992), in testing the 
convergence hypothesis, also added human capital to the model as well as physical 
capital. Adding this explanatory variable to the model provides an explanation to the 
question of why some countries are poor while others are rich. The model that they 
used, which included human accumulation, predicted that convergence can take place in 
35 years; meaning that countries reach their steady state in 35 years, while the Solow 
model predicted that countries reached their steady state in 17 years.  
 Evans and Karras (1996) examined the speed of convergence in 48 states in the 
US, which are near each other. In their paper they considered that only having physical 
capital as a production factor is not useful. Therefore, they added human capital to their 
model and estimated it with respect to the neoclassical growth model and found 
convergence. However, in contrast, Nazrul Islam (1995), using the same model as N. G. 
Mankiw et al. (1992), found a negative and insignificant effect of human capital on 
growth. F. Caselli et al. (1996) also found a negative significant effect for human capital 
on growth. Adding this additional variable started a new argument among economists. 
Economists like F. Caselli et al. (1996), and Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) stand 
contrary to this view and argue that “the relevant notion of capital is restricted to 
physical capital only” F. Caselli et al. (1996).  
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 F. Caselli et al. (1996) argued that what R. J. Barro and Lee (2000) had 
mentioned about conditional convergence rate was inconsistent. They believed that 
countries cover more than 2 per cent of their distance from the steady state each year. In 
other words, countries converge at the rate of 2 or 3 per cent per year (F. Caselli et al., 
1996). F. Caselli et al. (1996) believed that the estimation procedures were inconsistent, 
and, therefore, the coefficients and result were unreliable. The rate of convergence that 
he got from his investigation was 10%. The inconsistency that he spoke about has two 
explanations: endogeneity and omitted variable bias. Eliminating this biasness made the 
results different from before. For example, N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) estimated the 
capital share in output of 0.75. Since this was too high, relative to the national-account 
figure of about 1/3, they rejected the model in favour of an augmented version that 
includes human capital in the production function. Instead, with his procedure he find a 
value of 0.10 for the capital share in the basic model, which is too low (F. Caselli et al., 
1996). Therefore, they rejected the augmented Solow model. However, Kumar and 
Russell (2002), in their study, divided growth productivity into three components – 
technical, efficiency change and capital accumulation. They found that the growth rate 
of these countries was initially dependent on the human and physical capital 
accumulation, and they also found that capital accumulation (physical and human) was 
an important factor in economic convergence but not technological progress. In other 
words, as long as the economic convergence is considered, EU countries tend to 
converge of course with respect to physical and human capital accumulation and it 
seemed that focusing on technological progress leads us to divergence. Furthermore, 
Marelli and Signorelli (2008) examined the role of human capital in the European 
countries. In their paper they tried to explain the differences in productivity across EU 
countries by adding human capital to the growth model. They found that the education 
sector of an economy can be a “key factor of productivity differences”. 
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 Djistera (2006) also tested “the role of human capital in the Asian countries”. 
The results indicated that the level of human capital has a positive effect on economic 
growth and convergence process. They emphasized the role of a highly educated 
workforce in their study and mentioned “the quality of labour played particularly an 
important role in the outward orientation growth strategy through its impact on the 
quality of merchandise exports”.  
Highlighting the role of technology and knowledge on growth and trying to 
explain the different growth rate across countries through the channel of technology, 
makes the concept of human capital more important. Human capital becomes a source 
of imitation and innovation, which are stock of knowledge and important for growth. 
Economists like R. R. Nelson and Phelps (1966), Grossman and Helpman (1993), R. J. 
Barro and Lee (1994), and P.M. Romer (1986) emphasized the effect of human capital 
on growth through innovation as well as the level of human capital. In contrast to Lucas 
(1988), who argued that human capital accumulation is a main source of growth, they 
argued that the stock of human capital is important for the country not only to enhance 
its own technological innovation but also to increase its capacity to adopt these 
technologies from frontiers, and, therefore, accelerate their growth (Raiser et al., 2001).  
Human capital can generate new ideas and these new ideas induce technological 
progress. Therefore, the level of education and skill of the labour force becomes 
important in studies. 
In recent studies it can be seen that the composition of human capital has 
become very important (P. Aghion & P. Howitt, 2006; Krueger & Berg, 2003; N. G. 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Raiser et al., 2001; J.D. Sachs, 2003; Solow, 1956). R. Islam 
(2010), in his paper, applied different levels of education – initial, secondary and higher 
– and his results showed that poor countries with no skilled workers cannot take 
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advantage of technology or absorb technology from frontiers. He concluded that, 
“advanced countries are more likely to engage in innovating new technologies which 
require highly skilled human capital”. In the new growth theory a country that has the 
highest TFP is known as a country leader and countries far from the technology leader 
can take advantage of this backwardness and grow faster. This is known as the 
technology catch up theory. However, as mentioned originally by Abramovitz and 
David (1996), being far away from the technology leader does not guarantee the catch 
up progress unless they have sufficient social capital including education. Investing in 
human capital could increase the rate of innovation in technology in developed 
countries (P. Aghion & P. Howitt, 2006). Therefore, the role of education has become 
very important and policies enhancing education are very important to close the gap 
between the rich and poor (J. Benhabib & Rustichini, 1991). As R. Griffith et al. (2004) 
argued in their paper, innovation and R&D intensity play an important role in 
explaining the growth rate. However, this does not mean that countries that do not have 
highly educated labour to innovate cannot take advantage of this knowledge; the 
technology can transfer through other channels like the ability to imitate (absorptive 
capacity), international trade and FDI. In the debate on technology transfer, again 
human capital becomes important. The ability of a country to absorb technology is 
dependent on its human capital level. Furthermore, R&D and other factors like 
institutions and trade can improve the absorptive capacity of a country. 
This study tries to look at the debate of human capital through the two different 
classes of model: neoclassical model and new growth theory. 
In the neoclassical model, according to the assumption, human capital 
accumulation as well as physical capital accumulation is important for growth.  Now we 
want to look at the factors that can increase the accumulation of human capital. In 
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previous studies, investing in education was highlighted. By introducing new growth 
theories, innovation and imitation are important as well in explaining the growth. Here 
we reconcile the theory of neoclassical growth with these new factors that should 
contribute to growth. Institutions and globalization can increase the human capital 
accumulation. The more the country is open, the more it can observe advanced 
technology through FDI and international trade. Therefore, this item can be considered 
as an accelerator for observing technology. The other area that is important in 
accelerating technology diffusion is the role of institutions. By having proper 
institutions, countries that are far from the technology frontier can take advantage of this 
backwardness and can grow faster by adopting new technologies. 
In the new growth models, as creation and imitation become very important, we 
highlight the role of human capital in each of them, and, especially, the role of human 
capital in increasing the absorptive capacity.  
 
5.3 Institutional Factors in Economic Growth and Convergence 
As argued by D. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) the quality of 
institutions can be affected directly through three different ways: (1) “it reduces the 
informational asymmetries’ problems; (ii) it contributes to lower the various types of 
risks, as institutions define and enforce property rights; and (iii) it raises greater 
restrictions on politicians and interest groups’ actions, as institutions make them (more) 
accountable to citizens” (Dani Rodrik, Subramanian , & Trebbi, 2002). Also, De (2010) 
explained that “governance can also affect growth and income indirectly, through its 
impact on other determining factors such as trade, investments, infrastructure, and 
geography” (De, 2010). Therefore, this study uses six indicator proxies for good 
governance introduced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009): control of 
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corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, political stability 
and absence of violence and finally voice and accountability. The definition for each 
variable is available in chapter six.  It is expected that the relationship between each of 
the governance indicators and productivity will be positive, which means that 
improvement in governance increases the growth rate of countries. However, how does 
each class of model deal with the institutions phenomenon?  
One important difference between the neoclassical and evolutionary growth 
theory is in the way that they look at institutions. “Neoclassical economists tend to see 
institutions as created through and operating as they do because of the maximizing 
behavior of economic agents, and prevailing institutions as an equilibrium 
configuration. In contrast, evolutionary economists tend to see the institutional structure 
as always evolving” (R. Nelson, 2007).   
There is a class of model introduced by R. Nelson (2007), which was inspired by 
Schumpeter’s model but in some dimensions different from the Schumpeterian model. 
What makes this model different from the Schumpeter’ model is in identifying the role 
of institutional complexities of modern market economies.  
Similar to the neoclassical models, in the first generation of the endogenous 
growth model, there is no place for these complexities. One reason for oversimplifying 
the role of institutions is to focus more on reforming the limitation of the equilibrium 
concept in the growth models. Therefore, economists did not pay enough attention to 
investigate the assumption that the institutions can effect growth. The theory that they 
worked with consisted of firms, households and markets. Firms employ inputs for 
producing outputs, households supply labour and consume final outputs and markets 
adjust prices to equal the supply and demand. To enter institutions into the model the 
relationships that exist among markets, their institutional and social structures and the 
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way that they cooperate and trust each other should be recognized. The other important 
thing here is to identify the role of “non-market institutions” in the process of 
innovation. Developing institutional economics is a big step away from the Walrasian 
theory. 
By bringing institutions into the growth model, Nelson made the theory capable of 
making sense out of the aggregate time series of output in terms of GDP per capita. He 
believed that “satisfactory theory” can explain growth through “co evolution of 
technologies, firm and industry structures and supporting and governing institutions” 
(Nelson, 2007, p: 8). Nelson mentioned that a successful development has all these 
features in addition to the role of government policies, which can have a positive or 
negative effect on the growth of countries.  
Now, what is the perspective of the new growth theories about catching up and 
the convergence phenomenon? As said before, in the neoclassical theory, the 
accumulation of physical and human capital is very important. Neoclassical economists 
believe that as long as investment happens, they could have new technologies and new 
ways of doing things, even automatically. This point of view makes the new growth 
theory different. Although in the new growth models, investing in physical and human 
capital is very important to access new ways of doing things, it is not sufficient.  
Therefore, in this new growth theory, economists, like Nelson, Pack and Winter, 
believed that the main force of convergence is “Innovation and Assimilation”: 
assimilation is the means of learning about what other successful countries have been 
doing in their process of development over time. As said above there is no doubt that 
capital accumulation is necessary for innovation; however, if the country does not have 
an effective institutional structure, innovation will stop.  
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The important question here is: how do the institutional factors affect economic 
growth and through which channels? One possibility is through political instability, this 
factor is a motivation for investment in economies, for instance if there is no protection 
for property rights in an economy, the investment will reduce and so will the FDI (J. 
Benhabib & Rustichini, 1991; Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991; Tornell & Velasco, 1992). 
Therefore, political instability has a negative effect on investment and as investment in 
an economy has a positive effect on growth; we can conclude that political instability 
has a negative effect on growth. 
 R. J. Barro (1991) used the number of revolutions and coups, and political 
assassinations as a proxy for political instability and showed that there is a negative 
relationship between political instability and growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) also 
tested the relationship between growth and revolutions, and coups, and the index of civil 
liberties as a proxy for political and institutional indicators. The results indicated that 
there is no relationship between growth and the political indicators. Mauro (1995), in 
his paper, examined the effect of bureaucratic inefficiency and political instability on 
the growth rate of countries. Their findings showed that political instability has a 
negative effect on growth; however, the effect of the index of bureaucratic inefficiency 
is insignificant. 
 Alesina and Perotti (1996) also examined the effect of political instability on 
growth. They used “the number of politically motivated assassinations, the number of 
people killed in domestic mass violence, the number of successful and attempted coups, 
and a categorical variable for whether the nation is a democracy or a dictatorship”. The 
results indicated that the relationship is negative.  In line with previous studies, X. X. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) used different proxies for political and institutional indicators: law 
and order, political rights, civil liberties, number of revolutions, military coups and war 
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dummies. The first three variables have a positive effect on growth while the rest have a 
negative effect on growth. Furthermore, Asteriou and Price (2001), Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya (2005); Carmignani (2003), in their papers, investigated the effect of 
political instability on growth, their results support the positive relationship.  
Annett (2001); Bloom et al. (1998); Ellingsen (2000); Wayne Nafziger and 
Auvinen (2002), and Goldstone and Force (2005) used ethnic fractionalization as a 
proxy and showed that there is negative relationship between political instability and 
growth. Gastil (2002), in his study, indicated that civil liberties and political rights as 
proxies for institutional and political indicators have a positive effect on growth. Dreher 
(2003) used the same indicators as (Gastil), but the results were different. There was no 
significant effect on growth by these indicators. 
 D. Rodrik et al. (2002) investigated the quality of institutions on economies. The 
results were consistent with the theory in which better institutions have a positive effect 
on growth. Talukdar (2009) also examined the effect of institutional factors like law and 
order, democratic accountability and government stability, on growth. The results 
showed that there is positive relationship between institutional factors and growth.  
The other possibility is through the channel of technology transfer (knowledge 
spillovers). As said before, R&D activities play an important role in accelerating the 
speed of innovation, and, finally, growth. However, empirical evidence shows that those 
countries that do not have sufficient human capital can also grow at a good rate. This 
matter highlights the role of imitation (absorptive capacity) and technology transfer. 
One of the important items that can help speed the pace of technology transfer and the 
ability to absorb technology from the frontiers is the role of institutions. Having proper 
institutions increases the chance for the countries behind the technology leaders to take 
advantage of this backwardness and grow faster. This means that countries that are far 
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away from the technology leader, besides focusing on human capital and educating 
them, they should have an “appropriate institutional structure”. The empirical studies of 
R. Nelson (2007) showed that those countries that could build appropriate institutions as 
fast as possible could be successful.  
In previous studies most of the empirical studies use the structural and 
institutional change indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) as a proxy for institutions (Beck & Laeven, 2006; Eicher & 
Schreiber, 2005; Raiser et al., 2001; J.D. Sachs, 2003; Zeghni & Fabry, 2008). Some of 
the others, like Redek and Sušjan (2005), and Pääkkönen (2010) use the Heritage 
Foundation Index of economic freedom as a proxy for institutions, and, in some 
research, the results were insignificant and showed there is no relationship between 
institutions and growth. In this study, we employ different indicators for institutions, 
which were introduced by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and test two hypotheses: “in the new 
growth theory institutions have a positive effect on productivity through the channel of 
imitation (absorptive capacity) in high-income, middle-income and low-income 
countries” and “in the neoclassical growth theory, institutions have a positive effect on 
GDP growth through the accumulation of more human capital in high-income, middle-
income and low-income countries”.  
Institutions affect growth through governance. According to Kaufmann et al. 
(2009), the governance indicators that they introduced are the best proxies, which they 
define as “Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
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Nowadays, the role of policies and institutions are very significant in the debate on 
growth since having an efficient market needs good governance structures. Therefore, 
the major goal of governance is to enhance the condition of the markets (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; North, 1990). 
 
5.4 Globalization, Economic Growth and Convergence Progress 
As long as the consideration is about the economic growth and convergence 
across countries in the world, the debate of globalization arises. In this area there are 
two different ideas: one is supporting the positive force of globalization on decreasing 
the income gap across all countries, while the other idea is that globalization is a 
malignant and useless force for poor countries and that it only works for rich countries. 
In previous studies some of the authors like X. Sala-i-Martin (2002), D. Dollar and 
Kraay (2004), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), Agénor (2004), Ganuza, Morley, 
Pineiro, Robinson, and Vos (2005), and Neutel and Heshmati (2006) consider this 
phenomenon as an accelerator of growth, which leads to income convergence. They 
believed that the only thing that a country needs to do is simply open up its borders, 
reduce tariff rates, and attract foreign capital. Therefore, the poor will become rich and 
inequality will disappear as the poor countries catch up with the rich.  
However, some studies, like the one done by Slaughter (1997), show that trade 
liberalization leads to income divergence. D. Rodrik (1998), like Slaughter (1997), also 
did not find any effect of capital account openness on growth rate.  In addition, 
economists like Tsebelis and Garrett (2001), when grouping countries into two groups, 
rich and poor countries, found that the effect of FDI is positive on growth but only in 
rich countries. Milanovic and Squire (2005) in their studies, also indicate that 
globalization only affects the rich and industrialized countries and cannot help poor and 
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developing countries in the process of converging to the rich. Carkovic and Levine 
(2002) also found no relationship between foreign direct investment and growth. 
Nandakumar et al. (2004) found that trade and capital account liberalization has actually 
hurt the low-income countries, only benefiting higher income countries possessing 
stronger initial conditions in regard to infrastructure and human capital. 
In these studies for measuring globalization, most researchers only focussed on 
the economic aspects of globalization and used variables like trade, capital flow and 
openness as proxies for globalization, and, usually, also relied on the neoclassical 
growth theory and its assumption. Furthermore, most of them used cross sectional 
analysis, which does not consider time in their method, and also does not solve the 
problem of endogeneity, like the studies done by Alesina and Perotti (1996); 
Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997); Chanda (2005); D. Dollar and Wolff (1993); 
Frankel and Romer (1996); G. Garrett (2000); Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995); D. 
Rodrik (1998). However, after becoming aware of the shortcomings of this method, 
economists started using new methods like time series and sophisticated panel data, 
which consider both time and unit, such as fixed effect, random effect and first 
difference GMM. However, they still only focused on the economic aspects of 
globalization and some of the results were still inconsistent with the theories. According 
to Dreher (2003), what is important to highlight in this area is examining the results of 
globalization on growth in “greater detail”. These inconsistent results might be because 
of the omission of other important aspects of globalization from regression (Dreher, 
2003). Since the different dimensions of globalization are strongly related to each other, 
putting them separately into the model might cause a collinearity problem while 
omitting them could bias the results. Therefore, as what is more important here is the 
overall effect of globalization on growth, this study is going to contribute to the 
literature by using the new proxy for globalization introduced by Dreher (2003). As 
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Dreher (2003)  said, globalization is not only about the economic aspects. Dreher (2003)  
introduced an index in which two other dimensions of globalization are considered: 
social integration, and political integration. This index was named the KOF index and is 
calculated for 158 countries in the world, which Dreher (2003) used for ranking 
countries. This index was updated every year and available on the website of the “KOF 
index of globalization” until 2008. Details of the index are available in the table (1) in 
the appendix. Before Dreher, A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy (2002) calculated the overall 
index for globalization; however, their index has some problems. For example, some 
important dimensions of globalization are omitted and it was only calculated for three 
years, and, hence, it cannot be used for empirical investigations. 
 
5.5 Summary 
For decades the economic growth and its determinants have been the centre of 
attention. Why are some countries poor while others are rich? What causes growth in 
economies and which factors can accelerate this growth? Why can some countries catch 
up with the rich ones while others are trapped in the low-income level?  These questions 
have led economists to conduct empirical studies to find a proper answer.  This chapter 
tries to highlight the important areas that can contribute to economic convergence and 
growth: human capital, globalization and institutions. Governance indicators and the 
KOF index are the most comprehensive ones that can be found in databases that are 
ignored in recent studies for testing convergence. Therefore, in this research we apply 
them in our models by focusing on capital deepening accumulation and technological 
catching up theories. 
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6 Chapter 6 
Research methodology, model specification and data 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous sections, the importance of this study is its reopening 
of the debate on innovation and imitation. In respect of the innovation issue, the ability 
of a country to create and innovate new products is important, and, in imitation, the 
ability of a country to observe technology from advanced economies (absorptive 
capacity) becomes important.  In this study, we contribute to the literature by 
introducing institutions and globalization indicators as accelerators of absorptive 
capacity. Furthermore, we applied these new aspects of innovation and imitation in the 
neoclassical growth regression through the human capital channel and reconcile the 
neoclassical regression with these factors.  Now this chapter is going to describe the 
estimation method and the sample and data that are going to be used in this study. This 
chapter will be divided into 6 sections. The next section is a description of the 
estimation method in this study. The third section concerns the model and the variables 
used in the study, which are in two parts. The first part belongs to the new endogenous 
growth models while the second part concerns the neoclassical growth models. Then the 
variables applied in the research are defined and the expected sign described. 
Furthermore, the sources of data and list of countries that have been estimated are listed. 
Finally, the fourth section presents the research hypotheses.  
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6.2 Estimation Method 
In the previous studies, researchers like R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
and N. G. Mankiw et al. (1992) used cross sectional analysis, which failed to address 
some problems. In cross sectional analysis, it is clear there is no place for showing the 
effect of time variation, therefore, since the economic growth is a process happening 
over time it is necessary to use an alternative method for showing the effect of variables 
over time. In addition, they did not account for the problem of endogeneity and omitted 
variables and country specific effects. The nature and structure of countries are 
different; therefore, it is far from reality to assume that countries are homogenous. 
Hence, in order to solve these problems and have more accuracy in estimations, panel 
methods are used. Panel data have some advantages compared to cross sectional data 
and time series data. Both the time series and cross section only consider one 
dimension: time and individual, respectively. However, panel data considers at least 
both dimensions – time and individual – which provides “more informative data, more 
variability, less co linearity among variables, more degrees of freedom, and more 
efficiency” (Gujarati, 1995). 
Another advantage of using panel data is behind the power of analysing and 
evaluating policies and programmes. “One can better assess the impact of economic, 
political, institutional, and social policies and programs because the same cross-
sectional units are observed in each time-period” (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). R. J. 
Barro and Lee (1994) and R. J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995) tried to solve the 
problem of endogeneity. Although they could solve the problem of serial correlation, 
the problems of “inaccurate standard error” and “correlated individual effects” still 
remain. M. Knight et al. (1993) and N. Islam (1995) tried to solve the problem of 
correlated individual effects. However, they ignored the problem of endogeneity. The 
83 
problem with their method is that it is only applicable if all the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous and if some of the variables are predetermined or endogenous; there 
is a correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term, which make the 
results biased.  
For solving these problems, scholars like Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), 
and Arellano and Bond (1991) developed an estimator for dynamic panel data models 
named first differenced generalized method of moments.  In addition, F. Caselli et al. 
(1996) applied their method for the first time in growth literature, after which, many 
scholars used similar methods like J. Benhabib and Spiegel (1997); Jess Benhabib and 
Spiegel (2000), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Forbes (2000) in their research. 
However, this method has its own shortcomings, inasmuch as it behaves poorly when 
the time series are persistent, because the lagged levels of the variables, which are used 
as weak instruments for subsequent first difference, still correlate with the error term. 
Therefore, to solve this problem, Arellano and Bover (1995), and R. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) developed an estimator named system GMM. This estimates a system of 
equations in both first differences and levels, where in the levels equations the lagged 
first differences of the series are used as instruments and for the difference equation the 
lagged two period or more of the dependent variable and first differences of the series 
are used as instruments. Therefore, by using sysGMM the estimates are no longer 
biased by any omitted variables and there is no problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, 
by taking first differences the problem of the country specific effect is also solved.  
Pedroni (2008), in his workshop in the IMF, discussed how to choose the best 
estimator for the panel dataset. He argued that the proportion of the number of 
individuals to the length of time (N/T) could be a good way for choosing the best 
method. He suggested that if the time series is short relative to individuals, fixed effect, 
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generalized method of moments (GMM), system generalized method of moments 
(sysGMM) are the best estimators to apply for estimation amongst the others. For these 
panel datasets with the short time series, it is assumed that the data are stationary and so 
there is no need to do a unit root test. Using instruments variables are valid including 
owns lagged. However, in the cases where lagged dependent variables are included in 
the model, there is no place for fixed and random effects estimators and GMM is the 
best one.  
Statistical diagnostics play an important role in identifying the validity of the 
results of estimations. In the OLS method, the estimator should be BLUE and there are 
some assumptions like normality, homoscedasticity, and non-autocorrelation, which, 
together, make the method reliable. However, System GMM allows for 
heteroscedasticity in data and the distribution of error terms should not necessarily be 
normal. As Baltagi (2009) argued in his book, dynamic panel models have a problem 
with heteroscedasticity of data; however, it can be controlled (Baltagi, 2009), p. 144). In 
dynamic system GMM, as the instruments are applied, the Sargan test is used for testing 
the correlation between the error tem and the instruments and the null hypothesis is 
whether the instruments are valid in the sense that they are not correlated with the error 
term in the first difference equation.  If the Sargan test is rejected it means that the 
overidentifying restrictions are not valid so the instruments are not valid.  For testing the 
residual serial correlation, there are the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, where the null 
hypothesis of each test is that the test should reject the null of no first order serial 
correlation, however, it should not reject the null that there is no second-order serial 
correlation (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007; Roodman, 2006) 
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6.2.1 A Consistent Estimator for Growth Regressions 
In this section we describe the growth regression that we derive from the Solow-
Swan model and also from the new growth theory to be estimated by system GMM. The 
first section describes the first model, which is the new endogenous growth model. The 
second model describes the extended neoclassical growth model. 
 
6.2.1.1 Estimating the New Growth Model by System GMM 
The following chart shows the framework that we follow to insert variables into 
the model: 
 
 
In this class of models for explaining convergence, according to Paul M Romer 
(1986), P Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Charles Jones (1998), the stock of knowledge 
Figure 6-1: New growth model framework 
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is very important in explaining the growth rate of countries in addition to accumulation 
of human capital. Therefore, we added two components of knowledge stock to the 
model: imitation and innovation. In addition, in the imitation part we focused on the role 
of institutions and globalization factors plus human capital and try to show their effect 
through the channel of absorptive capacity.  
By combining the new growth theory with the empirical evidence of the role of 
creation and imitation the following equation is derived as the growth equation in our 
study (Castellacci, 2011).  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑖,𝑡⁄ = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽1 +∝1)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜇log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − ζ𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡       (6-1) 
Since YF is constant across countries we can put it as a constant term, which can differ 
over time ζ𝑡 (time dummy). 
Where:  
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡is annual GDP per capita growth rate between 1996 and 2010. 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ is lagged annual GDP per capita growth rate between 1996 and 2010. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is annual Secondary school enrolment ratio 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is annual gross formation of capital 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is annual index and FDI  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is research intensity and number of scientific journals  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is governance indicators  
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is annual lagged level of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $)  
between 1996 and 2010. 
𝜇 is convergence rate  
ζt  is time dummy 
𝜌𝑖 Country specific effect  
This equation is our guide to have a useful specification for empirical research. 
Using the cross sectional approach in previous studies just assumed away the cross-
country specific and time affects across countries and assumes that countries are 
homogenous. Since this assumption is far from reality, in the case of this study, by 
using panel estimators there is a place for reflecting country specific effects (𝜌𝑖) and 
period specific intercepts ζ𝑡, which captures things that are common in all countries 
like technology changes in the US. As can be seen, we indexed all of the variables by 
time to explore the changes of the variables during time in each country (i) rather than 
just across countries, this is the notion of panel data.  Clearly the above equation (6-1) 
can be written as:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽1 +∝1)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
(1 + 𝜇)log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − ζ𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡      (6-2) 
In addition, according to R Blundell and Bond.S (1998) , by taking first difference from 
equation (6-2) the country specific effects will be removed from the equation and so the 
assumption  E(𝜌𝑖∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 0 is satisfied.  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛾 + 𝛽4)∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽1 +∝1)∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
(1 + 𝜇)∆log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃∆𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − ζ𝑡 − ζ𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡      (6-3) 
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It should be highlighted here that this assumption does not imply that the 
country specific effect does not have any effect on growth, however, these effects will 
be presented in the model by other steady state determinates, like investment rate and 
physical capital.  This assumption means that there is no correlation between economic 
growth and the country specific effect in the absence of other variables. 
 
6.2.1.2 Estimating the Neoclassic Growth Model by System GMM 
The following chart shows how we apply the variables to the model. 
Figure 6-2: Neoclassical growth model framework 
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As can be seen, human capital can be accumulated through four channels in this study: 
1- investment in education, the most common proxy for human capital 
accumulation, 
2- globalization ( through technology transfer), for late-comer countries, 
3- institutions (through imitation or increasing absorptive capacity), and  
4- innovation ( through investing in R&D activities) 
Part of GDP is going to be invested in education, which leads to the formation of 
human capital. Therefore, secondary school enrolment as a proxy for investment in 
primary education is added to the model and the number of scientific journals can be a 
proxy for higher level of education. Another way of accumulating human capital is 
through technology spillovers and absorbing new technologies as these need a certain 
level of human capital. Globalization, particularly in the form of FDI, is a way for 
technology spillovers to take place. Globalization is multi-dimensional, even if limited 
to economics.  It covers trade, capital flows, migration, but, very importantly, 
technology transfer. The KOF index covers the dimensions of political, social and 
economy.  Furthermore, institutions, which become the important determinants of 
economic growth in recent literature, are the other channel for accumulation of human 
capital. These two concepts, institutions and globalization, are included in the model by 
considering the fact from the new growth theory that the absorptive capacity of a 
country can present a possibility for accelerated human capital 
accumulation(Bidlingmaier, 2007).  
From chapter 3, we have equation (3-28), which is our guide for a useful 
specification for empirical research. As mentioned before, using the cross sectional 
approach just assumed away the cross-country specific and time affects across countries 
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and assumes that countries are homogenous; since this assumption is far from reality, by 
using panel estimators there is a place for reflecting country specific effects (𝜌𝑖) and 
period specific intercepts ζ𝑡, which captures things that are common in all countries. 
As can be seen, we indexed all of the variables by time to explore the changes of the 
variables over time in each country (i) rather than just across countries; this is the notion 
of panel data.   
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡+(1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝜋𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 +
𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝜗𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡) + (1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡)
𝜌𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡) −
(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + (𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 − 1)𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (6-4) 
And the general form of equation 6-4 is like the following equation: 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4 ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜃5 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜃6 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝜃7ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜃8𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (6-5) 
Where: 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) is annual GDP per capita growth rate between 1996 and 2010. 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑠ℎ ) is annual secondary school enrolment rate 
𝐿𝑛(𝑠𝑘 ) is annual gross capital formation(%GDP) 
ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵) is annual KOF index and annual foreign direct investment (%GDP) 
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂) is research intensity and number of scientific journals 
ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆) is governance indicators 
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𝐿𝑛(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) is population growth rate plus 0.05, based on the assumption of the 
Solow model. (n is population growth rate, g is technology progress and δ is 
depreciation rate) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡−1) is annual lagged level of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $) 
between 1996 and 2010. 
𝜁𝑡 is time dummy  
𝜌𝑖 is country dummy  
Clearly the above equation (6-1) can be written as: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4 ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜃5 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜃6 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝜃7ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + (1 + 𝜃8)𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (6-6) 
And, according to R Blundell and Bond.S (1998) , by taking first difference 
from equation (6-6) the country specific effects will be removed from the equation and 
so the assumption  E(𝜌𝑖∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 0 is satisfied.  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃2∆𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4 ∆ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜃5 ∆ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜃6 ∆ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝜃7∆ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + (1 + 𝜃8)∆𝐿𝑛 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 − 𝜁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6-7) 
It should be highlighted here that this assumption does not imply that the 
country specific effect does not have any effect on growth; however, these effects will 
be presented in the model by other steady state determinants, like investment rate and 
physical capital.  This assumption means that there is no correlation between economic 
growth and the country specific effect in the absence of other variables.   
To make a comparison between this model and the augmented Solow model, G. 
Mankiw, D. Romer, and D. N. Weil (1992) argued that we consider two different 
models in our analysis. The first model is the augmented Solow model that includes 
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human capital, and the second one is the model that we explained above. The first 
model can be derived from the second model by applying some restrictions to the 
second model: θ4 =θ5 =θ6=0 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜃5𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
           (6-8 
This equation is the augmented Solow model. We test both these two equations 
(6-5) and (6-8) investigate the significant effect of each explanatory variable added to 
the Solow model on economic growth.  
 
6.2.2 Data and measurement issues 
For estimating equation (6-3) the data for GDP per capita growth rate, level of 
GDP per capita, gross formation of capital, secondary school enrolment ratio, FDI, KOF 
index, governance indicators, R&D inputs, TFP and product varieties are used.  For 
estimating equation (6-4) population growth is added to the equation according to the 
assumption of the Solow-Swan model. The data included here are from low-income, 
high-income and middle-income countries, which are listed in the next section. The data 
covers the period of 1996 to 2010. The data are constructed as follows. 
- GDP per capita growth rate: GDP per capita growth rate is used for 
testing the convergence process, as a dependent variable. The growth rate is 
calculated by subtracting the values of real GDP per capita from the values of 
previous year. According to the World Bank (2010) the definition of real GDP per 
capita is “the total value of the final uses of goods and services, plus exports and 
minus imports of goods and services produced annually by a country divided by the 
93 
country’s total population”. The values are in constant 2005 international Dollar. 
The data is available from the World Bank database (2010).  
- Lagged level of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $): 
according to the theory for testing the convergence hypotheses the initial level of 
GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $) should be added to the model as 
one of the independent variables to see whether or not developing and undeveloped 
countries can converge and catch up with the developed ones. The sign and 
statistical significant of this variable is very important since if it is negative it means 
that convergence is happening otherwise there is divergence. The values are in 
constant 2005 international Dollar adjusting for inflation by PPP. The data are 
available from the World Bank database (2010). 
- Formation of Capital: according to the Solow model, and following G. 
Mankiw et al. (1992), gross capital formation is included in the model as another 
independent variable for physical capital accumulation. The data are available from 
the World Bank database (2010). 
- Population growth rate: According to the Solow model population 
growth rate is added to the model as a proxy for labour supply and population age 
structure and following G. Mankiw et al. (1992) we add (0.05) to this rate as a 
reasonable assessment of the value of (g+δ).  The data are available from the World 
Bank database (2010). 
- Human capital: G. Mankiw et al. (1992) in their paper made a criticism 
about the standard Solow model and argued that the growth rate of countries cannot 
be explained by only considering physical capital, and, to solve the problem, they 
added human capital to the model. The variable that they considered as a proxy for 
human capital was school enrolment in primary and secondary. In this study, we 
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want to contribute to the literature by incorporating three other aspects that can be 
considered as accelerators of human capital accumulation: globalization, institutions 
and innovation. These new aspects were introduced by the new growth theory 
through technology channel in the literature, but since we want to retain the 
assumptions of the neoclassical models, exogenous technology assumption, we 
applied them through the channel of human capital and count them as accelerators 
of human capital accumulation in the model. Therefore, we applied the following 
variables: 
o Secondary school enrolment ratio: is included as an 
independent variable as a proxy for human capital. According to UNESCO the 
definition is “gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, 
to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education 
that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong 
learning and human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented 
instruction using more specialized teachers”. The data are available from the World 
Bank database (2010). 
- Total factor productivity growth rate: According to the World 
productivity database (WPD), the definition of TFP is part of the changes in 
production that are not related to labour and capital inputs. For calculating the TFP 
growth rate, we are following “growth accounting”,3 which was inspired by Hall 
Jones’ (1999) production function.  
𝑌 = 𝐴 𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼                                                                                                             (6-5)        
                                                 
3“Growth accounting” is a procedure used in economics to measure the contribution of different factors to economic growth and to 
indirectly compute the rate of technological progress, measured as a residual, in an economy. This methodology was introduced by 
Robert Solow in 1957 
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Where, Y is real GDP, k is capital stock, L is labour force and α is share of income in                               
capital stock, which is assumed to be constant.  
By dividing equation (6-5) by L, we can examine how much of the variation of Y can be 
explained by the observed factor as K and how much by unobserved “residual” factor as 
TFP. Therefore, we have the following equation: 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘𝛼                                                                                                                       (6-6) 
 And from this equation we can estimate TFP: 
𝐴 = 𝑇𝐹𝑃 =  
𝑦
𝑘𝛼
                                                                                                         (6-7) 
The share of capital is assumed to equal to 0.30.  For estimating TFP the amount 
of capital stock is needed, which is not available from the World Bank dataset or Penn 
World table (PWT). Therefore, following Francesco Caselli, Gerardo Esquivel, and 
Fernando Lefort (1996)’s method, the equation for capital accumulation is as follows: 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1                                                                                         (6-8) 
Where, K is the amount of capital, δ is depreciation rate assumed to be 5% according to 
Bosworth and Collins (2003), I is investment, i denotes country and t is for time period.  
According to Griliches (1996) and Lee and Guo (2004) , for having initial capital stock 
we can estimate the following equation: 
𝐾𝑡−1 =
𝐼𝑡−1
𝑔+𝛿
                                                                                                              (6-9) 
Where, g is economic growth measured by annual average of real GDP over 1960 to 
2010.  
- R&D: This study drives R&D from R&D expenditure, because the data 
for R&D expenditure are available for most of the countries. Timing R&D 
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expenditure by GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $) divided by 100 
gives the R&D input. According to the World Bank, R&D expenditure is “the gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) is composed of the combined expenditures 
of business enterprise, higher education, government, and private non-profit sectors 
and is expressed as a percentage of GDP in constant 2005 dollar”. 
- Product varieties: According to the Schumpeterian growth models, 
employment (P Aghion & Howitt, 1998; J Ha & P  Howitt, 2007) and GDP 
(Krugman, 1994) are usually measures of product variety. In this study we run the 
models by applying both, and because the results are more promising using 
employment we use that one accordingly.  
- Research intensity: For measuring research intensity, R&D input should 
be normalized. This study follows J Ha and P  Howitt (2007) and Madsen (2008), so 
R&D input is divided by employment (population) and TFP for measuring research 
intensity.  
- Number of scientific journals: are included as an independent variable, 
which affect human capital accumulation. According to the World Development 
Indicators (WDI 2010) database this variable refers to scientific articles published in 
the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, 
engineering and technology and earth and space sciences. The data are available 
from the World Bank database (2010). 
- Globalization (GLOB): KOF index and FDI are included as 
independent variables, which affect human capital accumulation. What we 
contribute to the literature here is using an alternative factor, KOF index, instead of 
applying trade and openness as proxies for globalization. Since in the recent growth 
literature it is very important to consider trade as a flow of ideas and goods instead 
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of just considering it as the flow of goods, in this study we are going to use the 
index introduced by Dreher (2003) that covers all of these aspects. The advantage of 
this index is that it covers three different dimensions: economic integration, political 
integration and social integration.  
o KOF index: is included as an independent variable as a proxy for 
globalization. According to Dreher (2003), the KOF index “is covering three most 
important aspects: economic integration, social integration and political integration. 
To measure these dimensions, 23 variables have been combined to three sub-indexes 
using an objective statistical method” (Dreher, 2003). The values are between zero 
to ten scales. The higher the value the more open the economy.  
o Foreign direct investment (FDI): is included as an independent 
variable as a proxy for globalization. According to the World Bank website: 
“Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating 
in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in 
the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars.” 
- Institutions: Governance indicators are included as independent variables, 
which affect human capital accumulation. As the role of governance – as a proxy 
for institutional factors – is often cited as the missing link in the recent growth 
literature, the current study aims to clarify these effects. Kaufmann et al. (2009), 
on a research project, introduced indicators that covered 212 countries and 
measured six dimensions of governance. The data are available on worldwide 
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governance indicators in Worldwide Governance indicators (WGI), World Bank 
database 2010. We cannot add all of these six dimensions into one equation 
because the results of the pairwise correlation test, which are shown in the 
appendix, indicate that these six indicators are highly correlated with each other, 
so they should be added separately to the model4: 
o Voice and accountability( G6) : “Captures perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media” (WGI, 2010). 
o Political stability and absence of violence (G3): “Measures the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” 
(WGI, 2010). 
o Government effectiveness(G2): “Captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies” (WGI, 2010). 
o Regulatory quality (G4): “Captures perceptions of the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development” (WGI, 2010). 
                                                 
4 - The  methodology of calculation of these indicators can be found on  the appendix  
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o Rule of law (G5): “Captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and, in particular, the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence” (WGI, 2010). 
o Control of corruption (G1): “Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests” 
(WGI, 2010). 
Table 6-1 shows all the variables used in the model with their expected signs. 
Table 6-1: Expected signs of variables 
Independent variables Signs 
Ln. GDP per capita Negative 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) Positive 
Population Growth Negative 
Secondary school enrolment Positive 
Number of Scientific journals Positive 
FDI Positive 
KOF index Positive 
R&D intensity Positive 
Government Effectiveness Positive 
Regulatory Quality Positive 
Rule of law Positive 
Voice and accountability Positive 
Control of corruption Positive 
Political stability and absence of violence Positive 
 
According to the initial works of R. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the relation 
between GDP per capita growth rate and initial level of GDP per capita is negative. 
Many economists after them confirm this negative sign; therefore, I also expect to find a 
negative relationship between GDP per capita and TFP and respective growth rates.  
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The relationship between the formation of capital, economic growth and 
convergence is expected to be positive. Solow believed that the saving rate is constant, 
however, others like Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) considered it as an endogenous 
factor, which affects economic growth.  In addition R. J. Barro (1991) discussed that 
more savings shift the level of steady state upward, which increases the growth. 
Moreover, several studies like those done by G. Mankiw et al. (1992), Bassanini and 
Ernst (2002) and Ederveen, Groot, and Nahuis (2006) approved the positive effect of 
saving rate on economic growth.   
Population growth rate is a key factor to show the structure of age in an 
economy and also indicates the amount of labour supply in an economy. According to 
Solow (1956), the more population growth, the less capital-labour ratio an economy has, 
which reduces investments in that economy. G. Mankiw et al. (1992), and S. Ederveen, 
H.L.F. Groot, and R. Nahuis (2006) show that population growth has a negative effect 
on growth. This research is also expecting a negative sign for population growth on 
growth.  
 Paul M Romer (1986), in his research, discussed the role of human capital on 
growth and considered it as another engine of growth. After him, several people worked 
on this area and proxied different variables for measuring human capital. In general, it is 
difficult to find an adequate proxy for this factor. School enrolment rate is used by G. 
Mankiw et al. (1992), R. J. Barro (1991) and R. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). This 
study uses the secondary school enrolment variable as a proxy for human capital to 
examine the effect of each on growth and to determine the effect of it on convergence 
process. This is expected to have a positive sign.  
The KOF index and foreign direct investment are used as proxies for 
globalization. The expected sign is positive for this group of indicators. Dreher (2003)  
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introduced the KOF index, which includes three sub-indexes: economic integration, 
political integration and social integration. In his paper he concludes that, in general, 
globalization can promote growth. Here, in this study, we use these two indices to show 
their effect on the growth and convergence process. Kottaridi (2005), Krueger and Berg 
(2003), and D. Dollar and Kraay (2004) found a positive relationship between trade and 
growth. We also expect to find a positive relationship.  For FDI, some researchers 
argued that there is a positive relationship between this and growth in countries that are 
rich Blomström et al. (1997), while others believe that there is negative relationship 
between them in low-income countries (Geoffrey Garrett, 2000). In this research we 
investigate this relationship according to three groups of countries with different levels 
of income.  
According to several economists, such as Cappelen, Fagerberg, and Verspagen 
(1999), and Bassanini and Ernst (2002), research intensity is an item that can increase 
productivity, and, therefore, growth through improving technology. However, an 
important matter here is a good combination of labour force and technology progress. 
Human capital should have sufficient skills to use these technologies (Miles & Scott, 
2002). Therefore, here we expect to find a positive relationship between research 
intensity and growth. 
Political and institutional factors are also very important in growth. As explained 
in the literature review, economists use several indicators for the proxy. However, here, 
for the first time, we want to examine the effect of six different variables, named as 
governance indicators, which were introduced by Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
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6.2.3 Sources of Data and List of countries 
6.2.3.1 Sources for Data 
The sources of data used for analysis consist of:  
· World Development Indicators, 2010: “World Development Indicators” (WDI) is 
the primary World Bank database for development data from officially-recognized 
international sources. The WDI includes data from 209 countries spanning from 
1960 to 2010. It presents the most current and accurate global development data 
available, and includes national, regional and global estimates.” (World Bank, 
2010). This database covers 16 topics including: 
1. Agriculture and rural development 2. Infrastructure 
3. Aid effectiveness 4. Labour and social protection  
5. Economic policy and external debt  6. Poverty  
7. Education 8. Private sector 
9. Energy and mining  10. Public sector 
11. Environment  12. Science and technology  
13. Financial sector  14. Social development  
15. Health  16. Urban development 
· The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (1996-2010): the dataset 
includes six dimensions of governance for 213 economies over the period 1996–
2010: 
o Voice and Accountability 
o Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
o Government Effectiveness 
o Regulatory Quality 
o Rule of Law 
o Control of Corruption 
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The dataset is available for 1986, 1998 and 2000 and annually from 2002 to 
2010. The data collected through the responses of citizens and experts on the 
government quality. The range of tolerance for these indicators is from -2.5 to +2.5, the 
lower value belongs to the country with lower government quality. 
 
6.2.3.2 List of Countries 
This study has grouped countries as listed in table 6-1, which are divided based 
on their income-level based on World Bank classification in 2011.5  
For high-income countries, OECD countries have been chosen, and, since the 
data was not available for most of the variables in Estonia and Korea Rep., these two 
were dropped from the sample.  For low-income countries, Afghanistan, Somalia, 
Zimbabwe and Mauritania were dropped because there were no data for governance 
indicators and KOF index for these countries. Across middle-income countries (108 
countries), 90 countries have been chosen and 18 countries dropped because the lack of 
data for most of the variables. These groups of countries, for which most of the data are 
available, are evaluated from 1996-2010. 
Table 6-2: list of Countries in each group 
High-income High-income High-income 
Australia Hungary Poland 
Austria Iceland Portugal 
Belgium Ireland Slovak Republic 
Canada Italy Slovenia 
Czech Republic Israel Spain 
Denmark Japan Sweden 
Finland Luxembourg Switzerland 
France Netherlands United Kingdom 
Germany New Zealand United States 
Greece Norway 
 
                                                 
5 - For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies is gross national income 
(GNI) per capita. Economies are divided according to 2010 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The 
groups are: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006 - $3,975; upper middle income, $3,976 - $12,275; and high 
income, $12,276 or more. 
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Table 6-2: continued 
Low-income Low-income Low-income 
Bangladesh Gambia, The Niger 
Benin Guinea Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Haiti Sierra Leone 
Burundi Kenya Tajikistan 
Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic Tanzania 
Central African Republic Liberia Togo 
Chad Madagascar Uganda 
Comoros Malawi Myanmar 
Congo, Dem. Rep Mali Nepal 
Eritrea Mozambique Ethiopia 
 
Table 6-2: continued 
Middle-income Middle-income Middle-income Middle-income 
Angola Ecuador Seychelles Cameroon 
Algeria Jordan South Africa Cape Verde 
Philippines Kazakhstan St. Lucia Congo, Rep. 
Antigua and Barbuda Latvia 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Honduras Lebanon Suriname Djibouti 
Azerbaijan Libya Thailand Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Belarus Lithuania Tunisia El Salvador 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia, FYR Turkey Albania 
Botswana Malaysia Uruguay Armenia 
Brazil Maldives Venezuela, RB Belize 
Bulgaria Mauritius Samoa Bhutan 
Chile Mexico 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
Bolivia 
China Namibia Senegal Cuba 
Colombia Indonesia Solomon Islands Dominica 
Costa Rica India South Sudan 
Dominican 
Republic 
Papua New Guinea Vietnam Paraguay Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia Fiji Panama Georgia 
Peru Ghana Romania Guatemala 
Russian Federation Guyana Morocco Tonga 
Mongolia 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Nicaragua Ukraine 
Nigeria Uzbekistan Iraq Sri Lanka 
Pakistan Vanuatu Kiribati Sudan 
Moldova Swaziland   
Note: This group is a combination of upper middle-income and lower middle-income countries 
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6.3 Research Hypotheses 
Given the discussion of research objectives in chapter one the following 
hypotheses will be tested in this research for three groups of countries with different 
levels of income from the period 1996 to 2009.  
Hypothesis 1: There is no difference in the explanatory power of the NCGM and 
NGM across the sample of countries. There is a big disagreement between these two 
schools of thought on the sources of growth: whether technological changes are the 
most important sources of growth or formation of capital. 
Hypothesis 2:  Convergence in middle- and low-income countries is faster than in 
high-income countries in both the neoclassical and new growth theories. According to 
the theories of convergence, in both theories, countries that are poorer and are far away 
from technology leaders tend to grow faster than rich ones or the leaders. 
Hypothesis 3: Globalization, institutions and innovation factors have a positive 
impact on productivity growth (as components of knowledge growth) and have the 
fastest convergence speed in the sample of countries. 
 To show how different dimensions of technology evolved in past years, this study 
follows the standard analysis of testing convergence, β convergence, for innovation 
intensity, human capital, innovation, globalization and studies how their statistical 
distributions have evolved over the past thirteen years and which of them have the 
fastest speed among the others in each group of countries. 
 Hypothesis 4: Globalization can help poor countries to come out of the trap of 
low-income level in both models. There are two points of view about globalization 
phenomenon. One group believes that globalization is a malignant force that only helps 
advanced countries to take advantage of backwardness(Carkovic & Levine, 2002; 
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Milanovic & Squire, 2005; Slaughter, 1997). However, the other group believes that 
globalization can also help poor countries to come out of the low-income trap and catch 
up with the rich ones(Agénor, 2004; Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 2002; Ganuza et al., 2005; 
Neutel & Heshmati, 2006). 
 Hypothesis 5: Institutions have a positive relationship with growth in both classes 
of models. Appropriate institutions and government policies can help countries further 
from their leader to take advantage of this backwardness and grow faster. 
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7 Chapter 7 
Estimation Results 
7.1 Introduction 
In presenting the empirical results, this chapter seeks to do the following.  The 
overall objective is to provide an empirical basis for the many theories of convergence 
and to benchmark other research on these theories.  The first specific objective is to test 
the convergence hypothesis across different countries using the neoclassical and new 
growth models. The second is to evaluate the applicability of these models to the data 
set we are using.  The third is to study the explanatory power of additional variables like 
globalization, innovation and institutions on growth that have not been taken into 
account in existing studies. In doing so, we shall also explore whether the level of 
economic development matters in the explanatory power of these variables.   
The rest of this chapter is as follows. The next section reports the results of β 
convergence in terms of GDP per capita based on augmented Solow-Swan regression 
(neoclassical growth regression) in low-income, middle-income and high-income 
countries. It also examines the role played by the variables cited above in explaining β 
convergence. The results of sigma convergence are also reported in this section. Section 
three is about the results of β convergence in terms of GDP per capita based on applying 
new growth regression in low-income, middle-income and high-income countries. This 
section also reports the results of φ convergence in terms of each technology dimension 
that is considered in this study – innovation, globalization and institutions – to show 
how the technology gap evolved in recent years.  Finally, section four is the conclusion. 
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7.2 Neoclassical growth model 
This section tests the β convergence hypothesis in terms of GDP per capita in 
three groups of countries – high-income, middle-income and low-income countries – 
using the DSGMM6 method. As said before, convergence happens when there is a 
negative relationship between the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita and 
initial amount of GDP per capita, which means that countries that are far from their 
steady state (poor countries) can grow faster and reach to the steady state growth path 
rather than those that are closer (rich countries).  Therefore, if the sign of initial GDP 
per capita is negative it means that convergence happened across countries.   
β convergence is tested by applying equations (7-1) and (7-2) in samples of low-
income, middle-income and high-income countries between 1996 and 2010 in terms of 
GDP per capita based on the neoclassical theory.  
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜃4ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜃5𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
            (7-1) 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4 ln(1 + 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜃5 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜃6 ln(1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝜃7ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) + 𝜃8𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜁𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (7-2) 
All the variables are taken in natural log form. In addition, for institutions, 
innovation and globalization in equation (7-2) all the variables are normalized before 
entering for estimation to become between zero and one. Therefore in this form they can 
act like an accelerator coefficient for the human capital factor.  
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7.2.1 Testing β Convergence in First Augmented Solow-Swan Model 
We begin with the augmented Solow-Swan model (equation 7-1). Table (7-1) 
reports the results for the whole as well as the split samples.  
Table 7-1 Testing convergence in the first Augmented Solow-Swan Model using dynamic system GMM 
VARIABLES Whole sample High-income Low-income Middle-income 
     
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.139*** 0.196*** -0.118** 0.0164* 
 (0.00483) (0.0278) (0.0479) (0.00994) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.00106*** -0.0139*** -0.0212 -0.478*** 
 (3.26e-05) (0.369) (0.415) (0.0370) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.158*** 0.280 0.191** 1.198*** 
 (0.00448) (0.388) (0.841) (0.0830) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 2.157*** 3.484*** 0.231*** 4. 609* 
 (1.00496) (1.067) (0.0806) (1.0313) 
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 0.05) -1.208*** -0.115*** -0.218*** -0.022*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0803) (0.00989) (0.00789) 
     
Implied λ 0.0000707 0.00107 … 0.0500 
     
Observations 1,616 392 298 1231 
Number of code 149 29 30 90 
Sargan test,P-value 0.3435 1.0000 0.9987 1.0000 
AR(1),P-value 0.0000 0.0042 0.3226 0.0003 
AR(2),P-value 0.0768 0.2548 0.3654 0.9269 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, time dummies are also included in 
estimated regression, the results are not reported here.  
 
 
According to the Augmented Solow-Swan regression we are expecting a 
positive sign for θ2 and θ3 and negative for θ4. As can be seen from table (7-1), we can 
see that for all of the variables this prediction is true for all groups. However, the 
significance and magnitude coefficient of each variable are different in different groups, 
which will be discussed later. 
The other implication of this model is about speed of convergence, which is calculated 
by the following formula (G. Mankiw et al., 1992): 
Implies speed of convergence: θ = (𝑒−𝜆𝑡 − 1) → 𝜆 = −1/𝑡[𝐿𝑛(1 +  𝜃)] 
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The implied speed of convergence is reported in the same table (7-1). As can be 
seen, the speed of convergence is 0.0000707 for the whole sample, 0.05001 for middle-
income countries, 0.001 for high-income countries and no convergence for low-income 
countries. This means that middle-income countries of the sample move halfway to the 
steady state in about 13 years,7 for high-income countries the speed of countries is very 
slow and takes decades to move to the steady state. In addition, the results show no 
convergence according to this model for low-income countries. The results for middle-
income countries is much larger from the results of G. Mankiw et al. (1992), which 
reported a speed of convergence for 0.0137 a year using the same regression, and lower 
than that found by Malcolm Knight, Norman Loayza, and Delano Villanueva (1993), 
which is 0.0631 for developing countries, also using the same regression.  These huge 
differences can be discussed by the method and nature of the data that they used for 
estimating the growth regressions. In their study, G. Mankiw et al. (1992) did not care 
about the country specific effect and the relationship that it could have with other 
explanatory variables. It is true that Knight applied panel data analysis but even in his 
study he ignored the problem of endogeneity of some variables in the model and also 
the fact that the lagged level of the dependent variable, in this study, lagged GDP 
growth, can also affect the dependent variable. Therefore, they ignored the problem of 
endogeneity, which, in this study, by applying dynamic system GMM, we account for 
country specific effects by taking first difference from the regression and we account for 
omitted and endogeneity by adding instrument variables to the model. Therefore the 
coefficients are no longer biased towards zero.  
  
                                                 
7  The formula for calculation half-life is T= Ln (2)/ λ, T is number of years.  
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7.2.1.1 Determinants of Growth in the First Augmented Solow-Swan Model  
Table (7-1) also reports the effects of investing in human capital, physical 
capital and population growth on economic growth across these groups of countries. As 
can be seen the signs of investing in physical capital are positive and significant in all 
groups. However, it is less productive for low-income countries compared to high-
income and middle-income countries. Moreover, between high-income and middle-
income countries, it is stronger in middle-income countries.  
For investing in education for the secondary level, as the results show, it is less 
productive for low-income countries than middle-income countries. This means that by 
investing more in their secondary education middle-income countries can speed their 
economic growth. The sign of this variable is positive but not significant for high-
income countries, meaning that they already have enough level of human capital with 
secondary education and investing in this section will not affect growth. This is 
consistent with the argument of M. R. Islam (2010) who said that “advanced countries 
are more likely to engage in innovating new technologies which required highly skilled 
human capital”. 
The growth rate of population has a negative and significant effect on GDP 
growth, especially when we eliminate middle-income and high-income countries from 
the sample. 
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7.2.2 Testing β Convergence in the Second Augmented Solow-Swan Model 
Table (7-2), (7-3), (7-4) and (7-5) report the second augmented version of 
Solow-Swan model, equation (7-2), by including institutions, globalization and 
innovation variables to the model in the whole sample as well as the split ones. By 
including globalization indicators, institutions factors and innovation proxies we try to 
control the unobserved effects. The important fact here is the way that we apply these 
variables into the model. According to the neoclassical growth theory the accumulation 
of capital is important in explaining the growth rate across countries so we apply these 
variables through the accumulation of human capital rather than endogenizing them 
through technology to the model. This means that these factors are more closely related 
as factors that can speed up the process of capital accumulation for increasing 
production than to the efficiency variable. 
First, we discuss the speed of convergence in each group of countries. As can be 
seen, each of the governance indicators is included separately; therefore, we have six 
equations. 
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Table 7-2 Second Augmented Solow-Swan model in the whole sample using dynamic system GMM 
panel data. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.221*** 0.217*** 0.198*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.211*** 
 (0.00315) (0.00220) (0.00389) (0.00361) (0.00402) (0.00302) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.00084*** -0.00077*** -0.000717*** -0.00076*** -0.0006*** -0.000732*** 
 (1.29e-05) (9.44e-06) (1.56e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.57e-05) (1.24e-05) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.0646*** 0.0542*** 0.0639*** 0.0564*** 0.0742*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.00478) (0.00651) (0.00523) (0.00516) (0.00535) (0.00573) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 5.118*** 5.111*** 5.110*** 4.112*** 5.120*** 5.117*** 
 (2.00313) (2.00273) (2.00565) (2.00238) (2.00275) (2.00277) 
ln(1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 0.0549*** 0.0531*** 0.0534*** 0.0533*** 0.0544*** 0.0565*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00242) (0.00312) (0.00218) (0.00284) (0.00346) 
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 0.05) -2.208*** -2.164** -1.218*** -1.0653*** -2.249** -2.0274** 
 (1.117) (1.118) (1.0602) (1.126) (1.113) (1.102) 
𝑙𝑛(1
+ 𝐽𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) 
0.00982*** 0.00956*** 0.00839*** 0.00971*** 0.0084*** 0.00827*** 
 (0.000520) (0.000423) (0.000438) (0.000487) (0.000435) (0.000418) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 3.88*** 4.67*** 6.10*** 5.24*** 4.59*** 4.96*** 
 (3.7) (4.15) (4.18) (5.41) (4.25) (4.18) 
ln(1 + 𝐾𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 4.276*** 4.268*** 4.054*** 4.159*** 3.421*** 4.996*** 
 (3.107) (3.136) (3.132) (3.110) (3.154) (3.124) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺1) 2.986***      
 (0.117)      
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺2)  2.172***     
  (0.122)     
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺3)   2.017***    
   (0.111)    
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺4)    2.113***   
    (0.132)   
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺5)     -0.210  
     (0.268)  
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺6)      1.561*** 
      (0.152) 
Obs. 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 
No.id 149 149 149 149 149 149 
sargan 11.56 11.55 11.43 7.43 9.52 10.38 
AR2-p Value .1935 .081 .082 .187 .298 .293 
AR1-p Value .365 .578 .165 .0454 .376 .257 
Note: ∆Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per capita growth rate, Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per 
capita,  
lnsh,i,t: secondary school enrolment ratio, 𝑙𝑛 (ni,t + 0.05): Population growth rate plus 
0.05,  
lnski,t : gross capital formation, R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of 
scientific journals, KOF: Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: 
Government Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: 
Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results 
for AR1 and AR2 show that there is no first and second serial correlation in the 
residuals, which also give validity to the model.  The Sargan statistics test the null 
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hypothesis of the correct model specification and validity of the instruments. As 
the results show we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the 
instruments are valid. Time dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
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Table 7-3 Second Augmented Solow-Swan model in high-income countries using dynamic system GMM 
panel data 
VARIABLES Eq.(1) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.753*** 0.688*** 0.708*** 0.714*** 0.723*** 0.702*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0604) (0.0617) (0.0518) (0.0648) (0.0646) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.4108*** -0.41*** -0.4117*** -0.4104*** -0.4107*** -0.4106*** 
 (7.42e-05) (7.24e-05) (5.74e-05) (7.06e-05) (6.53e-05) (6.34e-05) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 -0.0481*** -0.0392*** -0.0430*** -0.0176 -0.0356*** -0.0279** 
 (0.00447) (0.00737) (0.00784) (0.0168) (0.00757) (0.0128) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 4.070*** 4.184*** 4.896*** 4.969*** 4.503*** 3.958** 
 (1.557) (1.523) (1.563) (1.519) (1.555) (1.543) 
ln(1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 0.970*** 1.071*** 1.055*** 1.136*** 1.045*** 0.880*** 
 (0.150) (0.196) (0.169) (0.162) (0.177) (0.162) 
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 0.05) -0.346*** -0.246** 1.366*** 0.157** -0.326*** 1.750** 
 (0.887) (0.791) (1.250) (0.752) (0.907) (0.812) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐽𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) 0.538** 0.449*** 0.544** 0.455** 0.540** 0.563*** 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.159) (0.154) (0.154) (0.152) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 5.50** 4.34** 9.78*** 6.17*** 6.05*** 6.62*** 
 (2.78) (2.06) (2.30) (2.35) (2.06) (2.01) 
ln(1 + 𝐾𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 3.085*** 3.081*** 3.299*** 2.870** 2.912*** 1.584** 
 (2.331) (2.600) (2.714) (1.149) (2.434) (2.781) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺1) 2.563**      
 (1.291)      
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺2)  3.689***     
  (2.803)     
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺3)   3.390***    
   (1.141)    
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺4)    6.015***   
    (3.931)    
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺5)     3.857**  
     (1.507)  
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺6)      1.626 
      (1.765) 
Obs. 388 388 388 388 388 388 
No.id 29 29 29 29 29 29 
sargan 13.68 13.25 12.63 8.403 12.72 11.28 
AR2-p Value 
.0935 .181 .092 .287 .198 .193 
AR1-p Value 
.395 .538 .1621 .0484 .362 .245 
Note: ∆Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per capita growth rate, Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per 
capita,  
lnsh,i,t: secondary school enrolment ratio, 𝑙𝑛 (ni,t + 0.05): Population growth rate plus 
0.05,  
lnski,t : gross capital formation, R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of 
scientific journals, KOF: Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: 
Government Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: 
Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results 
116 
for AR1 and AR2 show that there is no first and second serial correlation in the 
residuals which also give validity to the model. The Sargan statistics tests the null 
hypothesis of correct model specification and validity of instruments. As the results 
show we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are 
valid. Time dummies are also included, which is not reported here.   
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Table 7-4 Second Augmented Solow-Swan model in middle-income countries using dynamic system 
GMM panel data. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr gdppcgr 
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.330*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0165) (0.0227) (0.0252) (0.0113) (0.0288) 
7.2.2.1 𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.71*** 
-0.72*** -0.71*** -0.71*** 
 (0.00018) (0.0001) (0.00015) (0.000103) (0.00018) (0.00019) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.214*** 0.11*** 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0358) (0.0329) (0.0242) (0.0272) (0.0364) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 5.335*** 5.24*** 5.218*** 5.212*** 5.225*** 5.305*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0118) (0.0129) (0.00912) (0.0102) (0.0151) 
ln(1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 0.024** 0.048*** 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.024** 0.015 
 (0.00986) (0.0091) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0109) (0.0138) 
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 0.05) 0.753*** 0.0389** 0.604*** 0.196*** 0.088*** 0.393*** 
 (0.228) (0.243) (0.405) (0.284) (0.153) (0.403) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐽𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) 0.944** 1.138** 9.9805* 0.9536** 0.907* 1.0797* 
 (0.328) (0.330) (0.347) (0.328) (0.325) (0.328) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 4.963** 4.783* 5.081** 5.414** 4.929** 5.053** 
 (2.450) (2.476) (2.444) (2.504) (2.439) (2.435) 
ln(1 + 𝐾𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 7.19*** 8.15*** 5.77*** 3.07*** 6.06*** 9.43*** 
 (2.203) (2.209) (2.070) (2.198) (2.194) (2.276) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺1) 8.323***      
 (3.391)      
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺2)  5.567***     
  (2.628)     
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺3)   2.970***    
   (1.913)    
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺4)    7.961***   
    (3.845)   
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺5)     5.353***  
     (2.930)  
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺6)      5.458*** 
      (1.325) 
Observations 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
Number of code 90 90 90 90 90 90 
sargan 36.61 35.61 30.37 32.42 32.04 30.51 
arm1 -2.406 -2.094 -2.038 -2.063 -2.146 -2.143 
arm2 0.367 0.108 0.712 0.383 0.484 0.279 
Note: ∆Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per capita growth rate, Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per 
capita,  
lnsh,i,t: secondary school enrolment ratio, 𝑙𝑛 (ni,t + 0.05): Population growth rate plus 
0.05,  
lnski,t : gross capital formation, R&D: research intensity , Journal: number of 
scientific journals, KOF: Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: 
Government Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: 
Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results 
for AR1 and AR2 show that there is no first and second serial correlation in the 
residuals which also give validity to the model. The Sargan statistics tests the null 
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hypothesis of correct model specification and validity of instruments. As the results 
show we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are 
valid. Time dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
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Table 7-5 Second Augmented Solow-Swan model in low-income countries using dynamic system GMM 
panel data 
VARIABLES Eq.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
∆𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.0810** 0.0837*** 0.0916** 0.0784*** 0.0795*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0140) (0.0370) (0.0303) (0.0246) (0.0229) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.121* -0.132** -0.11** -0.172** -0.181** -0.151** 
 (0.00617) (0.00497) (0.00452) (0.00505) (0.00547) (0.00275) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.315*** 0.276** 0.279*** 0.247*** 0.338*** 0.289*** 
 (0.100) (0.122) (0.0827) (0.0936) (0.0751) (0.0724) 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 6.0766*** 6.0826*** 6.0763*** 6.0636** 6.0692*** 6.0699*** 
 (1.0296) (1.0146) (1.0170) (1.0248) (1.0262) (1.0178) 
ln(1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 0.0749** 0.103* 0.156* 0.0728 0.0831 0.113* 
 (0.0723) (0.0574) (0.0873) (0.0697) (0.0593) (0.0683) 
ln (𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 0.05) -4.277** -5.235** -5.601*** -5.360*** -3.877* -4.641*** 
 (2.057) (2.052) (1.178) (1.306) (2.325) (1.279) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐽𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡) -0.000211 -0.00198 0.000865 -0.00132 -0.000308 -0.000211 
 (0.00260) (0.00381) (0.00337) (0.00403) (0.00291) (0.00445) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 0.00502* 0.00413** 0.00346* 0.00288 0.00464** 0.00314* 
 (0.00189) (0.00156) (0.00184) (0.00176) (0.00186) (0.00184) 
ln(1 + 𝐾𝑂𝐹𝑖,𝑡) 9.034*** 10.68*** 10.61*** 11.57*** 8.274** 9.199*** 
 (2.860) (2.521) (1.327) (2.199) (3.799) (1.674) 
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺1) -0.352*      
 (0.178)      
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺2)  3.601     
  (3.097)     
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺3)   3.056    
   (1.663)    
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺4)    2.722   
    (4.448)   
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺5)     -0.370  
     (3.438)  
𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺6)      1.075 
      (2.869) 
Obs. 298 298 298 298 298 298 
No.id 30 30 30 30 30 30 
sargan 13.68 13.25 12.63 8.404 12.72 11.28 
AR2-p Value .0935 .181 .092 .287 .198 .193 
AR1-p Value .395 .538 .1621 .0484 .362 .245 
Note: ∆Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per capita growth rate, Ln(yi,t−1): lagged GDP per 
capita,  
lnsh,i,t: secondary school enrolment ratio, 𝑙𝑛 (ni,t + 0.05): Population growth rate plus 
0.05,  
lnski,t : gross capital formation, R&D: research intensity , Journal: number of 
scientific journals, KOF: Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: 
Government Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: 
Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results 
for AR1 and AR2 show that there is no first and second serial correlation in the 
residuals which also give validity to the model. The Sargan statistics tests the null 
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hypothesis of correct model specification and validity of instruments. As the results 
show we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are 
valid. Time dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
  
121 
Table 7-6 shows the implied speed of convergence, which is derived from the 
previous tables for the whole sample as well as the splits sample. The results indicate 
that the coefficients of the initial level of per capita GPP are significant having a 
negative sign, which shows an inverse relationship between the initial level of per capita 
GPP and the subsequent growth rate for all groups of countries. However, these rates 
are different across them.  
Table 7-6 Speed of Convergence in second Augmented Solow-Swan model, 1996-2010 
Countries Eq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Whole 
sample 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-
0.000846
*** 
-
0.000773
*** 
-
0.000717
*** 
-
0.000768
*** 
-
0.000649
*** 
-
0.000732
*** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 
0.000056
42 
0.000051
55 
0.000047
82 
0.000051
22 
0.000043
28 
0.000048
82 
High-
income 
  
Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence  
0.03526 0.03517 0.03536 0.03522 0.03525 0.03524 
Middle
-
income 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-0.72*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.72*** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 
0.08543 0.08443 0.08436 0.08522 0.08450 0.08455 
Low-
income 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient -0.121* -0.132** -0.11** -0.172** -0.181** -0.151** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 0.009920 0.01089 0.008964 0.014519 
0.015359 
0.012592 
Notes: the first row of each group reports the coefficient of initial GDP per capita in each equation 
separately. The second row shows the speed of convergence related to each equation.  
For high-income countries, as can be seen, almost 3% of the gap between the 
initial level of GDP per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year. We 
explained in section 7-2-1 about this higher rate of convergence compared to initial 
studies. However, in comparing the results of the second augmented Solow-Swan model 
to the first one, it can be seen that the speed is faster here, which shows that considering 
the other explanatory variables other than investing in human capital is effective in 
speeding the growth rate across countries. This is also the same for middle-income 
countries. 
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For middle-income countries, on average, almost 8% of the gap between the 
initial level of GDP per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year. This 
result supports the idea of convergence, which means that countries far away from the 
steady state growth path can grow faster. 
Finally, for low-income countries 1% of the gap between the initial level of GDP 
per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year. As can be seen, in the 
first augmented Solow-Swan model there was no convergence across low-income 
countries, however, convergence appears after adding these explanatory variables to the 
model. This means that by considering these variables for controlling the steady state, 
convergence could emerge even in low-income countries albeit at a slower rate, which 
raises the idea of income threshold. Countries should reach to a certain level of income 
to be capable of taking advantage of the advanced technologies that is transferring from 
the frontier.  The results of the explanatory variables in low-income countries also 
support this idea. 
To sum up, in comparing the results in these three groups, it shows that the 
convergence rate is much higher for middle-income countries than for high-income 
countries.  This is consistent with the convergence hypothesis, which said that countries 
far away from their steady state could grow faster than rich ones. However, the results 
of the low-income group contradict the hypothesis.  Indeed, these results suggest that 
convergence is not monotonic with respect to income.  An income threshold may need 
to be reached before convergence occurs.  Countries below that threshold are caught in 
a poverty trap from which it takes a long time to escape.8 
  
                                                 
8 Sachs, (2000) made a similar argument about low income / low institutional capacity countries never being able to take advantage 
of technologies like the Internet. 
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7.2.2.2 Determinants of Growth in second Augmented Solow-Swan Model  
Tables (7-7),(7-8), (7-9) ,(7-10) and (7-11) report the effects of investing in 
human capital, physical capital, population growth, globalization indicators, FDI and 
KOF index, institutions factor, R&D inensity and number of scientific journals on 
economic growth across these groups of countries.  
The estimated coefficient for investing in education is positive and significant 
for the whole sample, while by eliminating middle-income and low-income countries 
from the sample the coefficient becomes negative and significant. This result contradicts 
what R. J. Barro (1991), G. Mankiw et al. (1992) and others, who use cross sectional 
data analyses, found in their studies. One explanation for this result is that when the 
time dimension is added to the education variable it means that in addition to cross 
country difference we also consider changes in human capital over time in each country. 
Why are the coefficients negative in high-income countries but remaining positive for 
middle-income and low-income countries? This indicates that while investing in the 
secondary level of education increased in high-income countries between 1996 and 
2010, output growth fell. However, this story is not true for middle-income and 
especially for low-income countries, where a one point increase in investing in 
education will increase their GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points. The explanation for 
this might be because for middle-income and low-income countries the cross sectional 
effects are strong enough to overcome the time series relations.   
Table 7-7 The results for secondary school enrolment ratio in both models 
Model 
Variable 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
First Model 𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.158*** 0.280 0.191** 1.198*** 
Second Model 𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.0646*** -0.048*** 0.315*** 0.214*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation. 
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Furthermore, as the results show, the coefficients are stronger for low-income 
than for middle-income countries. This means that low-income countries, by investing 
more in their secondary education level, can speed their economic growth. This result is 
not consistent with the first model, where investing in education at the secondary level 
was less productive for low-income countries than middle-income countries. Our 
explanation for this result is that it seems that the quality of education investment 
increases when the technology can transfer across low-income countries through 
globalization.   
The sign for investing in physical capital is positive and significant in the whole 
sample and it is the strongest amongst the other variables. A one point increase in the 
formation of physical capital increases the GDP growth rate by 6 percentage points. 
When the middle-income and low-income countries are eliminated from the sample, the 
sign is still positive and a one point increases in the formation of physical capital 
increases the GDP growth rate by 4 percentage points.  For middle-income countries 
and low-income countries it is the same and the sign is positive and significant and a 5 
percentage and 6 percentage point variation in GDP growth can be explained by the 
physical capital accumulation in these two groups of countries, respectively.  
Table 7-8 The results for investment in physical capital in both models 
Model 
Variable 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
First Model 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 2.157*** 3.484*** 0.231*** 4. 609* 
Second Model 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 6.118*** 4.070*** 6.076*** 5.335*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table. 
As can be seen, the coefficients for investment in physical capital are larger in 
all groups when proxies like FDI, KOF index, institutions, R&D intensity are added to 
the model. Furthermore, the coefficient of investment in physical capital is largest in 
low-income countries compared to the middle-income and high-income countries, and, 
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compared to the first model the coefficient becomes six times as large as it was in the 
first model. These results can indicate that the quality of investing in physical capital is 
improving in all groups, especially in low-income countries when the country lets 
technology transfer internationally. This scenario is proven by the positive and 
significant effect of the globalization variable in low-income countries.  
 P. M. Romer (1990), Philippe   Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Talukdar (2009) 
were the pioneers who tried to explain the important role of innovation in the process of 
long-run growth in the new growth theory. In line with their study, we add R&D 
intensity and the number of scientific journals as a proxy for innovation. The sign of 
R&D intensity is positive and significant for the whole sample as well as for the split 
ones. However, the sign for number of scientific journals is negative and significant for 
the whole sample. 
Table 7-9 the results for R&D intensity and Number of Scientific Journals in the second model 
Variables 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
R&D 3.88*** 5.50** 0.01* 4.96*** 
No.Journals -0.01** 0.538*** -0.0002 0.95** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table. 
When eliminating the middle-income and low-income countries from the whole 
sample the coefficients of R&D intensity became strongly significant. Meaning that 
investing more in R&D activities has a positive effect on the productivity growth, which 
is in line with most of the research done in this field. Furthermore, this is a proof of 
what M. R. Islam (2010) argued, in that since high-income countries already have the 
educated people and the required level of highly skilled workers they can take 
advantage of the R&D outcomes in the most efficient way.  The sign for the number of 
scientific journals is also positive and significant, although it is less significant than 
investing in the R&D sector.  
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The results are also positive and significant for middle-income countries but less 
significant than for the high-income group. This means that even when considering 
technology transfer they still have to work on their fundamentals to be capable of taking 
full advantage of the output of R&D activities. For example, they have to invest more in 
their higher level of education.  
For low-income countries, the sign for R&D intensity is positive and significant 
in most equations albeit the effect is very small compared with the other two groups. In 
addition, for the number of scientific journals the sign is not significant in any of the 
equations. Our explanation is that investing more in R&D activities is not working since 
they do not have an adequate level of human capital or sufficient highly skilled workers 
to take advantage of the R&D activities outcomes. 
The next step is to investigate the globalization phenomenon in the process of 
growth. As discussed earlier, economists do not reach the same conclusion concerning 
the effect of globalization indicators on growth. In earlier studies, trade, openness and 
FDI were used as proxies for globalization but their results were not consistent. Here, in 
this research, we apply an alternative proxy named as the KOF index, which was 
introduced by Dreher (2003)  to explore the different dimensions of globalization on 
growth and the convergence process. We also apply the FDI index.  
Table 7-10 The results for FDI and KOF index in second model 
Variables 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
KOF 4.27*** 3.1*** 9.03*** 7.19*** 
FDI 0.05*** 0.97*** 0.07** 0.02** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. Since the results of all 6 equations were familiar, we just 
put the results of the first equation in this table. 
For high-income countries, the effect of the KOF index is positive and 
significant. This means that globalization can increase economic growth across 
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countries with a high level of income. The sign of FDI is also positive and significant in 
this group but less powerful than the KOF index.   
For middle-income countries the results for both variables are positive and 
significant, and these countries can also take advantage of international technology 
spillovers through globalization since they have an adequate level of human capital in 
their countries. Furthermore, here we can see that the KOF index is more powerful than 
FDI. 
It is the same for low-income countries with the difference that the effect of 
globalization is very big in this group. This can be another reason for the significant 
sign of physical capital accumulation for this group of countries, as we discussed 
earlier. This positive and strong sign means that opening up the borders and allowing 
for international technology transfer can make a lot of difference in these countries. This 
is consistent with the argument of economists like Charles Jones (1998) who argue that 
although some countries do not have highly skilled workers to take advantage of the 
R&D output, they can still grow.  These economists argue that it is true that there is low 
level of skilled human capital in these countries to take advantage of the advanced 
technologies but by opening up the borders to foreign investments, those countries bring 
them a skilled labour force and so they can train the labour force in the host country.  In 
low-income countries we can also see that the results for the KOF index are more 
powerful than for FDI. 
In general, we can conclude that this new KOF index is a better proxy for 
measuring globalization because it not only measures the flow of goods, but also the 
flow of technology and knowledge by considering the infrastructure, such as Internet 
users, and telephone lines. 
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What is the role of institutions in determining the growth path? In the recent 
literature, and, specifically, in the new growth models, numerous studies investigated 
the effect of institutions on economic growth. None of the previous studies in the area of 
convergence and growth used the governance indicators to study the effect of 
institutions on growth or investigated their role on the convergence process. Therefore, 
in this study, we apply these Governance indicators, which have six dimensions, and, as 
mentioned in chapter 6, because of the high positive correlation between these 
indicators that cause the problem of multi-collinearity we should add them separately to 
the model (Appendix). Because of the importance of these indicators we discuss them in 
each group and after that compare them among groups. 
Table 7-11 The results for Governance indicators in the second model 
Variables 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
G1 2.98*** 2.56** -0.35* 8.32*** 
G2 2.17*** 3.68*** 3.60 5.56*** 
G3 2.01*** 3.390*** 3.05* 2.97*** 
G4 2.11*** 6.015*** 2.72 7.96*** 
G5 -0.210 3.87** -0.37 5.34*** 
G6 1.56*** 1.62 1.07 5.45*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government 
Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, 
G6: Voice and Accountability. 
As the results show, for the whole sample the sign for all of the indicators except 
rule of law is significant and positive. When the group of middle-income and low-
income countries are eliminated from the sample, the significance appears for rule of 
law, which means that this factor affects growth in countries with a high level of 
income. However, the significance of voice and accountability disappears, and the other 
indicators remain positive and significant in the equation. Regulatory quality (G4) has 
the highest positive significant effect on economic growth in the high-income group 
(6%). As mentioned before, in general, countries with high regulatory quality are those 
countries that have less regulatory restrictions in any kind of market; for example, 
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labour and financial.  These countries provide a more stable environment for private 
investors in the country to invest and even for foreign investors, which leads to more 
development. Therefore, the results in the high-income countries show that 6% of the 
violation of their growth can be explained by this factor. Therefore, this factor plays an 
important role in their process of growth.  
The sign for rule of law (G5) is also positive and significant (3.8%). Having a 
high score for rule of law in an economy means the countries can protect the property 
rights of their citizens and protect the interests of its investors or inventors, which can 
speed its economic growth rate. In countries with a high score for the rule of law, 
patents can be invented and their rights are protected. Therefore, the rate of innovation 
will increase in such a country, and, finally, they can have a high rate of economic 
growth.  The results show that this factor can be very effective on the growth rate of 
high-income countries if they consider this factor seriously.  
The sign for political stability and absence of violence (G3) is also positive and 
significant in high-income countries (3.4%). In countries in which the process of 
selecting and replacing the government is stable, the investors feel safe to invest in such 
economies. Therefore, the rate of flight back of capital is less, which leads to the rapid 
growth rate in the economy. 
The sign is also positive and significant for Government effectiveness (G2) 
across high-income countries (3.7%). Countries that ranked highly according to this 
factor are those countries that have a high quality in public services and powerful policy 
planning. The positive and significant sign for this variable in high-income countries 
suggests that having a powerful government increases the economic growth rate.  
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The sign for control of corruption (G1) is also positive and significant across 
high-income countries (2.56%), which show that developed countries with a high 
control of corruption are successful in giving confidence to the investors to invest in the 
economy.  
Finally, the results show that the only factor that is not significant across high-
income countries for economic growth is voice and accountability (G6). This means that 
the productivity of a country is not affected by the system in which the government is 
selected. In the other words, the other reason could be that all these high-income 
countries have strong voice and accountability indicators, so there is not much variation 
in this indicator to explain growth.  
For middle-income countries the results show that for all of the indicators the 
signs are positive and significantly different from zero, and also stronger than for high-
income countries. Among all the indicators, control of corruption (G1) has the highest 
positive significant effect on economic growth in the middle-income group. This shows 
that by controlling their corruption developing countries can be successful in giving 
confidence to the investors to invest in their economy and thereby grow fast (8.3% of 
the variation is explained by this factor). 
The regulatory quality (G4) is the second highest positive significant effective 
factor on economic growth (7.96%). These countries, by providing a safe environment 
for private investors and foreign investors can increase their productivity.  
The sign is also positive and significant for government effectiveness (G2) 
across high-income countries (5.56%). The results suggest that having a powerful 
government increases the economic growth rate across developing countries.   
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The results for voice and accountability (G6) are positive and significantly 
different from zero, thereby indicating that the productivity of a country is affected by 
the system in which government is selected across developing countries. This result 
contradicts the result of high-income countries where the voice and accountability did 
not affect the growth rate of the high-income countries.  
The sign for rule of law (G5) is also positive and significant (5.35%). This 
shows that building a strong system of justice and law for protecting the rights of the 
citizens will be effective for growth.   
The sign for political stability and absence of violence (G3) is also positive and 
significant in middle-income countries (2.9%). In countries in which the process of 
selecting and replacing government is stable, the investors feel safer to invest in such 
economies. Therefore, the rate of flight back of capital is less and leads to a rapid 
growth rate in the economy. 
However, for low-income countries the significance disappears for almost all of 
the factors controlling for corruption for which the sign is negative and significant at 
10%.  This is an interesting result for two reasons. First, because again it raises the issue 
of the income threshold. Our explanation for this result is that since these countries do 
not reach a certain level of income and development, they cannot take advantage of 
these factors. Second, as we said, the sign of control for corruption is negative in this 
group, meaning that controlling for corruption is not effective in low-income countries. 
The issue of corruption and level of development is a big issue in recent literature. Some 
economists believe we can track developed countries and see that they are not fighting 
corruption in the initial stages of their development (Khan, 2004). Khan (2004) argues 
that fighting corruption, though necessary, is not the only prerequisite for growth. This 
itself is further support for reaching the income threshold. In the other research Mironov 
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(2005) analyses the effects of corruption on economic growth across 141 countries 
during 1996 and 2004. The results of his study are another support for what the current 
research found. His results show that residual corruption has positive effects on 
economic growth. In other words, he found out that the residual corruption is correlated 
positively with capital accumulation and so economic growth in developing countries 
and poor countries.  Furthermore, Heckelman and Powell (2008) in another research 
show that limiting economic freedom causes the corruption to have a positive effect on 
economic growth. 
 
7.2.3 δ - Convergence 
“δ convergence” means that the dispersion of GDP per capita reduces over time. There 
exist several ways of quantifying the inequality of income distributions but a commonly 
used measure is the standard deviation of the logarithms of per capita GDP. If the value 
of standard deviation in a sample becomes smaller it means that the country reduced the 
gap that existed. Otherwise, there is no δ convergence. Table 7-12 shows the results of 
the analysis of δ convergence for GDP per capita in the following groups of countries. 
Table 7-12 Results of testing δ convergence in terms of GDP per capita, 1996-2010 
GDP per capita 
Coefficient of 
variation in t96 
Coefficient of 
variation in t2010 
Rate of change (%) 
High-income 0.898552 0.805812 -10.321 
Middle-income ( upper ) 0.668754 0.522679 -21.8429 
Middle-income ( lower ) 0.620489 0.539005 -13.1323 
Low-income 0.54205 0.491879 -9.25579 
Note: Standard deviation of logarithms of GDP per capita,1996-2010, Rate of changes=( t2010-t96/t96)*100  
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The results show that in all three groups of countries there is a decreasing 
dispersion in terms of GDP per capita across countries over time. However, the speed of 
δ convergence is rapid in upper middle-income countries. The lowest rate belongs to the 
low-income countries, which is 9 per cent. This result is exactly in line with our β 
convergence in which the rate of convergence is particularly rapid for the middle-
income group.  
 
7.3 New Growth Model 
In this section, we are going to test β Convergence and φ Convergence by 
applying the dynamic system GMM across groups of sample countries. As can be seen 
the concept of β Convergence is the same as the neoclassic model, meaning that if the 
sign of initial GDP per capita is negative countries behind the steady state can grow 
faster, otherwise there is divergence across countries. What makes this model different 
from the NCGM is the way that the variables apply in the model. As we described in 
chapter 3, we focused on the new growth models where, in these models, technology 
plays an important role in explaining the different growth rate across countries unlike 
the NCG model where the emphasis was on capital accumulation. We expect the sign 
for innovation, globalization and institutions to be more sensitive than capital 
accumulation in these classes of models in our sample.  
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7.3.1 Testing β Convergence: The Link Between Technological Change and 
Convergence in Income 
In chapter three we showed how we link technology change and growth of GDP 
per capita in terms of endogenous theories. This section presents the results of 
estimating the following equation:  
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑦𝑖,𝑡⁄ = 𝜃1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜇log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 −ζ𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (7-3) 
Where ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,growth rate of GDP per capita at time (t), is related to log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
,the logarithm of GDP per capita at the start of the period, and other controlling 
variables, such as physical capital accumulation, the intensity of innovation activities, 
human capital level, the institutions (governance indicators) and globalization. By 
estimating this equation we can understand how much of the growth can be explained 
by technological changes and how much by physical accumulation. The coefficient of 
log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 shows whether convergence happened across countries or not. If it is negative, 
it means that countries behind the steady state can grow faster, otherwise there is 
divergence across countries.  
β convergence is tested by applying equation (7-3) in samples of low-income, 
middle-income and high-income countries between 1996 and 2010 in terms of GDP per 
capita based on the new growth theory. All the variables are taken in natural log form. 
The country specific effects are controlled by following the generalized method of 
moment’s estimation procedure. Tables 7-13, 7-14, 7-15 and 7-16 show the results of 
testing β convergence for the whole sample as well as for high-income, middle-income 
and low-income countries:  
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Table 7-13 Testing β convergence in terms of GDP per capita in the whole sample, using dynamic system 
GMM 
Equations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  
0.261*** 0.255*** 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0082*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.0074*** -0.0062*** -0.0072*** 
 
(4.46e-06) (8.19e-
06) 
(4.23e-06) (6.76e-06) (7.05e-06) (6.82e-06) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 0.0569*** 0.042*** 0.0544*** 0.0495*** 0.0717*** 0.0450*** 
 (0.00295) (0.0029) (0.00270) (0.00236) (0.00302) (0.00295) 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.137*** 0.123*** 
 (0.00224) (0.0026) (0.00203) (0.00194) (0.00240) (0.00276) 
Log(FDI) 0.0558*** 0.053*** 0.0546*** 0.0525*** 0.0525*** 0.0547*** 
 (0.00160) (0.0010) (0.00188) (0.00120) (0.000790) (0.00197) 
log (journal) 
0.0095*** 0.0094**
* 
0.0082*** 0.0091*** 0.0078*** 0.0089*** 
 
(0.000234) (0.000179
) 
(0.000187) (0.000196) (0.000158) (0.000119) 
Log(R&D) 4.32*** 5.50*** 6.33*** 6.74*** 5.34*** 6.30*** 
 (1.92) (1.78) (1.57) (2.45) (1.81) (1.06) 
Log(KOF) 1.318*** 1.480*** 1.150*** 1.327*** 0.398*** 1.385*** 
 (2.0394) (2.0439) (2.0492) (2.0578) (2.0547) (2.0633) 
Log(G1) 3.251***      
 (1.0853)      
Log(G2)  2.506***     
  (1.101)     
Log(G3)   1.872***    
   (1.0568)    
Log(G4)    2.042***   
    (1.109)   
Log(G5)     -0.445***  
     (1.0945)  
Log(G6)      2.097*** 
      (1.0641) 
Obs. 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 
No.id 149 149 149 149 149 149 
sargan 86.83 83.71 86.76 84.49 84.23 88.24 
AR2-p Value -1.816 -1.807 -1.873 -1.793 -1.833 -1.842 
AR1-p Value -1.078 -1.194 -1.010 -1.019 -1.018 -1.064 
Note: 
∆yi,t−1
yi,t−1⁄ : lagged GDP per capita growth rate, logyi,t−1 : lagged GDP per 
capita,  log(HC): secondary school enrolment ratio, CF: gross capital formation, 
R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of scientific journals, KOF: 
Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government Effectiveness, 
G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule 
of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results for AR1 and AR2 show that 
there is no first and second serial correlation in the residuals, which also gives 
validity to the model.  The Sargan statistics tests the null hypothesis of correct 
model specification and validity of instruments. As the results show we cannot 
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reject the null hypothesis, which shows that, the instruments are valid. Time 
dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
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Table 7-14 Testing β convergence in terms of GDP per capita using dynamic System GMM across High 
income countries  
Equations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  
0.644*** 0.617*** 0.637*** 0.619*** 0.643*** 0.659*** 
 (0.0931) (0.0920) (0.0946) (0.0922) (0.0940) (0.0933) 
log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.45* -0.488* -0.455** -1 -0.474** -0.46* 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.950) (0.000) (0.247) (0.063) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 -15.91 -12.10 -20.36 12.94 17.14** 14.75* 
 (5.258) (5.435) (5.076) (5.409) (5.454) (5.168) 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 0.520*** 0.529*** 0.558*** 0.527*** 0.544*** 0.564*** 
 (0.0549) (0.0802) (0.0574) (0.0681) (0.0717) (0.0607) 
Log(FDI) 1.729*** 2.791*** 2.508** 2.739*** 2.520** 1.288 
 (1.234) 1.226) (1.249) 1.222) 1.216) (0.209) 
log (journal) 
1.0776*** 1.0798**
* 
1.0839*** 1.0907*** 1.0809*** 0.9669*** 
 (1.00993) (1.0134) (1.0145) (1.0139) (1.0132) (1.0123) 
Log(R&D) 
6.0484*** 6.0510**
* 
6.0489*** 6.0540*** 5.0501*** 6.0446*** 
 (1. 468) (1. 0317) (1. 305) (1. 364) (1. 504) (1. 489) 
Log(KOF) 4.038* 4.608** 4.303** 4.515** 4.311* 4.353** 
 (3.123) (1.112) (1.138) (2.781) (1.117) (1.222) 
Log(G1) 2.386***      
 (1.532)      
Log(G2)  4.364***     
  (1.666)     
Log(G3)   4.271**    
   (1.485)    
Log(G4)    7.770***   
    (1.127)   
Log(G5)     3.264*  
     (0.866)  
Log(G6)      1.502*** 
      (1.125) 
sargan 207.79408 207.7880 209.07359 208.94014 209.60235 199.03852 
AR2-p Value .31235034 .4591524 .26509498 .29570693 .28689714 .90706144 
AR1-p Value .10597 
.1408266
5 
.11226635 .1434355 .12020117 .09581717 
Obs. 379 379 379 379 379 379 
No.id 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Note: 
∆yi,t−1
yi,t−1⁄ : lagged GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑙𝑜𝑔yi,t−1 : lagged GDP per 
capita,  log(HC): secondary school enrolment ratio, CF: gross capital formation, 
R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of scientific journals, KOF: 
Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government Effectiveness, 
G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule 
of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results for AR1 and AR2 show that 
there is no first and second serial correlation in the residuals which also give 
validity to the model.  The Sargan statistics tests the null hypothesis of correct 
model specification and validity of instruments. As the results show we cannot 
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reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are valid. Time 
dummies are also included, which is not reported here.   
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Table 7-15 Dynamic system GMM, testing β convergence in terms of GDP in middle-income countries. 
Equations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  
0.674*** 0.669*** 0.653*** 0.649*** 0.652*** 0.651*** 
 (0.0976) (0.0981) (0.0964) (0.0956) (0.0973) (0.0980) 
log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.648*** -0.723*** -0.762*** -0.68*** -0.848*** -0.732** 
 (1.024) (0.961) (0.932) (0.919) (0.959) (0.929) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 0.930 0.519 -0.0806 0.978 0.772 0.728 
 (2.362) (2.374) (2.507) (2.391) (2.367) (2.357) 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 0.318* 0.154** 0.255* 0.115** 0.0720*** 0.134** 
 (1.749) (1.745) (1.735) (1.717) (1.734) (1.731) 
Log(FDI) 3.59*** 1.99*** 3.86*** 3.87*** 2.33*** 2.91*** 
 
(8.02e-07) (7.31e-
07) 
(9.21e-07) (5.97e-07) (4.87e-07) (8.78e-07) 
log (journal) 1. 014** 1. 029*** 1. 0558** 1. 0798** 1. 044** 1. 015* 
 (0. 168) (0. 102) (0. 286) (0. 217) (0. 153) (0. 344) 
Log(R&D) 5.238** 5.455** 5.337** 5.937** 5.584** 5.0543** 
 (1.590) (1.630) (1.686) (1.466) (1.578) (1.572) 
Log(KOF) 9. 234*** 8. 41*** 8. 618*** 8. 661*** 8. 426** 8. 415*** 
 (10. 818) (1. 638) (1. 850) (1. 170) (1. 180) (1. 797) 
Log(G1) 4.181*      
 (0.956)      
Log(G2)  4.513**     
  (0.921)     
Log(G3)   7.621**    
   (0.839)    
Log(G4)    6.806**   
    (0.887)   
Log(G5)     -4.557  
     (0.886)  
Log(G6)      5.503* 
      (0.953) 
sargan 165.48596 166.5270 168.9306 170.72275 168.59732 169.10407 
AR2-p Value .2696833 .2667295 .25331787 .25700299 .26083871 .2596185 
AR1-p Value .23076397 .2047918 .21083427 .26090361 .23084908 .20482335 
Obs. 456 456 456 456 456 456 
No.id 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Note: 
∆yi,t−1
yi,t−1⁄ : lagged GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑙𝑜𝑔yi,t−1 : lagged GDP per 
capita,  log(HC): secondary school enrolment ratio, CF: gross capital formation, 
R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of scientific journals, KOF: 
Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government Effectiveness, 
G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule 
of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results for AR1 and AR2 show that 
there is no first and second serial correlation in the residuals which also give 
validity to the model.   The Sargan statistics tests the null hypothesis of correct 
model specification and validity of instruments. As the results show we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are valid. Time 
dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
  
140 
Table 7-16 Testing β convergence in terms of GDP in low-income countries, Using dynamic system 
GMM. 
Equations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  
0.224 0.191 0.211 0.213 0.203 0.198 
 (0.264) (0.268) (0.263) (0.267) (0.268) (0.262) 
log𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
-0.0289*** -
0.0283**
* 
-0.0295*** -0.0323*** -0.0277*** -0.0302*** 
 (0.102) (0.960) (0.093) (0.007) 0.909) (0.072) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 3.415*** 2.338** 3.217*** 2.520*** 2.629*** 2.620*** 
 (2.078) (1.727) (1.716) (2.045) (1.758) (1.576) 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 3.0530** 3.750*** 3.0313*** 3.529*** 3.202** 3.357** 
 (2.051) (2.287) (2.082) (2.432) (2.118) (2.106) 
Log(FDI) 1.592 2.021 0.899* 1.216 0.165 1.433 
 (6.826) (6.148) (0.871) (6.053) (0.088) (5.893) 
log (journal) 0.635 -0.293 0.522 0.326* 0.416 0.441 
 (0.912) (0.984) (0.974) (1.139) (0.986) (0.915) 
Log(R&D) 0.734 -1.284 -0.413 0.00503 -0.411 1.146 
 (4.570) (4.740) (0.860) (0.008) (0.702) (4.640) 
Log(KOF) 0.0726 0.0314 0.0494 0.0721 0.0185 0.0477 
 (0.0693) (0.0621) (0.0743) (0.0677) (0.0468) (0.0674) 
Log(G1) -0.575      
 (0.555)      
Log(G2)  3.885     
  (5.268)     
Log(G3)   -0.229    
   (0.521)    
Log(G4)    -0.993   
    (0.670)   
Log(G5)     1.349  
     (3.206)  
Log(G6)      -1.204 
      (2.014) 
sargan 22.370168 20.42315 22.151908 21.017792 21.099152 21.690762 
AR2-p Value .15293232 .1887076 .13746631 .29462389 .18951612 .277408 
AR1-p Value .43416257 .4610631 .41256745 .24585619 .33327424 .11344095 
Obs. 198 198 198 198 198 198 
No.id 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: 
∆yi,t−1
yi,t−1⁄ : lagged GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑙𝑜𝑔yi,t−1 : lagged GDP per 
capita,  log(HC): secondary school enrolment ratio, CF: gross capital formation, 
R&D: research intensity, Journal: number of scientific journals, KOF: 
Globalization indicator, G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government Effectiveness, 
G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule 
of Law, G6: Voice and Accountability. The results for AR1 and AR2 show that 
there is no first and second serial correlation in the residuals which also give 
validity to the model.   The Sargan statistics tests the null hypothesis of correct 
model specification and validity of instruments. As the results show we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, which shows that the instruments are valid. Time 
dummies are also included, which is not reported here.  
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As can be seen, we have six equations estimated in each table and in each equation 
a different governance indicator is entered to be tested. First, we analyse the speed of 
convergence in each group separately. Table 7-17 shows the implied speed of 
convergence, which is calculated like before: 
Table 7-17 Speed of Convergence in New Growth model, 1996-2010 
Countries Eq 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Whole 
sample 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-
0.00828*
** 
-
0.00772*
** 
-
0.00702*
** 
-
0.00741*
** 
-
0.00623*
** 
-
0.00725*
** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 0.000554 0.000517 0.00047 0.000496 
0.000416
6 
0.000485
1 
High-
income 
  
Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-0.45 -0.488 -0.55 -1 -0.474 -0.46 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence  
0.039856 
0.044628
7 
0.053234 …… 0.04283 
0.041079
1 
Middle
-
income 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-
0.648*** 
-
0.723*** 
-
0.762*** 
-0.68*** 
-
0.848*** 
-0.732** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 
0.069608
3 
0.085582
5 
0.095699 0.075962 
0.125591
7 
0.087784
6 
Low-
income 
 Initial GDP per 
capita coefficient 
-
0.0289*** 
-
0.0283*** 
-
0.0295*** 
-
0.0323*** 
-
0.0277*** 
-
0.0302*** 
 𝜆  =Speed of 
convergence 
0.00195 0.00191 0.00199 0.00218 0.00187 0.00204 
Note: the first row of each group reports the coefficient of initial GDP per capita in each equation 
separately. The second row shows the speed of convergence related to each equation. 
For the whole sample, as well as the split samples we can see that the 
convergence is similar to the neoclassical growth model. The coefficient of initial GDP 
per capita is negative, meaning that countries far from the steady state growth path can 
grow faster. It is interesting when we compare the result with the NCGM. As can be 
seen, for high-income countries, on average, almost 4% of the gap between the initial 
level of GDP per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year, which is 
higher than the result of the NCGM, which was 3%.  
For middle-income countries, on average, almost 9% of the gap between the 
initial level of GDP per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year. Again 
the results of NGM show the faster convergence compared to NCGM, which was 8%.   
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Finally, for low-income countries less than 1% of the gap between the initial 
level of GDP per capita and the repetitive steady state vanishes in one year. This result 
is slower than the NCG model, which was 1%.   
To sum up, comparing the results of NGM with NCGM, the rate of convergence 
for both high-income and middle-income countries is higher in the new growth model 
than the neoclassical growth model. However, for the low-income countries it is slower. 
Our explanation for this result is that since the middle-income and high-income 
countries have the capacity to take advantage of the technology of the frontiers, the 
explanatory variables that were added to the model to determine the steady state of 
growth path across these countries are effective on GDP growth, and, hence, accelerate 
the convergence process. This is consistent with the notion of the new growth theory in 
which technological change is the main source of growth. As discussed before in this 
study, the explanatory variables, in new growth regression, are components of 
productivity growth and through the channel of technology they affect GDP growth, so 
we can see that through this channel they are more effective on GDP growth across 
those countries that are developed or in the later stages of development. The set of 
results for low-income countries is another proof of this, since these countries are 
undeveloped or in the early stages of development these factors through the channel of 
technology are not effective on them. Therefore, the NCG model is the model that 
should apply for these countries with this level of income. In other words we can say 
that selecting which growth model should be applied for countries is monotonic to their 
income level, whether capital deepening models or technological catching up models. In 
other words, an income threshold may need to be reached before countries can take 
advantage of technological change.  Countries below that threshold are caught in a 
poverty trap from which it takes a long time to escape.  
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7.3.1.1 Determinants of Growth in the New Growth Model  
Tables (7-8),(7-9), (7-10) and (7-11) also report the effects of investing in 
human capital, physical capital, globalization indicators, FDI and KOF index, 
institutions factor, R&D intensity and number of scientific journals on economic growth 
across these groups of countries. Once again, it is necessary to emphasize the 
differences between this model and the NCGM. In the NGM all these factors except 
physical capital, affect technology, and, through the channel of technology, they affect 
economic growth, while in the NCGM, innovation, globalization and institutions are the 
factors that facilitate human capital accumulation in the process of growth. 
If we take a look at the signs and significance of the variables in the new growth 
regression in the middle-income and high-income countries it is clear that they are 
stronger and more effective than in the NCG regression.   
As can be seen, the sign of secondary school enrolment ratio is negative and not 
significant in most of the equations across high-income countries. Secondary education, 
while an important building block, cannot capture this skill level, given that it would be 
universal in all high-income countries. The sign of secondary school enrolment ratio is 
positive but not significant across middle-income countries as well. However, the sign is 
positive and significant in low-income countries and very significant. This means that 
by investing more in their secondary education level, low-income countries can speed 
their economic growth.  
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Table 7-18 The results of secondary school enrolments ratio in the NG model 
Model 
Variable 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
NGM 𝑙𝑛𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 0.06*** -15.91 3.41*** 0.93 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table. NGM: New growth model. 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡: 
Secondary school enrolments ratio 
The sign of investing in physical capital is positive and significant in all groups 
and more effective on growth across low-income countries.  
Table 7-19 The results of investment on physical capital in both models 
Model 
Variable 
Whole 
sample 
High-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
NGM 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 0.133*** 0.52*** 3.05** 0.31* 
NCGM 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 6.118*** 4.070*** 6.076*** 5.335*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table. NGM: New growth model. 𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 : 
gross capital formation 
As table 7-19 shows, comparing the results of the NG model with the NCG 
model shows that physical capital accumulation is more effective when applying the 
NCG model for all groups.   
The signs of R&D intensity are positive and not significant for the whole 
sample. The results are the same for the number of scientific journals. However, when 
we eliminate low-income and middle-income countries from the sample it becomes 
positive and significant across high-income countries, which means that investing more 
in R&D activities has a positive effect on the productivity growth. This is in line with 
most of the research done in this field. The sign of number of scientific journals is also 
positive and significant, although it is less effective than investing in the R&D sector.  
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Table 7-20 The results of R&D intensity and Number of scientific Journals in both models 
 
Whole sample High-income Low-income Middle-income 
NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG 
R&D 3.88*** 4.32*** 5.50** 6.04*** 0.01* 0.73 4.96*** 5.23** 
No.Jour
nals 
-0.01** 0.001*** 0.538*** 1.07*** -0.0002 0.63 0.95** 1.01*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table.  NG: New growth model. NCG: 
Neoclassical growth model. 
The results of R&D intensity are also positive and significant for middle-income 
countries, which mean that by considering technology transfer they can take advantage 
from the output of R&D activities. Comparing the results of R&D intensity with the 
NCG model shows that R&D intensity is more effective on growth in the NG model 
than in the NCG model. The sign of number of scientific journals is positive and 
significant in this group. 
For low-income countries, as can be seen, the signs of R&D intensity and 
number of scientific journals are positive but not significant in most equations. We have 
the same explanation as for the neoclassical growth theory: investing more in R&D 
activities is not working since they do not have an adequate level of human capital or 
sufficient highly skilled workers to take advantage of the outcomes of R&D activities. 
For high-income countries, the effect of the KOF index is positive and 
significant and more effective than the NCG model. This means that globalization can 
increase economic growth across countries with a high level of income. The sign of FDI 
is also positive and significant in this group but less effective than the KOF index. 
Again this could be a good sign that this new KOF index is a better proxy for measuring 
globalization, as it not only measures the flow of goods, but also the flow of technology 
and knowledge by considering the infrastructures, such as Internet users and telephone 
lines. 
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Table 7-21 The results of the KOF index and FDI in both models 
 
Whole sample High-income Low-income Middle-income 
NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG 
KOF 4.27*** 1.31*** 3.1*** 4.60** 9.03*** 0.072 7.19*** 9.23*** 
FDI 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.97*** 1.72*** 0.07** 1.59 0.02** 3.59*** 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. For the second model, since the results of all 6 equations 
were familiar, we just put the results of the first equation in this table.  NG: New growth model. NCG: 
Neoclassical growth model. 
For middle-income countries the results for both variables are the same, and 
these countries can also take advantage of international technology spillovers through 
globalization since they have a high enough level of human capital in their countries. 
Again the results are more effective than the NCG model.  
The story is different for low-income countries. Neither the KOF index nor the 
FDI has a significant effect on economic growth in this model. However, as can be seen, 
the results were significant for the NCG model. One explanation for this might be that 
since we apply these variables in NGM through the channel of technology, and as 
components of technology regression, they are not effective in countries with a low 
level of income or those countries that are not yet developed.  This leads to the 
interpretation that the application of each class of growth model is dependent on the 
level of development. For example, in high-income countries where there is a sufficient 
level of human capital, technology spillovers through globalization and innovation are 
effective, whereas, when considering low-income countries with underdeveloped 
economies, these factors are no longer effective.  
Governance indicators have a positive and significant effect on economic growth 
across high-income countries, and, as can be seen, they are more effective than the NCG 
model. For middle-income countries, except for the rule of law, the other governance 
indicators have a positive and significant effect on economic growth and are more 
effective than the NCG model on GDP growth.  For low-income countries, none of the 
governance indicators are significant. 
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Table 7-22 The results of Governance indicators in both models 
 
Whole sample High-income Low-income Middle-income 
NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG NCG NG 
G1 2.98*** 3.21*** 2.56** 2.38*** -0.35* -0.57 8.32*** 4.18* 
G2 2.17*** 2.50*** 3.68*** 4.364*** 3.60 3.88 5.56*** 4.513** 
G3 2.01*** 1.87*** 3.390*** 4.27*** 3.05* -0.29 2.97*** 7.62** 
G4 2.11*** 2.04*** 6.015*** 7.77*** 2.72 -0.99 7.96*** 6.80** 
G5 -0.210 -0.44*** 3.87** 3.26* -0.37 1.34 5.34*** -4.55 
G6 1.56*** 2.097*** 1.62 1.502*** 1.07 -1.20 5.45*** 5.50* 
Note: This table is derived from previous tables. G1: Control of corruption, G2: Government 
Effectiveness, G3: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, G4: Regulatory Quality, G5: Rule of Law, 
G6: Voice and Accountability. 
To sum up, the results obtained are two-fold. First, the explanation of the powers 
of the explanatory variables is only stronger in the new growth theory for the middle-
income and high-income countries but not in the low-income countries. Second, we 
cannot apply this new growth theory to different countries with different levels of 
income. Actually this result is very interesting, because it demonstrates that the 
argument concerning which class of model is valid is not the right argument. Each 
theory should be applied by policy makers according to the fundamentals and the level 
of development and income. 
 
7.3.2 φ Convergence 
To show how different dimensions of technology have evolved in past years, this 
study follows the standard analysis of testing convergence, unconditional β 
convergence, for innovation intensity, human capital, innovation, globalization and 
studies how their statistical distributions have evolved over the past thirteen years. In 
this research, we are following the traditional way of testing β convergence, meaning 
that countries that are far away from the frontiers should reduce their gap to the 
technological leader faster in terms of technological dynamics compared to industrial 
ones; we call it φ convergence.  We test the φ convergence for each dimension of 
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technology over the period 1996-2010 to see the new aspects that can affect the 
distribution of technological activities in the world (Castellacci, 2011): 
1- Governance indicators (6 indicators for institutions)  
2- KOF index and FDI index (proxy of Globalization) 
3- R&D intensity and number of scientific journals (proxy for innovation) 
4- Secondary school enrolment (proxy for human capital) 
Using exactly the same method that is used by R. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for 
testing the β convergence, the initial level of each variable is used as the only regressor 
and the annual growth rate of each dimension is the dependent variable.  
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝜑1𝐴𝑖,0 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                     (7-2)  
Where 
∆𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑖
⁄  is the growth rate for each technology dimension of country i 
over the period 1996-2010, and 𝐴𝑖,0 is the the log of its initial level at the beginning of 
the period. 𝜑1shows the speed of convergence for each dimension of technology. Table 
7-23 shows the results. 
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Table 7-23: φ convergence in terms of technology dimensions, 1996-2010 
φ 
convergence 
High-income Middle-income Low-income 
Coefficient  Speed    Coefficient  Speed  Coefficient  Speed  
KOF index 
-0.7160601 0.096846 -0.8471365 0.144478 
-0.3062579 
0.028127 
FDI -0.6153078 
0.073486 
-0.8462477 
0.144032 
-0.5363397 
0.059123 
R&D -0.6386378 
0.078298 
-0.8561291 
0.149141 
+0.4651196 
------ 
Journals 
-0.7381398 0.103073 
-0.8561395 
0.149147 +0.4475 ------ 
School 
enrolment 
-0.2816667 0.025448 -0.4506667 0.046081 
-0.8281398 
0.135467 
Control of 
corruption 
-0.9257564 0.200031 
-0.7331524 
0.101621 -0.3806667 0.036855 
Political 
stability and 
absence of 
Violence 
0.9901717 
0.355576 
-0.7844689 
0.11805 -0.4311259 0.043392 
Governance 
effectiveness 
-0.7247285 
0.099231 
-0.7281398 
0.10019 -0.4989098 0.053151 
Rule of law -0.9285564 
0.202988 
-0.7405206 
0.103775 -0.4456236 0.045378 
Regulatory 
quality 
-0.7323578 
0.101393 
-0.6825628 
0.088267 -0.694108 0.091117 
Voice and 
accountability  
-0.8086918 
0.127221 
-0.8833463 
0.165273 -0.7741196 0.114442 
Note: The first column of each group reports the coefficient estimated from OLS regression and the 
second columns reports the speed of convergence.  
The first column of each group reports the φ-coefficients, in which, in all the 
regressions, it turns out to be negative. This means φ-convergence is happening in terms 
of technology in these groups of countries.  Of course, the speed of convergence among 
them is different.  The speed of convergence is particularly rapid for governance 
indicators in high-income countries (on average 18%) and it is 11% for middle-income 
countries. However, on average, it is 6% for low-income countries. For human capital 
the story is different, the speed of convergence is particularly rapid in low-income 
countries at 13% and it is quiet low for high-income and middle-income countries, 2% 
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and 4%, respectively. This is consistent with the idea of M. R. Islam (2010) who said 
that “advanced countries are more likely to engage in innovating new technologies 
which required highly skilled human capital”. Furthermore, for globalization indicators, 
which, in this study, are KOF index and foreign direct investment (FDI), the speed of 
convergence is highest for middle-income countries on average 14% and 8% for high-
income countries while it is 4% for low-income countries. For innovation activities it 
also has the highest rate for middle-income, which, on average, is 14% and 8% for high-
income. However, the interesting thing is that the sign of innovation activities 
coefficient is positive for low-income countries, which means that across low-income 
countries there is no convergence in terms of innovation. This suggests that those 
countries that are very far from technology leaders are increasing the disparity in terms 
of innovation. This is a very significant result. 
We can conclude that since the middle-income countries that are further away 
from the technology leaders have an adequate level of human capital they can take 
advantage of being more globalized and also invest more in their R&D activities, which 
will increase their productivity more than the others.  However, as P Aghion and P 
Howitt (2006) argued in their paper, just being further away from the technology leader 
is not the only criterion to grow faster. The results here are another proof of this 
statement. As we can see in the low-income countries, although they are further away 
from the technology leaders compared to the middle-income countries, since they do not 
have an adequate level of human capital or the skill to take advantage from the imported 
technology, being more globalized and investing more in R&D activities is less 
effective for them.   
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7.4 Middle-income Trap: More Testing on Convergence 
Understanding how countries go through the economic development sequence is 
the unending quest of development economists. Most often, the sequence is from low-
income to middle-income and, ideally, to high-income. In some cases, however, 
countries get stuck in the low- or middle-income groups for a long period of time and do 
not move up. For the low-income countries we see empirically that these countries 
trapped in the poverty and cannot catch up to the upper stage.  We discussed the reason 
behind this “poverty trap” in previous sections by testing convergence hypothesis and 
studying the effects of institutions and globalization and creation in these countries. 
However, the empirical evidence shows that some countries that moved from low-
income to middle-income over two decades were still trapped and could not cross the 
border to the high-income level (Gill and Kharas, 2007). Economists like Spence 
(2011), in his book, claim that this is the “middle-income transition”. He said that 
middle-income transition is the situation when “that part of the growth process that 
occurs when a country’s per capita income gets into the range of $5,000 to $10,000” 
(Spence 2011, 100). 
To study this middle-income trap, we are going to study the trend of growth in the 
sample of this study and see how many of the countries in middle-income group of this 
study have been trapped in this level of income for years and how many of them move 
to the high-income level.  
As we described earlier, this study used the World Bank classification for 
grouping countries, which is based on the GNI Atlas method.  
The most recent World Bank classification with data for 2012 is as follows: a 
country is low-income if its gross national income (GNI) per capita is $1,025 or less; 
lower middle-income if its GNI per capita lies between $1,026 and $4,035; upper 
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middle-income if its GNI per capita lies between $4,036 and $12,475; and high-income 
if its GNI per capita is $12,476 or above. Under this classification, 35 out of the 174 
countries in the sample were considered low-income in 2012, 63 lower middle-income, 
44 upper middle-income, and 31 high-income (see Appendix Table 1a and 1b). 
Figure 7-1 Distribution of countries by level of income 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; World Bank 
Figure 7-1 shows that the number of low-income countries decreased from 108 
countries in 1985 to 35 countries in 2010. The largest decline in the number of low-
income countries was during 2005 and 2010. Where 25 out of 26 of them moved to the 
lower middle-income group and 1 of them moved to the upper middle-income group 
(China). These countries could escape from the poverty trap and converge with the 
middle-income countries. However, the other 35 countries have remained in the poverty 
trap since 1985 and could not even move to the lower middle-income level. 
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Table 7-24 countries that have always been in the low-income group between 1985 and 2010 
Afghanistan Liberia Gambia, The 
Bangladesh Madagascar Guinea 
Benin Malawi Guinea-Bissau 
Burkina Faso Mali Haiti 
Burundi Mauritania Kenya 
Cambodia Mozambique Tanzania 
Central African Republic Nepal Togo 
Chad Niger Uganda 
Comoros Rwanda Kyrgyz Republic 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Sierra Leone Zimbabwe 
Eritrea Somalia  
Ethiopia Tajikistan  
 
The more interesting thing concerns the countries that escaped from the middle-income 
trap since 1985.   
In 1985, there were only 4 countries in the high-income group, but, after five 
years, 11 countries escaped from the middle-income trap, and, by 1995, there were 21 
countries in this group. However, for nearly ten years, until 2005, no countries could 
escape from the middle-income trap when 5 countries – Greece, Ireland, Korea Rep., 
Portugal and Slovenia – caught up with the high-income countries. Between 2005 and 
2010 another 5 countries escaped from the middle-income trap – the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia, Poland and the Slovak Republic.  This is consistent with the results 
of testing β convergence, where convergence happened across the middle-income 
group. Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that some countries remained in the middle-
income group, but, as the results of convergence show, they will move to the upper 
stage in approximately nine years. 
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7.5 Summary of Statistical Results 
7.5.1 Convergence in each Class of Model 
One of the hypotheses in this study is testing the convergence speed in GDP per 
capita for low-income, middle-income and high-income countries where poorer 
countries, according to the convergence hypothesis, should grow faster than the richer 
ones. In this study, we test the convergence hypothesis in the neoclassical growth 
model, capital deepening model, and also the new growth model and technology based 
models. The results show that the speed of GDP convergence is faster in the middle-
income countries than the high-income countries in all models. This is widely known.  
However, it is the slowest across the low-income countries in the NCGM and there is no 
convergence in the NGM, which does not support the idea of convergence. Therefore, 
according to these results we can conclude that income convergence is not monotonic to 
income.  An income threshold may need to be reached before low-income countries can 
benefit from policies like investing more in the R&D sector. The signs and significance 
of the explanatory variables is proof of this claim. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
also shows the existence of a poverty trap. The results of section 7-4, for the study of 
the middle-income trap are another proof for this. The results show that the 30 countries 
in the low-income group have been in this group since 1985, according to our time 
panel, and could not escape from the poverty trap. Therefore, a minimum level of 
institutional capacity and human capital depth is required to accelerate the growth and 
convergence in this group to accelerate their growth rate and move to the upper stage 
(Hypothesis 2). 
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7.5.2 Impact of Globalization on Economic Growth and Convergence 
The other hypothesis of this research is testing the impact of globalization on 
economic growth of the sample in both theories. In the growth literature, a large 
proportion of articles concern the effect of opening up the borders of countries and 
reducing the tariff rates to increase the international trade across countries. This still 
remains a debate up until now. As we discussed, some economists believe that 
globalization is a malignant force that only helps developed countries to take advantage 
of this openness (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001; Slaughter, 1997). However, other groups 
believe that globalization can also help developing and undeveloped countries to catch 
the rich ones and accelerate their growth rate (David   Dollar & Kraay, 2001; Geoffrey 
Garrett, 2000; Greenaway & Torstensson, 1997). 
In this research, the KOF index and FDI were chosen as proxies for 
globalization. In the new growth literature, globalization is not only about the trade of 
goods but also about the transferring of technology across countries through 
communication and infrastructure. Consequently, the KOF index was chosen, which 
covers two other aspects besides the economic aspect: political and social. The results of 
this study show that globalization affects the growth of the middle-income and high-
income countries in both models irrespective of whether the focus is on capital 
accumulation (NCGM) or technological change (NGM). Furthermore, this impact is 
more effective on middle-income, which supports the faster rate for convergence across 
middle-income than high-income countries. However, in respect of low-income 
countries globalization is only effective on the growth through the channel of capital 
accumulation but not technology. 
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7.5.3 Impact of Institutions on Economic Growth and Convergence 
The other hypothesis of this research is testing the impact of institutions on the 
economic growth of the sample in both theories. Economists, like R. Nelson (2007), 
believed that having proper institutions leads to promote growth. This is supported by 
many other economists who, recently, have argued that building strong institutions can 
positively affect growth in countries. However, measuring a good proxy for institutions 
has always been a debatable issue in literature, especially in recent years where the 
place of institutions has become important for growth. In this research we choose 
governance indicators as a proxy for institutions since these factors cover six different 
dimensions that are very important to analyse the effects of institutions in economies. 
Furthermore, the results of this research do not support the idea of having strong 
institutions that can promote growth in all countries. According to the results, 
institutions only affect growth across middle-income countries and high-income 
countries that are above the income threshold, but not for low-income countries in both 
models. Even the effect of controlling corruption is negative and significant in low-
income countries, which means that if the government does not control the corruption in 
this group not only they cannot cease the growth but also they promote growth in these 
economies. This is further support for the existence of an income threshold (Hypothesis 
5). This last point also shows that the level of development is an important context for 
any discussion of the relationship between institutions, technology catch-up and 
economic growth. 
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7.5.4 Testing the φ convergence 
The other hypothesis of this research is to test how different dimensions of 
technology have evolved in recent years (φ convergence). This study follows the 
standard analysis of testing convergence, unconditional β convergence, for innovation 
intensity, human capital, innovation, globalization and studies how their statistical 
distributions have evolved over the past thirteen years. We call it φ convergence in this 
study. The results show that the gap that already exists between these groups of 
countries can be explained by the technological differences amongst them. The results 
again highlight the income threshold and the fact that countries can take advantage of 
those dimensions of technology that are appropriate to their income level and also the 
level of development. The results also emphasize the importance of creating and 
adopting technology across middle-income countries through investing more in the 
R&D sector and also through being more globalized to take advantage of the technology 
transfer through the Internet and foreign investment.  Being more globalized, these two, 
together with innovation, are the fastest drivers of technology advance in middle-
income countries. However, for low-income countries, capital accumulation and 
secondary schooling are the most important drivers. The results suggest that if low-
income countries want to close the gap on the other groups they have to increase the 
level of investment and human skills. In referring to human skill the results show that at 
the later stages of development, secondary education becomes less important in 
explaining the differences in growth while in low-income countries the secondary 
enrolment factor has the largest effect on productivity growth (Hypothesis 3). This is 
also consistent with the previous results.  
To sum up, the results for testing φ convergence show that low-income countries 
are not that successful in closing the gap separating them from middle-income and high-
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income countries in terms of innovation and institutions and globalization. However, 
these factors are important for those developed and developing countries since they 
contribute to the absorptive capacity as well as the innovative capability. This pattern of 
convergence is not only important because of its effect on income but also because these 
factors are important in terms of human welfare, and, hence, are important for 
policymakers.  
The important policy implications according to the results of our analysis is that 
countries for closing the gap with other groups should implement policies that are 
appropriate with their level of development and not just follow the pattern of developed 
countries or developing ones.  
 
7.5.5 Validity of Growth Models: Neoclassical or New Growth Models 
One of the hypotheses of this research concerns which growth model can explain 
the differences in growth rate across the countries of the sample. However, the results of 
both growth theories, NCGM and NGM, show that even considering all the variables, 
what is important in both models is just the income level. This is the wrong argument.  
It should be that the factors that explain growth or convergence differ between lower 
and middle-income countries.  For low-income countries, it is physical capital, whereas, 
for middle-income countries, it is R&D intensity, globalization and human capital.  
Therefore, the debate over which model is appropriate is not that meaningful without 
reference to a country’s level of income.  
We can conclude that for implementing policies in an economy, policymakers 
should first consider the stage of development in the country, and then decide which 
system to follow. The empirical results of this study are proof of this claim, since the 
results show that for low-income countries, despite much criticism, the NCGM still 
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remains relevant. This means that for low-income countries, which are at the initial 
level of development, focusing on policies that can increase the investment rate could be 
effective on output. However, since they do not have a foundation for creation and 
innovation technology, implementing policies like investing in the R&D sector is not 
worthwhile (Hypothesis one). Furthermore, these countries can implement policies that 
improve the relations with other countries to benefit from foreign investment and the 
flow of ideas from those countries. The positive and significant sign of the KOF index 
and FDI supports this idea.  
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8 Chapter 8 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
8.1 Overview 
This research is an empirical analysis that tests the convergence rate across three 
groups of countries classified based on their income according to the World Bank 
method by focusing on two growth models: neoclassical growth model and new growth 
model.  The basic question in the convergence debate is whether poorer countries are 
converging with the richer ones, and, in the case of this research, if yes, which growth 
model can better explain the economic growth across the sample of countries over time 
and across countries. The other important aspect of this research is the argument 
concerning this issue in that some economists believe that testing convergence 
hypothesis besides estimating the speed of convergence across countries, gives validity 
to growth models. Therefore, another important question in this research is whether 
testing convergence is a good criterion to give validity to each class of model. Besides 
these two aspects, another concern of this study is about growth determinants. Studying 
the factors that explain economic growth across countries is always a debatable issue 
amongst economists. However, empirical studies in this area largely ignore the 
importance of institutions and globalization. Therefore, this study investigates the role 
of institutions and globalization on economic growth of the sample countries and also 
the process of convergence. 
In the Solow model, NCGM, capital accumulations play an important role in 
explaining the different growth rates across countries. First, Solow (1956) focused on 
physical capital accumulation and after that G. Mankiw et al. (1992) talked about 
human capital accumulation. These models predict conditional convergence across 
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countries, which are not at their steady state level of income. Growth relates negatively 
to the initial level of income, so poor countries can grow faster than rich ones.  
Although in the new growth theory, in the latest models, convergence happens 
across countries, which is against P. M. Romer (1990) argument that countries can grow 
in the long-run, and, therefore, there is no convergence across countries. However, in 
these versions of the endogenous models they assumed that there is an increasing 
complexity of new innovation, and, therefore, they accept the existence of convergence 
across countries. Nevertheless, there is a big disagreement between these two schools of 
thought on the sources of growth: whether technological changes are the most important 
sources of growth or formation of capital.  
Both theories try to explain the difference across countries and the convergence 
process by focusing on capital accumulation and technological change, respectively. 
However, as mentioned before, empirical studies in this area largely ignore the 
importance of institutions and globalization and technology transfer. Therefore, in this 
research we tried to reopen the debate of convergence according to these shortcomings 
in empirical studies and by applying the generalized method of moments, re-estimated 
the models across three different groups of countries that are classified by their level of 
income according to the world classification method. 
 
8.2 Research Findings: Rate of Convergence in Neoclassical and New 
Growth Theory  
Testing the convergence in the first augmented Solow-Swan model, where the 
accumulation of physical capital and human capital are considered as controlling 
variables for the steady state, show that this theory is supported by middle-income 
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countries, meaning that they can grow faster than high-income countries. According to 
the theory it should be the same for low-income countries, however, the results of the 
convergence rate did not support this idea. There was no convergence in low-income 
countries according to this model. This result shows that just considering human and 
physical capital accumulation is not enough for countries with a low level of income to 
experience the fast growth rate and that other variables should be added to the model.  
Therefore, other variables were added to the model to see how the convergence 
rate changes across these groups according to these determinants of growth. Institutions 
and globalization and innovation factors were added to the model through the human 
capital accumulation channel as controlling variables, which facilitate and accelerate the 
rate of human capital accumulation.   
Table 8-1 Comparison of Convergence Rate Across Sample Groups Between NCG and NG Models 
Groups First NCG Model Second NCG Model NG Model 
Whole sample Less than 1% Less than 1% Less than 1% 
High-income Less than 1% 3% 4% 
Middle-income 5% 8% 9% 
Low-income No convergence 1% Less than 1% 
 
Comparing the results of the second model with the first model shows that 
convergence also appears in low-income countries based on the second model, albeit it 
is very slow. In addition, for high-income countries it becomes 3 percentage points, 
which is faster compared to the first model, while for middle-income countries the rate 
also becomes faster than the first model. One explanation for these results is that adding 
these controlling variables as facilitators of human capital accumulation is effective on 
growth, and, also, controlling for these variables has a positive effect on the growth rate 
164 
of these countries. The other explanation for what happens to low-income countries, 
which does not support the idea of convergence, is that an income threshold may need 
to be reached before convergence occurs in this group.  Countries below that threshold 
are caught in a poverty trap from which it takes a long time to escape. 
The results for the new growth model are more interesting. As table 8-1 shows, 
the results are promising for middle-income and high-income countries, although the 
rate for middle-income countries is still faster than for high-income countries, compared 
to the neoclassical growth the results for the rate become faster. However, the rate 
declines across low-income countries from 1 percentage point according to the NCG 
model to less than 1 by applying NG regression. One explanation for these results is 
that, in countries that are already above the income threshold or at the later stages of 
development, technological changes can have a stronger effect compared to countries 
that do not have the fundamentals and have not yet reached the income threshold. We 
can see that when we apply the new growth regression, where technological change is 
the main source of growth and where the globalization, innovation and institutions are 
components of knowledge growth, the rate of convergence becomes faster than when 
applying the NCG model. However, as the results show, this is not true for low-income 
countries. In low-income countries, where the income threshold is not reached, the main 
source of growth is still capital accumulation. The results of the growth determinants 
provide further evidence for this conclusion. The effects of physical capital in the NCG 
model are three times as large as in the NG model.  In the other words, we can say that 
income convergence is not monotonic to the income level of countries, and that the 
income threshold may need to be reached before countries can take advantage of the 
technological change and so speed up the rate of convergence. In other words, we can 
say that applying which growth theory is appropriate is monotonic to income level or 
level of developments. The new growth regression can be applied in countries that are 
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developed or in the process of development, but not for those countries with a low level 
of income. For low-income countries or undeveloped countries the neoclassical growth 
theory that is based on capital accumulation should be applied. In other words, 
governments should implement policies that increase the investment rate. 
The other part of the results explains the sources of difference across countries. 
In the above discussion we conclude that the rate of convergence, when applying new 
growth regression, is faster in middle-income and high-income countries, and we relate 
it to the nature of new growth theory in which the main source of growth is 
technological change. The results of the determinants of growth support this idea. This 
means that if we take a look at the signs and significances of the variables in the new 
growth regression for middle-income and high-income countries it is clear that they are 
stronger and more effective than the NCG regression.  For example, when we compare 
the results of neoclassical growth regression with new growth regression in high-income 
countries, it can be seen that research intensity is more productive in new growth 
regression than in the neoclassical growth regression. This is also true for globalization 
indicators and governance indicators. Comparing the results for middle-income 
countries provides the same conclusion; the productivity of the variables is more when 
we apply the new growth theory. We can say that the effectiveness of variables is 
deeply related to the level of their development, and, therefore, level of income. 
However, what about low-income countries? 
For low-income countries that are not developed or in the initial stages of 
development, the interpretation of the results is a little different. As the results show, 
physical and human capital formation is effective and significant on growth in both 
classes of model, especially in the NCG model. However, for the other explanatory 
variables we can see that when applying the NG model, none of the explanatory 
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variables are significant. When applying the NCG model, the most effective variable 
amongst others are the globalization indicators, which remain significant and positive. 
One explanation for this is that globalization, innovation and institutions have no 
immediate/direct impact when applying the new growth theory in which these variables 
are considered as sources for technological change. However, among them, 
globalization may work and remain important in the neoclassical growth model.  This is 
consistent with economists like Charles Jones (1998) who argued that although creation 
and innovation are not happening in all countries, we can see that some countries can 
still grow; being globalized and opening up the borders not only brings foreign 
investment to these countries but also brings technology. Therefore, we can see that 
there is also growth in these classes of countries, although at a slower pace.  The results 
of this study provide further evidence for what he claimed. It is true that these countries 
do not have a sufficient level of human capital to take advantage of the output of R&D 
activities and creation, but by working on their political stability, which is positive and 
significant across them, they can provide a safe environment for foreign countries to 
invest in their country. Therefore, they can take advantage from technology spillovers 
and so increase their GDP growth rate. Furthermore, this is an interesting result because 
we can conclude that reaping the benefits of technology is not possible for low-income 
countries until they reach a certain income threshold. 
 
8.3 Contributions of the Study 
The primary contribution of this study to the literature is reconciling the 
neoclassical growth model based on the new aspects of growth like the effects of R&D, 
institutions and globalization. In the previous studies, researchers may take a look at 
these variables in the neoclassical growth model, but they only add them as controlling 
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variables to the model for controlling the steady state of the growth path in the 
economies. In contrast, this study adds them to the model as components of human 
capital accumulation, which facilitate and accelerate the accumulation of capital, rather 
than just simple independent variables.  
Second, this study also focused on the imitation and innovation as components of 
knowledge growth for examining the new growth theory rather than focusing on 
innovation based models.  Furthermore, for imitation, factors like institutions and 
globalization are considered as variables that can have a direct effect on the speed of 
technology transfer, and, therefore, affect the imitation rate, and, ultimately, economic 
growth.  
Third, the study provides an analysis of convergence from a political economic 
point of view. Most of the studies focused on the political view or economic points of 
view separately, while in this study we consider both of them to analyse economic 
growth and convergence. For doing that, this study incorporates variables like political 
stability, regulatory quality and other institutional factors as well as economic factors 
like FDI, initial GDP per capita, and school enrolment ratio as both groups of variables 
have an influential effect on economic growth.  
Finally, in this study we extended the analysis of economic growth and 
convergence to the year 2010 for all of the variables.  
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8.4 Limitations of the study 
One of the greatest limitations of this study is availability of the data for low-
income and middle-income countries. Despite the fact that the World Bank database 
provides an extensive source of data for almost any kind of world activity, data are not 
available for some of the low-income and lower middle-income countries. 
Another limitation of this research is the choice of proxies for institutional factors in 
economies. For measuring institutions, the governance indicators were the most 
comprehensive ones that could be found in databases, which have their own 
shortcomings.  
Furthermore, the same thing happened for globalization. For measuring 
Globalization, the KOF index was the only one that covers other dimensions of 
integration besides the economic aspects, which has its own shortcomings. However, it 
is the most comprehensive among the others.  
 
8.5 Policy Recommendations 
A number of policy recommendations can be made based on the findings of this 
research. First, government should not follow blindly the policies implemented in 
developed countries. The results of testing convergence in both classes of growth 
models reveals that countries that are at the initial level of development or those that are 
not developed yet should still follow capital deepening models that focus on increasing 
the saving rate, and, therefore, lead to an increase in the investment in the economy. 
Implementing policies that lead to more investment in the R&D sector to have more 
creation and innovation does not have an outcome in these countries, since they do not 
have the fundamentals like sufficient level of human capital and physical capital.  The 
169 
findings of this study suggest that governments should take the existence of the income 
threshold seriously. 
Second, more attention should be paid to how the globalization phenomenon can 
affect economic growth and convergence in countries, especially low-income countries. 
Although many aspects of this phenomenon are difficult to measure and can be 
considered as part of the unobserved variables, recently, Dreher (2003), by introducing 
the KOF index, provided a better measurement for globalization. The effect and impact 
of globalization could be greatly increased if policies are capable of improving low-
income countries’ globalization efficiency and work harder within the confines of the 
political system. The findings of this study show that low-income countries could not 
benefit from R&D outputs so investing in these activities may not confer immediate 
tangible benefits; however, implementing policies that increase the speed of technology 
transfer through globalization could make it possible for these undeveloped countries to 
improve their culture through the Internet and other infrastructure, so that step-by-step 
they can speed up the imitation rate and increase the productivity and economic growth 
in their countries. 
Third, building strong institutions is not an ideal policy for countries that do not 
have the fundamentals. The findings show that for low-income countries, having strong 
institutions can even have a negative effect on economic growth. For example, 
controlling corruption in low-income countries might even slow down the convergence 
rate. The explanation is very simple, for example, if in an undeveloped country the way 
to get driving licences illegally is very easy and is not costly, and there is no need for 
lots of paperwork, people in that economy are able to obtain them, and, so, the 
transportation of goods and services will become easier and cheaper and lead to 
economic growth(Heckelman & Powell, 2008; Mironov, 2005). However, this should 
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not continue in the system after reaching a certain level of development, because it 
could have a negative effect on growth.  
 
8.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
Studying economic growth and convergence is a very dynamic issue and many 
scholars have attempted to figure out the effects of different determinants on economic 
growth by applying different methods that could consider unobserved effects as well. In 
this study we applied the dynamic system GMM since we had little time and a large 
number of units. However, the one suggestion for further research is to extend the time 
series, by focusing on other determinants of growth for which the data are available and 
use Pooled Mean group estimators or Mean group estimators to gain more robust 
results. However, applying a long time series has its own difficulties, for example, for 
large T, Kevin Lee et al. (1997) estimators, like GMM fixed effect, instrumental 
variables can produce inconsistent and potentially misleading estimates of the average 
values of the parameters in the dynamic panel data model. Furthermore, when the 
pooling assumption does not hold, the panel is referred to as a heterogeneous panel 
(some of the parameters actually vary across the panel). Therefore, for solving the 
problem of heterogeneity bias K. Lee, M. H. Pesaran, and R. P. Smith (1997) suggest 
two other estimators – pooled mean group or mean group estimators. In the GMM 
estimator, since first difference is taken, the differences between countries are 
eliminated from the regression, while for long time period we consider these differences 
by applying pooled mean group or mean group estimators.  
The other suggestion for further research is testing the convergence hypothesis by 
examining multiple dependent variables that present different aspects of economics, 
such as labour productivity and investment per worker. The reason for this is that 
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economic growth is complex and the concern of countries is not only to increase their 
GDP per capita, but also productivity. Therefore, we suggest applying alternative 
factors, in addition to GDP per capita, for testing convergence among countries and 
making a comparison among them. 
Finally, further research can classify countries based on the distance to the leader, 
for example, US can be picked as a leader based on the greatest TFP that it has in 2012 
amongst countries, and then test the convergence hypothesis with other explanatory 
variables to see whether the results are the same as when we classify countries based on 
their income.  
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10 Appendix 
Table 1: KOF Index of Globalization by details (2012) 
 
 
 
 
A. 
Indices and Variables 
 
Economic Globalization 
Weighs 
 
[36%] 
 i) Actual Flows (50%) 
 Trade (percent of GDP) (21%) 
 Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of 
GDP) 
(28%) 
 Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (24%) 
 Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent 
of GDP) 
(27%) 
 ii) Restrictions (50%) 
 Hidden Import Barriers (24%) 
 Mean Tariff Rate (27%) 
 Taxes on International Trade (percent of current 
revenue) 
(26%) 
 Capital Account Restrictions (23%) 
 
B. 
 
Social Globalization 
i) Data on Personal Contact 
 
[37%] 
(34%) 
 Telephone Traffic (25%) 
 Transfers (percent of GDP) (4%) 
 International Tourism (26%) 
 Foreign Population (percent of total population) (21%) 
 International letters (per capita) (25%) 
  
ii) Data on Information Flows 
 
(35%) 
 Internet Users (per 1000 people) (33%) 
 Television (per 1000 people) (36%) 
 Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (32%) 
  
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity 
 
(31%) 
 Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (44%) 
 Number of Ikea (per capita) (45%) 
 Trade in books (percent of GDP) (11%) 
 
C. 
 
Political Globalization 
Embassies in Country 
 
[26%] 
(25%) 
 Membership in International Organizations (28%) 
 Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) 
 International Treaties (25%) 
 
Source: 
 
Dreher, Axel, 2006, Does Globalization Affect Growth? 
Empirical Evidence from a new Index, Applied Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110. 
 
Updated in: 
Dreher, Axel; Noel Gaston and Pim Martens, 2008, Measuring Globalization 
- Gauging its Consequence, New York: Springer. 
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Pairwise correlation coefficients for governance indicators from 1996 to 2010 in 
high income countries. 
 
           |       G1       G2       G3       G4       G5       G6 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
          G1 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
          G2 |   0.9236*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
          G3 |   0.4697*  0.4707*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          G4 |   0.7729*  0.7739*  0.3910*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          G5 |   0.9515*  0.9219*  0.5151*  0.7815*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          G6 |   0.8185*  0.8085*  0.6475*  0.7544*  0.8250*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
 
Pairwise correlation coefficients for governance indicators from 1996 to 2010 
in middle income countries. 
             |       g1       g2       g3       g4       g5       g6 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
          g1 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
          g2 |   0.8405*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
          g3 |   0.6650*  0.5699*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g4 |   0.6902*  0.8187*  0.4333*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g5 |   0.8669*  0.8448*  0.7410*  0.7176*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g6 |   0.6378*  0.6066*  0.5371*  0.6520*  0.6543*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
Pairwise correlation coefficients for governance indicators from 1996 to 2010 
in low income countries. 
             |       g1       g2       g3       g4       g5       g6 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
          g1 |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
          g2 |   0.6164*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
             | 
          g3 |   0.5219*  0.5614*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g4 |   0.4649*  0.7370*  0.5024*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g5 |   0.7468*  0.7878*  0.7013*  0.6575*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
             | 
          g6 |   0.4189*  0.5552*  0.6461*  0.6504*  0.5813*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
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Pairwise correlation coefficients for Globalization indicators from 1996 to 2010 in 
high income countries. 
 
             |      fdi      kof 
-------------+------------------ 
         fdi |   1.0000  
         kof |   0.0293   1.0000  
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World Governance Indicators (WGI) Aggregation Methodology: 
Each of six aggregate WGI measures is constructed by averaging together data 
from the underlying sources that correspond to the concept of governance being 
measured.  This is done in the three steps described below.  
STEP 1:  Assigning data from individual sources to the six aggregate 
indicators.  Individual questions from the underlying data sources are assigned to each 
of the six aggregate indicators.  For example, a firm survey question on the regulatory 
environment would be assigned to Regulatory Quality, or a measure of press freedom 
would be assigned to Voice and Accountability.  A full description of the individual 
variables used in the WGI and how they are assigned to the six aggregate indicators, can 
be found by clicking on the names of the six aggregate indicators listed above. Note that 
not all of the data sources cover all countries, and so the aggregate governance scores 
are based on different sets of underlying data for different countries.   
STEP 2:  Preliminary rescaling of the individual source data to run from 0 to 
1.  The questions from the individual data sources are first rescaled to range from 0 to 1, 
with higher values corresponding to better outcomes.  If, for example, a survey question 
asks for responses on a scale from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 4, we rescale a 
score of 2 as (2-min)/(max-min)=(2-1)/3=0.33.  When an individual data source 
provides more than one question relating to a particular dimension of governance, we 
average together the rescaled scores. The 0-1 rescaled data from the individual sources 
are available interactively through the WGI website here, in the country data sheets, and 
in the data files for each individual source. Although nominally in the same 0-1 units, 
this rescaled data is not necessarily comparable across sources.  For example, one data 
source might use a 0-10 scale but in practice most scores are clustered between 6 and 
10, while another data source might also use a 0-10 scale but have responses spread out 
184 
over the entire range.  While the max-min rescaling above does not correct for this 
source of non-comparability, the procedure used to construct the aggregate indicators 
does (see below). 
STEP 3:  Using an Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to construct a 
weighted average of the individual indicators for each source.  A statistical tool known 
as an Unobserved Components Model (UCM) is used to make the 0-1 rescaled data 
comparable across sources, and then to construct a weighted average of the data from 
each source for each country.  The UCM assumes that the observed data from each 
source are a linear function of the unobserved level of governance, plus an error 
term.  This linear function is different for different data sources, and so corrects for the 
remaining non-comparability of units of the rescaled data noted above.    
The resulting estimates of governance are a weighted average of the data from each 
source, with weights reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources.  Click 
here for the weights applied to the component indicators. 
The UCM assigns greater weight to data sources that tend to be more strongly 
correlated with each other.  While this weighting improves the statistical precision of 
the aggregate indicators, it typically does not affect very much the ranking of countries 
on the aggregate indicators.  The composite measures of governance generated by the 
UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation 
of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance. We also report the data in percentile rank term, ranging from 0 
(lowest rank) to 100 (highest rank).  
 
